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ABSTRACT	
 
In light of the growing need to establish a coherent relationship between the European Court 
of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union and the courts of the ECHR 
member states, this study explores the challenges of jurisdictional competition that undermine 
the credibility of the courts and weaken the effectiveness of judicial protection of fundamental 
rights in Europe, and suggests ways to reduce emerging judicial tensions between these 
courts. It examines how to avoid inconsistencies in judicial practices of the European and 
national courts, how to approach accession of the EU to the ECHR, and how to ensure 
effective functioning of the pilot judgment mechanism and national judicial review 
procedures. It concludes that in order to coordinate cooperation between the courts it is 
important to strengthen their interactions through adhering to best practices at all levels. To 
pursue deeper integration of states into the European and international community and 
minimise the chance of rendering contradicting judgments by the courts, member states are 
expected to comply faithfully with their obligations under EU law and the ECHR, and the 
European courts shall exclude the possibility of encroachment on state sovereignty. Only if 
mutually agreed solutions are adopted will a greater consistency in their case law be achieved 
and a uniform system of protection of human rights ensured. 
 
Keywords: European Convention on Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights, Court 
of Justice of the European Union, German Federal Constitutional Court, Russian 
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ZUSAMENFASSUNG	
 
Aufgrund des wachsenden Bedarfs an kohärenter Interaktion zwischen dem Europäischen 
Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, dem Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union und den Gerichten 
der EMRK-Mitgliedstaaten, untersucht diese Arbeit die Problematik von 
Kompetenzkonflikten, die die Glaubwürdigkeit der europäischen und nationalen Gerichtshöfe 
untergraben und die Effektivität des gerichtlichen Rechtsschutzes in Europa schwächen, und 
schlägt die Lösungen vor, um Rechtsprechungskonflikte zwischen den Gerichtshöfen zu 
verringern. Es erfolgt eine Betrachtung der Fragen, wie Inkonsistenzen der gerichtlichen 
Rechtsprechung der europäischen und nationalen Gerichte vermieden werden können, wie der 
Beitritt der EU zur EMRK angegangen werden kann und wie das Piloturteilsverfahren des 
EGMR und nationalen gerichtlichen Überprüfungsverfahren wirksam funktionieren kann. Die 
Arbeit kommt zu dem Schluss, dass es für die Koordination der Zusammenarbeit zwischen 
den Gerichten wichtig ist, ihre Interaktionen zu verstärken, indem bewährte Verfahren auf 
allen Ebenen ausgetauscht werden. Um eine tiefere Integration der Staaten in die europäische 
und internationale Gemeinschaft zu erreichen und das Risiko von sich widersprechenden 
gerichtlichen Entscheidungen zu reduzieren, wird von den Mitgliedstaaten erwartet, dass sie 
ihre Verpflichtungen aus dem EU-Recht und der EMRK verlässlich erfüllen, und die 
europäischen Gerichtshöfe werden ihrerseits die Möglichkeit eines Eingriffs in die 
Souveränität der Staaten ausschlieβen lassen. Nur wenn einvernehmlich beschlossene 
Lösungen angenommen werden, wird eine größere Kohärenz in Rechtsprechung der 
europäischen und nationalen Gerichtshöfe erreicht und ein einheitliches System zum Schutz 
der Menschenrechte gewährleistet. 
 
 
Schlagwörter: Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention, Europäischer Gerichtshof für 
Menschenrechte, Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
Verfassungsgericht der Russischen Föderation, EU-Beitritt zur EMRK, Ermessensspielraum, 
europäischer Konsens, gerichtliche Kooperation, Piloturteilsverfahren  
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INTRODUCTION	
 
‘The Council of Europe and the European Union were products of the same idea, the same 
spirit and the same ambition. They mobilised the energy and commitment of the same 
founding fathers of Europe’1. 
-Jean-Claude Juncker. 
 
In the aftermath of World War II, which dramatically affected the economy of Europe, the 
political system and society itself, the need to avoid a repeat of this tragedy was evident.2 The 
lessons learned from WWII have provided the basis for the near-simultaneous formation of a 
number of organisations. First was the Council of Europe (CoE) in 1949, 3  intended to 
promote the cooperation between countries in the area of human rights with the aims of 
enhancing democracy and preventing further crimes against humanity. 4  Then came the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951,5 which was intended to create a strong 
and stable economic unity of member states.6 In order to give effect to those values enshrined 
in the CoE’s first treaty, the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 (ECHR),7 and in 
the Treaty of Paris establishing the ECSC of 1951, unique institutional mechanisms were 
established within the framework of their structures. Europeans saw the birth of the Court of 
Justice of the ECSC in 1952,8 and of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or 
Strasbourg Court) in 1959. To contribute to the strengthening of human rights protection and 
the economic integration, the member states, by ratifying these treaties, agreed to transfer a 
     ______________________________ 
1  Jean-Claude Juncker, ‘Council of Europe-European Union: A Sole Ambition for the European Continent’, 
Report to the Attention of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the Council of Europe 
(11 April 2006) 1. 
2  Philip D Grove, Mark J Grove and Alastair Finlan, The Second World War: The War at Sea (Osprey 2002) 75. 
3  Statute of the Council of Europe (opened for signature 5 May 1949, entered into force 3 August 1949) CETS 
No 001; Arthur Henry Robertson and J G Merrils, Human Rights in Europe: A Study of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (3rd edn, Manchester UP 1993) ch 1. 
4  Florence Benoît-Rohmer and Heinrich Klebes, Council of Europe Law: Towards a Pan-European Legal Area 
(Council of Europe Publishing 2005) 20-21. 
5  Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (opened for signature 18 April 1951, 
entered into force 23 July 1952) 261 UNTS 140. 
6  Derek Howard Aldcroft and Steven Morewood, The European Economy Since 1914 (5th edn, Routledge 
2013) 342. 
7 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols No 11 
and No 14 (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) CETS No 005. 
8  This institutional body being constituted in 1952 as the Court of Justice of the ECSC was known since 1958 
as the Court of Justice of the European Communities or the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and since 2009 
when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force was recognised as the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) (Article 19). The terms ‘ECJ’, ‘CJEU' are used interchangeably throughout the thesis, depending on 
whether the author referred to the past ‘ECJ’, or to the the current ‘CJEU’.  
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part of their sovereignty to these organisations and to be subject to compulsory jurisdiction of 
these European courts.9 
 
As soon as the commitment of the Court of Justice to promote the fundamental rights became 
obvious, this judicial institution, having started to resolve human rights disputes, was heavily 
criticised on the basis that it could not deliver judgments going beyond the competences 
envisaged by the Treaties. As far as the ECtHR was concerned, it was observed that this 
judicial institution has gradually broadened those entrusted to it powers at the cost of reducing 
the sovereignty of the contracting parties to the ECHR. 
 
The exercise of such extended competences by the two European judicial institutions, which 
were viewed by Andreas Voβkuhle as European ‘constitutional courts’, 10  subsequently 
resulted in jurisdictional clashes between the courts in resolving human rights cases.11 Thus, 
the idea of consolidating those areas – the national, that of the European Union (EU),12 and 
that of the ECHR – within the framework of the common European system for the protection 
of fundamental rights was important for maintaining the stability of their legal orders. 
 
Given the complex nature of emerged conflict situations between the courts in Europe, the 
major focus of this study will be to explore, firstly, the challenges of jurisdictional 
competition between the CJEU and the courts of the member states, the CJEU and the 
ECtHR, the ECtHR and the courts of the ECHR member states; secondly, to delineate the 
limits of the courts’ possible interference with each other’s jurisdiction; thirdly, to identify the 
extent to which the courts have managed to establish harmonious relationship, on which 
points it is still not possible to find a consensus, and, ultimately, under what conditions the 
courts will be ready to improve their dialogue when adjudicating human rights disputes 
relating to questions of national law, EU law and the ECHR. 
 
To minimise the chance of rendering contradictory rulings by courts at different levels and 
     ______________________________ 
9  Anneli Albi, ‘Referendums in the CEE Candidate Countries: Implications for the EU Treaty Amendment 
Procedure’ in Christophie Hillion, EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach (Hart Publishing 2004) 63. 
10 Andreas Voβkuhle, ‘Multilevel Cooperation of the European Constitutional Courts: Der Europäische 
Verfassungsgerichtsverbund’ (2010) 6 Eu Const L Rev 175, 176. 
11  Lech Garlicki, ‘Cooperation of Courts: The Role of Supranational Jurisdiction in Europe’ (2008) 6 Intl J of 
Const L 509 cited in Alec Stone Sweet, ‘On the Constitutionalisation of the Convention: The European Court 
of Human Rights as a Constitutional Court’, Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 71 (2009) 13. 
12  Since this study touches on the period starting from the birth of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
till its transformation into the European Community (EC) and the current European Union (EU), these terms 
will be used interchangeably to describe the whole enterprise. 
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achieve uniform standards of human rights protection it is thus important to scrutinise how 
‘the multilevel cooperation of the European constitutional courts’13 is currently sustained, and 
the CJEU’s and ECtHR’s jurisprudence is accommodated in the legal systems of the member 
states. 
 
The study is divided into three main chapters that correspond to the research objectives as 
follows. First of all, by analysing judicial practices of the CJEU and of the courts of the 
member states it evaluates the evolving nature of their relationship in resolving the conflicts 
between national law and EU law, and scrutinises whether the national courts recognise the 
supremacy of EU law. The author examines the functioning of those mechanisms that were 
elaborated by member states to safeguard the fundamentals of their constitutional orders. To 
understand how the balance between the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) and the 
CJEU is maintained, the study looks closely at the rationale behind the fundamental rights 
review, ultra vires review, and constitutional identity review. The author addresses the 
questions of how legally justified could be the exercise by national judiciary of these review 
powers that would allow the state to deviate from its obligation to comply with EU law, and 
how this correlates with the commitment undertaken by a state to promote European 
integration. 
 
Secondly, the study examines the cooperation between the ECtHR and the CJEU in handling 
human rights disputes. In light of the fact that over time the Court of Justice has ‘evolved 
from being a tribunal concerned primarily with economic matters to one with a much wider 
range of jurisdiction which is now explicitly tasked with enforcing human rights’,14 it was 
clear that a parallel judicial protection of fundamental rights in both the CoE and the EU 
might lead to a risk of creating double standards within the frame of a single European legal 
space.15 Bearing this in mind, what would have to be done next would be to evaluate the 
progress in negotiations for accession of the EU to the ECHR, the idea of which emerged 
almost four decades ago when the Court of Justice became more and more involved in the 
resolution of human rights cases. The study will scrutinise the CJEU’s Opinion 2/1316 on the 
     ______________________________ 
13  Voβkuhle (n 10) 178. 
14  Gráinne De Búrca, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human Rights 
Adjudicator?’ (2013) 20 Maastricht J Eur & Comp L 68, 171. 
15  Concurring Opinion of Judge Ress, and Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Traja, 
Botoucharova, Zagrebelsky and Garlicki in Bosphorus v Ireland [2005] ECHR 440, para 2; For the 
discussion on ‘double standards’ see, eg, Kathrin Kuhnert, ‘Bosphorus — Double Standards in European 
Human Rights Protection?’ (2006) 2 Utrecht L Rev 177. 
16  Opinion 2/13 Accession by the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [2015] OJ C 65/C. 
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incompatibility of the Draft Accession Agreement with the EU Treaties and discuss how the 
anticipated accession might affect the jurisdictional relationship between the ECtHR and the 
CJEU. Due to remaining obstacles on the path to accession that still have to be overcome, the 
author will analyse the legitimacy of applied currently by the ECtHR the equivalent protection 
doctrine aimed at maintaining a balanced relationship between the EU and the ECHR legal 
systems, and attempts to provide suggestions on how to avoid jurisdictional overlaps between 
these courts after EU accedes to the Convention. 
 
The third challenging issue to be addressed deals with those tensions that occur in the 
interactions between the ECtHR and the courts of the ECHR member states. The author 
explores the reception of the ECHR in the domestic legal orders and discusses the status of 
judgments of the Strasbourg Court in the hierarchy of sources of law within legal systems of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Poland. The 
study will address the controversial issue of how to resolve the conflict situations between the 
courts when the execution of the ECtHR’s judgments by the contracting parties that have 
agreed under Article 46(1) of the Convention to abide by a final judgment of the Court may 
encroach on their sovereignty. 
 
Given that those tensions between the courts have increased, particularly in light of the fact 
that the ECtHR in departing from its primary mission to adjudicate individual cases has 
shifted its focus to a more abstract review of the Convention provisions by identifying the 
structural problems in the national legal orders of the member states, the study will reflect on 
the process of constitutionalisation of the Strasbourg Court. It will analyse the nature of the 
newly established mechanism of the pilot judgment procedure that was designed to address 
the systemic problems revealed by the ECtHR at the national level, and the attitudes of the 
member states towards enforcement of pilot judgments in their legal systems. Having 
examined the legitimacy of this procedure, the author will argue that in view of those powers 
that the ECtHR started to exercise in its delivered pilot judgments, the application of the pilot 
judgment procedure gives rise to concerns about its effectiveness not only in handling the 
ECtHR’s caseload, but in protecting the fundamental rights of individuals.17 
 
The study suggests an alternative solution to a growing number of systematic cases at the 
    _______________________________ 
 
17  Discussion following the presentation by Luzius Wildhaber ‘Pilot Judgments in Cases of Structural or 
Systematic Problems on the National Level’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum and Ulrike Deutsch (eds), The European 
Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible Solution (Springer 2007) 80. 
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ECtHR, which is focused on improving the effectiveness of the domestic judicial protection. 
This approach aimed at minimising the negative consequences of the ECtHR being 
overloaded with complaints that indicate the existence of a structural problem may assist in 
decreasing the probability of the ECtHR rendering new pilot judgments and would reassure 
individuals that violations of their rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention could be 
rectified at the national level. The author seeks to encourage member states to end systematic 
abuses of fundamental rights through being involved in a comprehensive way in the adoption 
of stronger laws that would be compatible with the ECHR and EU law, bringing about 
relevant changes to national legislation and long-standing practices in light of the case law of 
the ECtHR, and reviewing their legal systems regularly regarding the availability and 
effectiveness of domestic legal remedies to avoid repetitive cases being brought before the 
ECtHR. The dissertation is presented as follows.  
 
Chapter I describes the development of cooperation between national and European courts. It 
highlights through the analysis of the relevant case law of the CJEU the gradually changing 
nature of its competences that were expanded to cover cases of human rights violations. The 
chapter attempts to define to what degree such an extensive authority of the CJEU 
corresponds to the jurisdiction of the courts of the member states, on the one hand, and of the 
ECtHR, on the other hand.  
 
In approaching these issues, it firstly discusses the collaboration between the CJEU and the 
national judiciary in the context of various review mechanisms elaborated by the FCC for the 
purpose of preserving the state’s sovereignty. Secondly, it observes the relationship between 
the CJEU and the ECtHR from the view of application of the equivalent protection doctrine. 
Finally, it explores future perspectives of the two judicial institutions’ interactions in light of 
ongoing negotiations on accession of the EU to the ECHR.  
 
Chapter II addresses the main difficulties that occur in interactions between the ECtHR and 
the courts of the ECHR member states, particularly the FCC and the Russian Constitutional 
Court. It investigates the extent to which contracting parties adhere to their obligations under 
the Convention. The chapter suggests how to improve the cooperation between the courts in 
order to diminish jurisdictional tensions between them in implementing the judgments of the 
ECtHR that may threaten the constitutional principles of national legal orders.  
 
In face of increasing number of conflict situations between the courts, the chapter examines 
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the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine and the European consensus concept by 
the ECtHR, draws attention to the need to eliminate several shortcomings in the use of these 
techniques in the jurisprudence of the Court, and provides recommendations for enhancing the 
acceptability of its judgments by the member states. 
 
Chapter III investigates the current trends of the constitutionalisation of the ECtHR. In an 
attempt to define whether the Strasbourg Court goes far beyond its original role of ensuring 
individual justice, it focuses on exploring the legitimacy of the pilot judgment procedure 
introduced by the ECtHR as a response to the growing number of repetitive cases. In 
scrutinising the impact of the pilot judgments on the legal systems of Poland, Germany and 
Russia, the chapter highlights the major drawbacks of this mechanism that result from its 
insufficient regulation. In view of this, the chapter intends to call on the member states to 
enhance the effectiveness of the domestic judicial mechanisms capable of redressing the 
infringements of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR at the national level. By 
accentuating the need to secure, on the one hand, the sovereignty of the contracting parties to 
the Convention, and to preserve, on the other hand, the subsidiary character of the Convention 
control mechanism in the resolution of cases of human rights violations, the chapter 
demonstrates the ways to advance cooperation between the international and national legal 
orders in the process of enforcing the judgments of the ECtHR. 
 
Based on presented in the dissertation findings, the study concludes that such complex 
interconnections between analysed national, supranational and international courts require a 
more comprehensive coordination. It ends with suggestions for further strengthening the 
commitments of all actors involved in this dialogue, namely the CJEU, ECtHR and the courts 
of the ECHR member states, for avoiding potential jurisdictional overlaps and intensifying 
judicial interactions at different levels. Those recommendations for improvement of the 
observed relationship between the courts will presumably contribute to theoretical and 
practical debates among the European and national judiciary, policy-makers and academics on 
promoting effective judicial protection of fundamental rights in Europe. 
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METHODOLOGY	
 
 ‘No study deserves the name of science if it limits itself to phenomena 
                                               arising within its national boundaries’,18  
  
      -Konrad Zweigert, Hein Kötz. 
 
To determine the degree of cooperation between the CJEU, the ECtHR and the courts of the 
ECHR member states, the use of the comparative law for the purposes of this study is 
important. By means of juxtaposing those approaches cultivated by these courts, operating in 
a multilevel system, in interpreting the fundamental rights provisions, and by highlighting 
convergences and divergences across their judicial practices, it will facilitate the search for 
solutions necessary to improve this judicial dialogue and to ensure the courts’ coordinated 
operation in a long-term perspective. 
 
Given that the discrepancies occurring in the jurisprudence of the examined courts when 
adjudicating cases on fundamental rights may create double standards in human rights 
protection in Europe,19 a comparative analysis would suggest how to harmonise the courts’ 
case law, change the legal policies in national legal orders and reshape the attitudes of 
national authorities towards establishing a more cooperative atmosphere necessary for 
effective enforcement of the European courts’ judgments. 
 
In search of the ways for regulating jurisdictional tensions between the courts at different 
levels, this study will make use of case studies, which according to Ernst Rabel might advance 
the process of finding the best suitable solutions that have already been used in other legal 
systems.20 Employing this approach will assist in identifying those mechanisms by means of 
which a balance between the courts in divergent constitutional orders could be sustained, 
make it possible to develop recommendations to prevent the emergence of conflicts between 
them, and demonstrate how these judicial institutions can learn from each other in resolving 
fundamental rights issues. It is thus important to scrutinise the case law of these courts in a 
historical perspective, as this may throw light on how their relationship evolved, uncover the 
     ______________________________ 
18  Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (2nd edn, Clarendom Press 1998) 14. 
19  Yutaka Arai - Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation and the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia 2001). 
20  Ernst Rabel, Das Recht des Warenkaufs [The Law on Sale of Goods] (De Gruyter 1938) 67; Zweigert and 
Kötz (n 18) 8, 16. 
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main challenges that the courts were confronting over years in the interpretation of 
fundamental rights provisions, and outline perspectives of their collaboration. This is 
particularly significant for defining areas requiring the promotion of coherent policies in the 
courts’ jurisprudence. 
 
To examine the nature of the relationship between judicial institutions in Europe, this study 
will rely on functional method, which, as asserted by Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, is ‘the 
basic methodological principle of all comparative law’.21 The courts under consideration will 
be regarded as functionally comparable judicial institutions22 which are adjudicating cases by 
interpreting fundamental rights consolidated in EU law, the ECHR and national legislation23   
 
The comparative analysis of the European and national ways of adjudication of fundamental 
rights issues will illustrate that, despite divergent approaches applied by the ECtHR, the CJEU 
and the courts of the ECHR member states, the models of conflict resolution adopted by these 
judicial institutions in respect of arising jurisdictional clashes are equivalent.24 According to 
Ralf Michaels, this presumption that ‘practical results are similar’,25   being a ‘necessary 
element of functionalist comparative law’,26 makes it clear that by responding in the same 
way to emerging jurisdictional problems at different levels the courts are striving to avoid 
challenges of jurisdictional competition.  
 
Given that both the problems raised in analysed legal orders were identical and the ways of 
resolving them were equivalent,27 Michaels has opined that ‘there is still strong faith that the 
similarities between different legal orders […] are […] proof of deeper universal values’.28 
Understanding this functional interdependence between the problems and solutions is central 
to the process of reducing possible inconsistencies in judicial practices of the courts and 
building harmonious cooperation that would meet the expectations of all actors involved in 
     ______________________________ 
21  Zweigert and Kötz (n 18) 31. 
22  Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 370. 
23  Vosskuhle (n 10) 185; on constitutional pluralism see, eg, N MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ 
(1993) 56 MLR 1; N Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 MLR 317. 
24  Giuseppe Martinico and Oreste Pollicino, The Interaction Between Europe's Legal Systems: Judicial 
Dialogue and the Creation of Supranational Laws (Edward Elgar 2012) 17; Giuseppe Martinico and Filippo 
Fontanello, ‘The Hidden Dialogue: When Judicial Competitors Collaborate’ (2008) 8 (3) Global Jurist 1. 
25  Zweigert and Kötz (n 18) 40. 
26 Michaels (n 22) 370. 
27  Zweigert and Kötz (n 18) 44-45. 
28  Michaels (n 22) 360; see, ‘the solutions are deemed inherent in problems’ in Josef Esser, Grundsatz und 
Norm in der richterlichen Rechtsfortbildung des Privatrechts [Principle and Norm in Judicial Development 
of Private Law] (Tübingen 1956) cited in Michaels (n 22) 346. 
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the dialogue. It is therefore important, firstly, to examine functional connections between the 
CJEU and the courts of the member states, attaching particular attention to the practice of the 
FCC. This is because Germany, as a founding member state of the European Economic 
Community (EEC), plays a central role in the European integration process29 and ‘provides a 
first level of human rights protection’ by means of existing differentiated system of judicial 
review complemented by a ‘powerful mandate’ of the FCC.30 To develop this argument, the 
study will turn to the analysis of the following relevant to the debate cases: Solange I,31 
Solange II,32  Maastricht,33  Lisbon34  and Melloni.35  In view of complex interface between 
national and supranational legal systems, such a selection of cases is driven by their 
constitutional significance to balancing contradictions arising between the courts in their 
judicial practices. 
 
Secondly, the analysis of interactions between the CJEU and the ECtHR will reflect on the 
evolution of their relationship in adjudicating cases on fundamental rights. It addresses those 
conflicting situations in which member states had to derogate from their obligations under the 
Convention to comply with their commitments under EU law and scrutinises the cases 
Matthews v United Kingdom36 and Bosphorus v Ireland,37 which highlight how currently the 
jurisdictional tensions between the CJEU and the ECtHR are avoided. 
 
Thirdly, when examining the relationship between the ECtHR and the national judiciary the 
study discusses those cases in which the courts confront each other in the growing light of 
occurring divergencies in their interpretation of fundamental rights. By comparing the legal 
systems of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Russian Federation and the Republic of 
Poland in terms of compliance with the obligations stemming from the ECHR, the analysis of 
the following ECtHR’s outstanding decisions in Von Hannover v Germany, 38  Görgülü v 
Germany,39 Markin v Russia, 40 Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia,41 Broniowski v Poland,42 
     ______________________________ 
29  Simon Bulmer, ‘Germany and Constitutional Politics’ in Maurizio Carbone (ed), National Politics and 
European Integration: From the Constitution to the Lisbon Treaty (Edward Elgar 2010) 53. 
30  Sebastian Müller and Christoph Gusy, ‘The Interrelationship between domestic judicial mechanisms and the 
Strasbourg Court rulings in Germany’ in Dia Anagnostou (ed), The European Court of Human Rights: 
Implementing Strasbourg’s Judgments on Domestic Policy (Edinburgh UP 2013) 27, 30. 
31 BVerfGE 37, 271 [1974] 2 CMLR 540 (Solange I). 
32  BVerfGE 73, 339 [1987] 3 CMLR 225 (Solange II). 
33  BVerfGE 89, 155 [1994] 1 CMLR 57 (Maastricht). 
34  BVerfGE 123, 267 [2010] 3 CMLR 276 (Lisbon). 
35  BVerfG, 2 BvR 2735/14 (15 December 2015) NJW 2016, 1149 (Melloni). 
36  Matthews v United Kingdom [1999] ECHR 1999-I. 
37  Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland [2005] ECHR 2005-VI. 
38  Von Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 2004-VI. 
39  Görgülü v Germany [2004] ECHR 89. 
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Rumpf v Germany,43 Burdov v Russia (no 2)44 and corresponding national judicial practice 
will reveal a homogeneity of attitudes between the domestic courts as regards the impact of 
the ECtHR’s judgments on the national legal systems. 
 
The study will illustrate that the model of relationship between the CJEU and the courts of the 
member states is guided by the Solange doctrine that was established for the purpose of 
minimising possible judicial tensions. It served as a basis for the ECtHR developing the 
equivalent protection doctrine necessary to preserve the exclusive authorities of the ECtHR 
and the CJEU, and to thwart potential jurisdictional conflicts between them. It also 
contributed to the regulation of the relationship between the ECtHR and the national judiciary, 
which is analysed in the context of Görgülü and Markin cases. The Solange doctrine 
represents a specific tool for solving the problems of jurisdictional competition which, 
according to Nikolaos Lavranos, allows the courts to delineate the sphere of their ‘reserved 
jurisdiction’ with respect to another authorised judicial power.45 Adhering to this approach 
will make it possible to avoid contradictory judgments, and substantially decrease the risk of 
fragmentation of fundamentals rights across Europe.46 
 
Due attention must be given to the member states selected for the purposes of this study. 
Germany was among the first countries to ratify the ECHR and to recognise the jurisdiction of 
the ECtHR; it has a long history of collaboration with this international mechanism. The 
FCC’s jurisprudence, having gained credibility among other states, was perceived as a model 
for the development of constitutional justice in Europe. 47  It is therefore significant to 
determine the extent to which its partnership experience acquired during this period might be 
valuable to those contracting parties to the Convention, as the Russian Federation and the 
Republic of Poland, which not only lack sufficient incentives to strengthen the cooperation 
between their national judiciaries and the ECtHR, but need to overcome certain challenges in 
their legal systems for building harmonious relationship in the future. Apart from that, in view 
of strong judicial protection of fundamental rights under the German Constitution, it is quite 
    _______________________________ 
40  Konstantin Markin v Russia App no 30078/06 (ECHR, 7 October 2010). 
41  Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia App nos 11157/04 and 15162/05 (ECHR, 4 July 2013). 
42  Broniowski v Poland (GC) [2004] ECHR 2004-V, Hutten-Czapska v Poland (2006) 42 EHRR 15. 
43  Rumpf v Germany App no 46344/06 (ECtHR, 2 September 2010). 
44  Burdov v Russia (no 2) (2009) 49 EHRR 22. 
45  Nikolaos Lavranos, ‘Towards a Solange-Method between International Courts and Tribunals?’ in Yuval 
Shany, Tomer Broude (eds), The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law: Considering 
Sovereignty, Supremacy and Subdisiarity (Hart Publishing 2008) 219. 
46  Nikolaos Lavranos,‘The Solange-Method as a Tool for Regulating Competing Jurisdictions Among 
International Courts and Tribunals’ (2008) 30(275) Loyola Los Angeles Intl & Comp L Rev 275, 334. 
47 Maartje de Visser, Constitutional Review in Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Hart Publishing 2014) 40. 
   11 
illustrative that the number of cases in which the ECtHR has acknowledged that Germany 
violated the provisions of the Convention is relatively low compared to Russia and Poland, 
which even at the time of ratification of the ECHR did not comply with the requirements of 
the CoE and had a long way to go towards democracy.48 Given that it was important to draw 
lessons from the German legal tradition of securing human rights and to observe ‘gaps in the 
law of one country’, which, as argued by Gerhard Dannemann, ‘almost like the blind spot 
[…] can be difficult to detect from within’,49 these countries were selected for the present 
comparative analysis.  
 
By demonstrating how distinct legal traditions, historical development, political environment 
and length of time in the ECHR regime affect the level of adherence by member states to 
conventional obligations, it will be accentuated that in those cases where the ECtHR and 
national courts arrive at different conclusions in their interpretation of fundamental rights, the 
contracting parties to the Convention have a tendency to adopt similar models of conflict 
resolution.50 This will also be explained by the fact that the national courts, when applying 
international law in their jurisprudence are ‘looking abroad for advice’51 to benefit from the 
experience of their foreign counterparts that managed to find the best ways of addressing 
jurisdictional tensions in those challenging cases. 
 
The widespread tendency to refer to the judicial practice of other ECHR member states when 
it comes to complex constitutional issues was warmly welcomed by Mads Andenas and 
Duncan Fairgrieve, who argued that ‘the existence of a solution in other jurisdiction may 
under certain circumstances provide persuasive arguments for that solution in one’s own 
jurisdiction’.52 Transposing other legal orders’ solutions to the country under consideration 
helps not only to support the courts’ position, but also increases the responsibility of the 
national authorities under international and European law as it will be expected to bring about 
necessary changes to domestic regulations and judicial practices. Antonios Tzanakopoulos 
emphasised that such an engagement of national courts with the decision of the court of 
another state may be vital for the ‘formation of the judges’ understanding and opinions on the 
     ______________________________ 
48  Statistics by state ‘Violations by Article and by State — 1959-2015 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=reports&c=#n1347956587550_pointer> accessed 29 
September 2015.  
49  Gerhard Dannemann, ‘Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?’ in Mathias Reimann and 
Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 416. 
50  Michaels (n 22) 370-371. 
51  Dannemann (n 49) 410. 
52  Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve, ‘Intent on Making Mischief: Seven Ways of Using Comparative Law’ 
in Pier Giuseppe Monateri (ed), Methods of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 51. 
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interpretation of rules of (international) law’.53 The use of comparative approach has similarly 
proved to be a significant tool in the jurisprudence of both the ECtHR and the CJEU, which to 
identifying how other legal systems addressed similar problems tend to rely in their decision-
making on divergent legal sources found at the national, European and international levels.54 
 
Through collecting statistical data this study will monitor the effects of those changes made in 
the national legal systems for compliance with the obligations under ratified treaties. 
Accumulated statistical information concerning various data such as the number of 
applications lodged and the number of cases adjudicated by the ECtHR, the number of 
decisions rendered by the courts of the ECHR member states, the number of cases submitted 
by national courts to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling procedure, the rate of references made 
by national judiciary to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR),55 the ECHR, the 
case law of the ECtHR and the CJEU will provide valuable insights regarding the progress 
and remaining loopholes in cooperation between the national and European judicial 
mechanisms. 
 
This will also be verified through the prism of economic approach, which for the purposes of 
this study implies the use of cost-effectiveness analysis.56 Assessing the economic effect of 
alternative legal solutions applied in other legal systems to similar problems might have a 
positive implication for adopting necessary regulations in a given legal order. The central 
argument here lies in the fact that inefficient legal rules might cause sizable costs on the 
parties than those that produce favourable outcome. Apparently, this would require member 
states to undertake complex measures, including bringing their national legislation and 
judicial practices in line with the European and international standards, in order to reduce 
costs for the states of removing the negative consequences of such conflicting national 
regulations and to facilitate the process of building the models of efficiently functioning 
     ______________________________ 
53  Antonious Tzanakopoulos, ‘Judicial Dialogue as a Means of Interpretation’ in Georg Nolte and Helmut 
Philipp Aust (eds), Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts-Uniformity, Diversity, 
Convergence (OUP 2016) 78. 
54 The major theoretical contribution to this topic has been made by Monika Ambrus that critically analysed the 
consistency and transparency of the application of the comparative law in the legal reasoning of the 
Strasbourg Court, and Sabine Gless and Jeannine Martin who addressed those challenges of applying 
comparative law in the jurisprudence of both the CJEU and the ECtHR when searching for the common 
standards either at the national level or within the international legal frame: 
 Sabine Gless and Jeannine Martin, ‘The Comparative Method in European Courts: A Comparison between 
the CJEU and ECtHR’ (2013) 1(1) Bergen J Crim L & Crim Justice 36; Monika Ambrus, ‘Comparative Law 
Method in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in the Light of the Rule of Law’ (2009) 
2(3) Erasmus L Rev 353, 356. 
55 EUCFR [2012] OJ C 326/391. 
56 Francesco Parisi and Barbara Luppi, ‘Quantitative methods in Comparative law’ in Pier Giuseppe Monateri 
(ed), Methods of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012) 306-307. 
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judicial institutions. 
 
In sum, the findings of this study will be generated by means of the analysis of primary legal 
sources; international treaties; EU legislation; normative acts of the ECHR member states; 
official documents of the UN, the CoE, the EU; statements and reports by human rights 
organisations; press releases relating to ECtHR judgments; case law of the CJEU, the ECtHR 
and the judicial practice of the domestic courts; opinions of Advocates General of the CJEU, 
officials of the CoE and judges sitting at the Strasbourg Court, the CJEU and the courts of 
ECHR member states; statistical and cost-effectiveness analyses; and interviews with human 
rights experts, judges and academics within the frame of the scientific conferences organised 
at the ECtHR in Strasbourg, Human Rights Centre at Ghent University, Max Planck Institute 
for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg and Norwegian Centre for 
Human Rights at the University of Oslo. 
 
By applying this complex methodological approach, the study will attempt to provide an 
explanation for revealed divergences in the jurisprudence of the examined judicial 
institutions, outline the tendencies of convergence in their practices, clarify jurisdictional 
relationships between them, and give recommendations for the policy-makers on required 
changes in domestic legal systems to exclude further jurisdictional conflicts and achieve an 
effective protection of fundamental rights. 
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LITERATURE	REVIEW	
 
The legal literature used to get a better understanding of functional connections between the 
examined judicial mechanisms will reflect on challenges of accession of the EU to the ECHR; 
the application of the doctrine of a margin of appreciation in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR; 
the effects of international law, EU law, the judgments of the European courts on the national 
legal systems; the application of the equivalent protection doctrine, and the operation of the 
pilot judgment procedure. Since these problematic issues will be more thoroughly explored 
within the chapters, some insights into the nature of the problems in the interactions between 
the courts will already be given at this stage. 
 
Legal scholars have commented extensively on the influence of the CJEU jurisprudence on 
the national legal systems and the constitutionalisation of the European legal order.57 By 
assessing the national responses to the implementation of EU law by member states, 
academics revealed the challenges of the reception of the supremacy doctrine at the national 
level, 58  but did not address the ways of overcoming national resistance towards further 
European integration. The analysis of the development of the judicial dialogue between the 
Court of Justice and the FCC by Juliane Kokott, Advocate General of the CJEU,59 shed 
considerable light on the limits over the transfer of sovereign powers to the EC and the extent 
to which the FCC guarantees the effective protection of fundamental rights in its legal order, 
but it falls short of examining those circumstances under which judges may disregard 
Community law in their practices. Since this is a problem of practical importance, this study 
will attempt to suggest how to cope with remaining uncertainties as regards relevant solutions 
to emerging jurisdictional tensions at the supranational and national levels. 
 
This concern has, to a certain extent, been addressed by Mattias Kumm who, in seeking an 
answer to the question of who has the ultimate authority to affirm the constitutionality of EU 
acts, introduced an alternative ‘common European constitutionalist’ approach that shifts the 
     ______________________________ 
57  Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet and Joseph Halevi Horowitz Weiler, The European Court and 
National Courts-Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing 2000). 
58  Herve Bribosia 'Report on Belgium’, Jens Plotner ‘Report on France’, Marta Cartabia ‘The Italian 
Constitutional Court and the Relationship Between the Italian Legal System and the European Union’, P. 
Ruggeri Laderchi ‘Report on Italy’, Monica Claes and Bruno de Witte ‘Report on Netherlands’, P. P. Graig 
‘Report on the United Kingdom’, Karen Alter ‘Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court 
Jurisprudence: a Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration’, Walter Mattli and Anna-Marie 
Slaughter ‘The Role of National Courts in the Process of European Integration: Accounting for Judicial 
Preferences and Constraints’ in Slaughter, Sweet and Weiler (n 57). 
59  Juliane Kokott, ‘Report on Germany’ in Slaughter, Sweet and Weiler (n 57). 
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debate from the need to determine whether the national courts are allowed to conduct review 
of secondary Community law to identifying ‘what kind of review is constitutionally 
warranted’.60 Kumm’s compehensive evaluation of the relationship between the CJEU and the 
courts of the member states helps to focus on elaborating possible modes of conflict 
resolution to maintain coherent development of the European legal order. 
 
Asteris Pliakos and Georgios Anagnostaras have discussed the exceptional cases of non-
compliance with the principle of supremacy of EU law, where it is necessary for the 
protection of constitutional principles of the member states.61 Following this approach, the 
national courts may initiate judicial review of EU normative acts to ascertain whether they are 
consistent with the fundamental rights incorporated in the national legislation, whether they 
did not transgress the limits of EU competences, or infringed the national constitutional 
identity.62 This could be beneficial for negotiating solutions to future conflicting situations 
that may arise at the EU and national level, and could also provide the domestic courts with 
the possibility to assert their understanding of fundamental rights. In contrast to this, Christian 
Tomuschat has argued that such a strict review of all EU secondary acts might inhibit the 
integration process.63  In view of this, Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem accentuated the need to 
promote coherence in the case law of these judicial bodies.64 
 
By paying considerable attention to those constitutional doctrines that the FCC develops in 
response to the judicial practice of the European courts, Peter Huber and Andreas Paulus 
outlined existing obstacles to an overall incorporation of their case law into the German legal 
system that may impede fulfilment by the state of accepted under international and EU law 
obligations, 65  but, however, left open the question of how to effectively settle those 
jurisdictional tensions between the courts that tend to increase in light of their concurrent 
jurisdiction. 
     ______________________________ 
60  Mattias Kumm, ‘Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe? Three Conceptions of the 
Relationship Between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice’ (1999) 36 
CMLR 351, 351. 
61  Asteris Pliakos and Georgios Anagnostaras, ‘Fundamental Rights and the New Battle over Legal and Judicial 
Supremacy: Lessons from Melloni’ (2015) 34(1) YB Eur L 97. 
62  Mehrdad Payandeh, ‘Constitutional Review of EU Law after Honeywell: Contextualising the Relationship 
between the German Constitutional Court and the EU Court of Justice’ (2011) 48 CMLR 9, 10.  
63   Christian Tomuschat, ‘Lisbon — Terminal of the European Integration Process? The Judgment of the 
German Constitutional Court of 30 June 2009’ (2010) 70 ZaöRV 251, 279-280. 
64  Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, ‘Kohärenz der Anwendung Europäischer und Nationaler Grundrechte’ 
[Coherence in the Application of the European and National Fundamental Rights] (2002) EuGRZ 473. 
65  Peter M Huber and Andreas L Paulus, ‘Cooperation of Constitutional Courts in Europe: The Openness of the 
German Constitution to International, European, and Comparative Constitutional Law’ in Mads Andenas and 
Duncan Fairgrieve (eds), Courts and Comparative Law (1 edn, OUP 2015) 281. 
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In examining the dynamics of collaboration between the courts at the national, supranational 
and international levels, the President of the FCC, Andreas Voßkuhle, drew attention to the 
constitutionalisation of the ECtHR and the CJEU, as they were performing functions that 
were comparable to those of the FCC.66 Having analysed the functional interconnections 
between the European and national legal systems in a hierarchical legal context, he coined the 
term Verbund as characterising the concept of multilevel cooperation of three courts. By 
scrutinising the effects of the decisions of these European courts in the German legal order, 
especially in cases dealing with the constitutional organisation of the state, Voßkuhle 
highlighted the importance of ‘sharing of responsibilities between the courts’ which would not 
lead to the reduction, but ‘tripling of the fundamental rights protection in the Verbund of the 
constitutional jurisdictions in Karlsruhe, Strasbourg and Luxembourg’.67  
 
These ideas were further developed by Charles Sabel and Oliver Gerstenberg, who proposed 
an interesting solution for resolving jurisdictional clashes between the courts that would 
require a ‘formation of a new order of coordinate constitutionalism in which member states, 
the ECJ, the European Court of Human Rights and other international tribunals or 
organisations agree to defer to one another's decisions, provided those decisions respect 
mutually agreed essentials’.68 Although considerable attention was given to the analysis of 
divergent legislative and judicial instruments necessary for achieving coordinated 
communication between supranational and national courts,69 legal scholars did not address 
thoroughly the issue of challenging relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR,70 which is 
particularly important in light of anticipated accession of the EU to the ECHR.71  
 
     ______________________________ 
66  Voβkuhle (n 10) 176. 
67  ibid 197. 
68  Charles F Sabel and Oliver Gerstenberg, ‘Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and the 
Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order’ (2010) 16(5) Eu L J 511, 512. 
69  Torsten Stein, ‘Always Steering a Straight Course? The German Federal Constitutional Court and European 
Integration’ in W Heusel (ed), A European Law Practitioner, Liber Amicorum John Toulmin (2011) 12 ERA 
Forum 219. 
70  Christiaan Timmermans, ‘The Relationship Between the European Court of Justice and the European Court 
of Human Rights’ in Anthony Arnull and others (eds),  A Constitutional Order of States? (Hart Publishing 
2011) 154. 
71  Tobias Lock, ‘The ECJ and the ECtHR: The Future Relationship between the Two European Courts’ (2009) 8 
L & Practice of Intl Courts & Tribunals 375, 395; Sonia Morano-Foadi and Stelios Andreadakis, ‘A Report 
on the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe: A Reflection on the Relationship between the Court of 
Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights Post Lisbon’ (Oxford Brookes 
University 2014) 30; Joseph R Wetzel, ‘Improving Fundamental Rights Protection in the European Union: 
Resolving the Conflict and Confusion Between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts’ (2003) 71(6) 
Fordham L Rev 2823, 2848. 
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Fisnik Korenica attempted to determine the scope of self-restraint that the ECtHR would 
exercise to preserve the distinctive nature of the EU legal order once the accession is 
finalised,72 and discussed those changes that would be required to be adopted to accommodate 
specific characteristics of the EU’s legal system. Doubts were expressed as to whether the 
Draft Accession Agreement encroaches on the autonomy of EU law.73  Several scholars have 
supported the idea that, despite its shortcomings, it has to be renegotiated for authorising 
accession of the EU to the Convention,74 however, no clear suggestions were made as to how 
to safeguard exclusive competences of the CJEU as the guarantor of the Union’s legal order. 
 
In contrast to the position of Rincon-Eizaga, who made several arguments in favour of the EU 
accession to the ECHR which could reduce a number of contradictory interpretations of the 
ECHR by the CJEU and the ECtHR and guarantee individuals access to judicial mechanisms 
in Europe, some academics argued that the accession will not assist in converging these legal 
systems, 75  but have not proposed how the interactions between the courts could be 
strengthened. Giuseppe Martinico and Oreste Pollicino disputed whether the two European 
courts have to review their missions,76 and discussed how to overcome obstacles to invoking 
EU law and the ECHR by national judiciary, which is apparently important for shaping 
national policies, but no clear suggestions were made as to how to increase the effective 
functioning of the European judicial institutions. 
 
Given that with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the EUCFR has obtained mandatory 
status, and the courts’ sphere of influence in deciding human rights cases was considerably 
affected,77 this has triggered a controversial reaction within the academic community on the 
     ______________________________ 
72  Fisnik Korenica, The EU Accession to the ECHR: Between Luxembourg's Search for Autonomy and 
Starsbourg's Credibility on Human Rights Protection (1st edn, Springer 2015) 434. 
73  Paul Gragl, The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights (Hart 
Publishing 2013) 125-126. 
74  Lorena Rincon-Eizaga, ‘Human Rights in the European Union. Conflict between the Luxembourg and 
Strasbourg Courts Regarding Interpretation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
(2008) 11 Rev Colomb Derecho Int Bogota 119; Olivier De Schutter, ‘The Two lives of Bosphorus: 
Redefining the Relationships between the European Court of Human Rights and the Parties to the 
Convention’ (CRIDHO Working Paper No 6, 2013) 12, 32; Paul de Hert and Fisnik Korenica, ‘The Doctrine 
of Equivalent Protection: Its Life and Legitimacy Before and After the European Union’s Accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ (2012) 13(7) German LJ 874, 877. 
75  Giuseppe Martinico, ‘Two Worlds (Still) Apart? ECHR and EU law before National Judges’ in Vasiliki Kosta, 
Nikos Skoutaris and Vassilis Tzevelekos (eds), The EU Accession to the ECHR (OUP 2014). 
76  Martinico and Pollicino (n 24). 
77  Luca Paladini, ‘The European Charter of Fundamental Rights After Lisbon: A ‘‘Timid’’ Trojan Horse in the 
Domain of the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ in Giacomo Di Federico, The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: From Declaration to Binding Instrument Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on 
Law and Justice (Springer 2011). 
   18 
scope of the protection of human rights in the EU.78 While analysing conflicts, inconsistencies 
and complementarities between the ECtHR and the CJEU, former President of the Strasbourg 
Court, Dean Spielmann, reflected on how the binding nature of the Charter and oncoming 
accession of the EU to the ECHR may assist in reaching common understanding as regards 
the interpretation of fundamental rights.79 Giuseppe Martinico and Oreste Pollicino have been 
arguing in favour of rapprochement between the legal systems of the EU and the ECHR that 
might lead to a more cooperative relationship between the two courts,80 but will not, however, 
exclude a possible emergence of contradictions. Laurent Scheeck observed this collaboration 
through the prisms of conflict, competition and cooperation. 81  Considering the 
interdependence of these factors, the proposed approach may contribute to raising awareness 
of an impact of the supranationalisation of judicial politics in Europe on national regimes. 
Although the analysis showed how the evolving intercommunications between these judicial 
mechanisms influence the process of the European integration, there is still a need to address 
the issue of increasing the legitimacy and credibility of the European courts operating in a 
polarised European legal space. Since this might require the improvement of applied 
methodological approaches, Hanneke Senden has suggested how to enhance the acceptability 
of these courts’ rulings by member states. 82  
 
Given that the problem of conflicting jurisdictions between national and international courts 
still continue to attract attention of legal scholars, the most recent contribution to the debate 
on strengthening the courts’ interactions by Georg Nolte and Helmut Philipp Aust played an 
important role in understanding why international legal obligations are not always interpreted 
and implemented in national jurisdictions in a uniform way.83 Those discussions among the 
academics that intended to answer the question of how domestic courts employ the rules of 
interpretation of international treaties and to identify the extent to which differences in the 
interpretation between domestic jurisdictions correlate with the international rules of 
interpretation present great theoretical and practical value as they provide the basis for the 
elaboration of convergent approaches to the interpretation of international treaties by domestic 
     ______________________________ 
78  Wetzel (n 71); Morano-Foadi (n 71) 30. 
79  Dean Spielmann, ‘Human Rights Case Law in the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts: Conflicts, 
Inconsistencies, and Complementarities’ in Philip Alston, Mara R Bustelo and James Heenan (eds), The EU 
and Human Rights (OUP 1999) 757. 
80  Martinico and Pollicino (n 24). 
81  Laurent Scheeck, ‘Competition, Conflict and Cooperation between European Courts and the Diplomacy of 
Supranational Judicial Networks’ (GARNET Working Paper No 23/07) 4. 
82  Hanneke Senden, Interpretation of Fundamental Rights in a Multilevel Legal System: An analysis of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union (1 edn, Intersentia 2011). 
83  Georg Nolte and Helmut Philipp Aust (eds), Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts-
Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence (OUP 2016). 
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courts. 
 
Several books have been written on the significance of the Convention mechanism for the 
protection of human rights in Europe.84 Alec Stone Sweet and Helen Keller comprehensively 
examined the impact of the ECHR and of the case law of the ECtHR on the national legal 
orders. 85 Andrew Drzemczewski in his ground-breaking comparative study on the ECHR 
threw light on the status of the Convention in the national legal systems of member states, the 
process of incorporation of the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court into divergent legal 
regimes, the relationship between international and domestic law and determined the extent to 
which national authorities ensure effective implementation of the Convention in their legal 
systems.86 Since little is still known about how to increase the effectiveness of the ECHR in 
the national legal systems, how to challenge national authorities to adopt decisions and 
legislation that will be compatible with the Convention this study will attempt to fill that gap. 
 
It has been discussed among scholars that in the majority of member states the ECHR is 
regarded as an integral part of the national legal system, lacking the same legal status as the 
Constitution. 87  This has raised a practical question of the status of judgments of the 
Strasbourg Court in national legal orders of member states, which had a significant resonance 
in the literature.88  However,  not enough attention has been attached so far to the analysis of 
contradictions in judicial practices of the ECtHR and the courts of the ECHR member states,89 
particularly in those cases where the enforcement of the ECtHR’s judgments might infringe 
     ______________________________ 
84  See, eg, Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White & Ovey: The European 
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86  Andrew Drzemczewski, European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law: A Comparative Study 
(Clarendon Press 1983). 
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Spyridon Flogaitis, Tom Zwart and Julie Fraser (eds), The European Court of Human Rights and its 
Discontents: Turning Criticism into Strength (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 156. 
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Federal Constitutional Court and the Binding Force of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
under Art. 46 ECHR’ in Hanno Hartig (ed), Trente ans de droit européen des droits de l'homme: études a la 
me'moire de Wolfgang Strasser Droit Et Justice 74 Collection créée par Pierre Lambert et dirigée par Daniel 
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Q Scientific J Perm U Herald 93. 
89  Müller and Gusy (n 30) 27-28; Anton Burkov, Konvenciya o Zawite Prav Cheloveka v Sudah Rossii 
[Convention on Human Rights Protection in Russian Courts] (Wolters Kluwer 2010) 37. 
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the fundamental principles of national legal systems.   
 
Recent debates have circled around the changing nature of the Strasbourg control 
mechanism.90 Some authors, in arguing that the ECtHR could be regarded as ‘transnational 
constitutional court’,91 have extensively scrutinised the process of application of the pilot 
judgment procedure by the ECtHR,92 and made recommendations on how to increase its 
efficiency.93 Given that it did not prove to be the most suitable instrument for reducing the 
number of systematic cases at the ECtHR, the academics still have not addressed how to 
handle this problem to ensure the proper functioning of the Strasbourg Court. Therefore, this 
study proposes an alternative solution to easing the backlog of the ECtHR, which is focused 
on strengthening the protection of fundamental rights by domestic judicial mechanisms.  
 
Given that the existing literature does not extensively enough address the whole range of 
challenges of cooperation between the ECtHR, the CJEU and the courts of the ECHR member 
states, the author believes that the present study will extend the scope of previously obtained 
results, and by reflecting in a historical perspective on the development of their interactions, 
showing how the convergence in their judicial practices may occur, outlining coherent 
approaches to the interpretation of fundamental rights, and making several recommendations 
for the improvement of their controversial relationship will assist in building mutually 
respectful dialogue between the courts and enhancing efficiency of fundamental rights 
protection in Europe. 
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CHAPTER	I	
COOPERATION	BETWEEN	NATIONAL	AND	SUPRANATIONAL	COURTS	
 
1.1	Introduction	
 
This chapter will shed light on the relationship between the CJEU and the courts of the 
member states. Through examination of the case law of the CJEU, it describes the evolution 
of the system of protection of fundamental rights in the EU, and the impact of this process on 
the interactions between the Court of Justice and national judiciaries, and the CJEU and the 
ECtHR. 
 
In approaching these issues, the chapter first explores the cooperation between the CJEU and 
the FCC in the context of various review mechanisms employed by the state to control the 
transfer of sovereign powers to the Community and define the limits of European integration. 
It then goes on to evaluate the extent to which national courts are allowed to conduct a review 
of EU law, and suggests ways to avoid further conflict situations with the CJEU. Secondly, it 
describes how the balance of powers between the CJEU and the ECtHR is currently achieved, 
and discusses possible changes in the nature of this cooperation that the potential accession of 
the EU to the Convention would entail. The analysis continues with an examination of 
Opinion 2/13 of the CJEU, which outlined the concerns raised by the Court due to the 
Accession Agreement being drafted to balance the interests of the contracting parties to the 
Convention and supranational organisation like the EU, but failing to preserve the autonomy 
of the EU legal order. It explores those adjustments that would be required to overcome 
obstacles posed by the CJEU and to proceed with accession negotiations. 
 
The chapter ends by assessing the scope of the application of the equivalent protection 
doctrine, the prospects of its operation in the event of EU’s accession to the Convention, and 
the challenges it might cause for the future relationship between the ECtHR and the CJEU.  
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1.2	Review	limits:	interactions	between	the	CJEU	and	the	courts	of	the	
member	states	
The problem of determining the limits of European integration and the constitutionality of EU 
legislation has proved to be fundamental, particularly in the early years of functioning of the 
examined judicial institutions. Although the principles of supremacy and direct effect of EU 
law guaranteed its effective enforcement, the emergence of contradictions between national 
and EU law was inevitable as the domestic courts, when adjudicating cases involving EU law, 
were governed by the idea of safeguarding constitutional orders of states. It is thus important 
to analyse how the relationship between the EU and the national legal systems developed, to 
scrutinise the reasons for the continuous resistance of states to accepting EU law 
unconditionally, and to propose solutions for mitigating jurisdictional conflicts between the 
CJEU and national courts. 
 1.2.1		 Fundamental	rights	review		
 
The main concern that emerged following World War II was the need to restore economically 
ravaged European countries. Both the Treaty of Paris of 1952 and the Treaty of Rome of 
195794 focused on economic growth through cooperation, and left issues relating to human 
rights largely to member states and their constitutions,95  despite having included several 
references to human rights.96 
 
The adoption of the German Constitution (Basic Law) on 23 May 1949, which acknowledged 
the ‘inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of 
justice in the world’, 97  affectted the functioning of the ECJ that had not considered itself 
responsible for the protection of fundamental rights.98 The ECJ first adjudicated on human 
rights issues in Stauder v City of Ulm,99 in which it confirmed its duty to secure human rights 
as being an integral part of the general principles of Community law.100 In this leading case 
concerning the problems of interpretation of EC law, the applicant, having alleged a violation 
     ______________________________ 
94  Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (opened for signature 25 March 1957, entered into 
force 1 January 1958) 298 UNTS 11 (Treaty of Rome). 
95  Bates (n 84) 161. 
96  Treaty of Rome (n 94), arts 7, 19.  
97  Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic Law) BGBl I, 1, art 1(2). 
98  Case 1/58 Stork v High Authority [1959] ECR 17, para 26. 
99  Case 29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419, 425. 
100  ibid [7]. 
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of Articles 1 and 3 of the Basic Law, challenged the Commission decision of 12 February 
1969101 that envisaged a special scheme authorising member states to distribute surplus butter 
at a reduced price to certain categories of recipients on condition that their names were 
revealed on vouchers. The Administrative Court of Stuttgart referred the case to the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 267 TFEU102 to revise the compatibility of the contested 
rule with the general principles of Community law. 
 
Having permitted each member state to determine its own ways of referring to the individuals, 
the ECJ indicated that it was the wording of the German text that required to include such 
details on the coupon.103 It was emphasised that a uniform interpretation of the real intention 
of the legislature should be ensured, and no stricter obligations should be imposed in some 
member states than in others.104 In case of potential conflicts, the most liberal interpretation of 
EC law should be adopted as this would not infringe fundamental rights enshrined in the 
general principles of Community law.105 In its reasoning the ECJ confirmed that the rule 
under consideration had to be interpreted as not requiring the indication of the beneficiaries’ 
names on coupons.106  
 
Despite the fact that the principles of supremacy107 and direct effect of EC law108 had already 
been developed by the ECJ in its jurisprudence, tensions between Community law and 
national law seemed to be inevitable. The main challenge in this respect was to determine 
whether, and, if so, to what extent, Community law could override fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the German Constitution,109 which in Article 24 allowed for the transfer of 
sovereign powers by law to international organisations. In search of an answer to this 
question, it would be useful to examine judicial practice of the FCC, which has paid particular 
attention to ensuring strong protection of fundamental rights in Germany since the date of its 
establishment in 1951. 110  Some light is thrown on this by the case Internationale 
     ______________________________ 
101  Commission Decision (EEC) 69/71 of 12 February 1969 [1969] OJ L52. 
102  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ L326/47-326/390     
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105  ibid [4]. 
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107  Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nedelandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
108  Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
109  Torsten Stein, ‘La Jurisprudencia de los Tribunales Alemanes en Relación con el Derecho Communitario 
Europeo’ [The Jurisprudence of the German Courts in relation to the European Community Law] (1982) 
9(3) Revista de Instituciones Europeas 785, 794. 
110  Ola Zetterquist, ‘The EU Constitution Viewed in the Light of Fundamental Constitutional Theories’ in 
Joakim Nergelius (ed), Nordic And Other European Constitutional Traditions (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
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Handelsgesellschaft, 111 in which the applicant claimed that under Council Regulation of 13 
June 1967 on the common organisation of the market in cereals112  and the Commission 
Regulation of 21 August 1967 on import and export licences,113 a system of import and export 
licences guaranteed by a deposit was in conflict with the right to freely choose the occupation 
or profession enshrined in Article 12(1) of the Basic Law.114 
 
On reference by the Administrative Court of Frankfurt-am-Main to the ECJ for the 
preliminary ruling,115 the legal validity of these regulations under EEC law was confirmed in 
a judgment of 17 December 1970.116 The ECJ’s finding was grounded on the autonomous 
status of Community law, which should not be overridden by national rules, and the validity 
of which could not be affected even if it could endanger the principles of national 
constitutional structure.117 Having emphasised that the applications for licences were made 
freely and in knowledge of the agreed consequences, the ECJ declared that the forfeiture of 
the deposit only served to enforce accepted obligations.118 
 
As a consequence of the ECJ ruling, the Administrative Court requested the FCC under 
Article 100(1) of the Basic Law, which would empower it to declare an Act of Parliament to 
be void for violation of the German Constitution, to examine whether imposed under 
Community law obligations were compatible with the Basic Law. Delivering its decision on 
29 May 1974, the FCC stated that, although Article 24 of the German Constitution envisaged 
the delegation of sovereign powers to interstate institutions, this could not create conditions 
for amending that part of the Basic Law concerning the fundamental rights without formal 
modifications to it, as it constitutes the basis of the constitutional structure of the Basic 
Law.119 This position of the FCC was based on the fact that the integration process in the 
Community did not advance to the extent that it could guarantee the existence of a 
democratically legitimate parliament and a codified catalogue of fundamental rights, which 
    _______________________________ 
2006) 25. 
111   Solange I (n 31), provisional English translation of the judgment is provided by the University of Texas at  
Austin at <https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=588> accessed 
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117  ibid [3]. 
118  ibid [18]. 
119  Solange I (n 111), s AI-4: 3-4. 
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would be comparable to the ‘substance of the Basic Law’.120 The FCC has therefore created a 
presumption that the guarantees of fundamental rights under the Basic Law will be given 
priority as long as the Community organs have not resolved the conflict of norms.121 It was 
clarified that, because the ECJ was not empowered to decide the questions of national law of 
member states, the FCC was similarly not authorised to rule on the validity of Community 
law.122  
 
Since the implementation of the Community regulation entailed the exercise of German state 
power, the national authoritites and domestic courts were bound in this process by the 
constitutional law of Germany. 123  This might explain why, any act proceeding from 
Community law that contradicted the Basic Law was subject under Article 90(2) of the Law 
‘On the FCC’124 and Article 100(1) of the Basic Law to fundamental rights review by the FCC 
with a view to determining its applicability in Germany. Given that it was still not possible 
either to resolve this clash of norms or to guarantee at the Community level efficient 
protection of fundamental rights comparable to that under the Basic Law, any similar 
references to the FCC were acknowledged as ‘admissible and necessary’.125 It was held in the 
present case that the system of deposits envisaged by the challenged rules was appropriate at 
that stage of the Community’s economic development and aimed to avert potential negative 
effects for the EEC.126 Since there was no evidence that the right of the complainant under 
Article 12 of the Basic Law could be violated, no obstacles existed to the implementation of 
the disputed regulation by German authorities. 
 
Having criticised the decision of the FCC in Solange I as undermining the principle of 
primacy of Community law and thus posing a threat to its uniform application, in its Report of 
1974 the Commission emphasised that the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ to interpret 
Community law was not being respected.127 From then on, the ECJ continued to promote its 
commitment to guaranteeing effective protection of fundamental rights at the Community in 
order to safeguard the autonomy of its legal order. 
     ______________________________ 
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The significant place of fundamental rights in the Community law has been confirmed by the 
ECJ in its case law. In Nold v Commission,128 a German coal wholesaler challenged the 
legality of the Decision of the Commission of 21 December 1972 authorising new terms of 
business of Ruhrkohle AG129 on the grounds that modified conditions for acquiring direct 
wholesaler status constituted a violation of fundamental rights, including property ownership, 
free development of the personality, freedom of economic action that were secured by Article 
14 of the Basic Law and by the Constitution of Hesse,130  and were recognised ‘by the 
Constitutions of other member states of the Community, by international Conventions and by 
the ECSC Treaty itself’.131 Even though the Commission was conscious that a great number 
of dealers would not be able to meet the newly introduced criteria,132 the application of this 
measure was justified by the necessity of concluding long-term contracts with dealers to 
stabilise the marketing system due to the decrease in coal sales.133 The ECJ stressed that in 
case it was dictated by the needs of the public interest, these rights were permitted to be 
limited in the Community legal order ‘if the substance of these rights is left untouched’.134 
 
The importance of Nold lies in the fact that the ECJ broadened the interpretation of the 
principle of fundamental rights,135 as in identifying the Community standards for human 
rights protection it also made a reference to international treaties to which member states were 
parties.136 This could confirm that the ECJ had recognised that the fundamental rights from 
different sources were regarded as constituting part of Community law and were to be 
respected as accentuated by the Joint Declaration adopted on 5 April 1977 by the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission in the exercise of their powers. 137  Further 
commitment of the Community to the strengthening of the fundamental rights protection was 
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also reflected in the approval by the European Council of the Declaration on Democracy in 
1978.138 
 
Having emphasised that the international treaties for the protection of human rights ‘could 
supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of the Community’,139 the 
ECJ explicitely relied on this in Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz which concerned 
limitations on planting vines.140  It was held that Article 2 of the Council Regulation of 17 
May 1976,141 which banned new planting of vines for a period of three years, did not infringe 
the landowner’s rights to pursue a trade and a right to property guaranteed by Articles 12 and 
14 of the Basic Law, Constitutions of the member states, and Article 1 of the Protocol No 1 to 
the Convention142 as it intended to prevent the overproduction of wine in the Community. 143 
 
Given that probable violations of fundamental rights by Community institutions could only be 
examined from the perspective of Community law, imposed in respect of the applicant 
restrictions were justified by the objectives pursued by the Community.144 Even though the 
owner still had a control over his property and remained free to exercise it for non-prohibited 
purposes, he was constrained in using it. The ECJ, despite referring to Article 1(2) of Protocol 
No 1 that pertmitted ‘to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property 
in accordance with the general interest’, stressed that it did not provide any further 
clarification on the application of such limitations.145 Thus, the ECHR with its Protocols was 
considered by the ECJ as instruments ensuring minimum standards for the protection of 
fundamental rights at the Community level.  
 
In Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft, the Federal Office of Food and Forestry, relying on the 
Commission Regulation of 8 August 1974 stipulating protective measures applicable to 
imports of preserved mushrooms,146 refused in July 1976 to issue a license for 1,000 tons of 
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Taiwanese canned mushrooms to the German importer.147 Despite the fact that the applicant 
was arguing that the market conditions had been changed and the Regulation was thus 
ineffective, the Administrative Court’s judgment of 1978 rejected claims of abuse of power by 
the Commission on the grounds that it was still necessary to secure the objectives of the 
common agricultural policy laid down in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome.148 
 
Suspending proceedings, the Federal Supreme Administrative Court referred the question of 
validity of the Regulation to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, which did not consider it 
appropriate to abolish the protective measures owing to the ongoing market conditions.149 
Further objections to the ECJ’s decision were dismissed by the Federal Supreme 
Administrative Court in its judgment of 1 December 1982,150 and refused leave either to 
present a case to the FCC pursuant to Article 100(1) of the Basic Law, or to refer the case for 
a new ruling to the ECJ.151  
 
The ECJ held in CILFIT that the courts were exempted from their obligation to submit the 
case for a further preliminary ruling if:  
 
‘[a] the question raised is irrelevant or [b] that the Community 
provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court or [c] 
that the correct application of Community law is so obvious as to 
leave no scope for any reasonable doubt’. 152 
 
Reference to this new ruling in the same case would be accepted by the ECJ in the event 
either of inaccuracy of the previous interpretation, or when a new legal issue has been 
challenged, or due to performance of the new facts that would lead to reaching a distinct 
conclusion. The applicant’s appeal was rejected as it did not meet these criteria,153 and the 
exercise of this right to challenge the validity of a previously delivered judgment154 was not 
allowed because it was not listed among the acts of Community institutions that could be 
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subject to review under Article 267 TFEU.155  
 
The petitioner’s claim under Article 100(1) of the Basic Law could also not be satisfied as the 
FCC was not authorised to conduct a constitutional review of the compatability of the 
preliminary ruling of the ECJ with the provisions of the Basic Law.156 Being deprived of the 
constitutional right to a hearing guaranteed under Article 101(1) of the Basic Law, the 
appellant argued that the Federal Supreme Administrative Court disregarded its procedural 
and substantial rights secured by the German Constitution.157 Therefore it was important to 
define whether the ECJ was considered lawful within the meaning of Article 101(1) sentence 
2 of the Basic Law. 
 
In its Twentieth General Report on the Activities of the EC, the Commission confirmed that, 
by 1986, ‘real progress’ in the Community’s contribution to the strengthening human rights 
guarantees has been achieved. 158  Having affirmed positive developments in ensuring 
fundamental rights protection in the EC that was regarded ‘substantially similar’ to that 
provided under the Basic Law,159 the FCC was confident in the legitimacy of the ECJ,160 and 
eventually abandoned the exercise of its jurisdiction to rule on the compatibility of the 
secondary Community legislation with the provisions of the Basic Law.161 Given that the 
FCC’s previous position has been replaced and the ECJ was given a ‘place in the German 
constitutional structure as lawful court’,162 the Federal Supreme Administrative Court was no 
longer obliged to transfer the case to the FCC. Any such petitions to the FCC under Article 
100(1) were thereafter inadmissible as long as it was not shown that the level of protection 
provided in the Community has decreased since Solange II.  
 
There is clearly strong willingness among the Community institutions to ensure the 
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observance of fundamental rights and to integrate them into Community law. However, as not 
all the rights secured by the Basic Law have so far been examined by the ECJ, it could be that 
legal gaps might occur as it uses a case-by-case approach and the protection of fundamental 
rights is still in a transitory phase. 163 This is why it was crucial to exclude a parallel reading 
of fundamental rights contained in Community law and national legislation in order to secure 
comprehensive protection of human rights at the Community level. 
 	1.2.2	Ultra	vires	review	
 
The FCC largely maintained its non-intervening approach in reviewing EU secondary 
legislation, but proclaimed in Maastricht its authority to exercise control over the powers of 
the EC.164 Such reservation, according to Andreas Voβkuhle, was necessary for ensuring that 
the EU and its legal system are functioning properly, and that the national identities of the 
member states as stipulated in Article 4(2) TEU165 are respected.166 
 
Although the FCC acknowledged the constitutionality of German ratification 167  of the 
Maastricht Treaty,168 which was followed by several amendments to the Constitution,169 the 
Court pointed out that the transfer of powers to the EC under Article 24(1) of the Basic Law 
was subject to restrictions envisaged by Article 79(3).170  By restating that Germany remained 
a member of a ‘compound of states’,171 which exercised its powers under the authorisation of 
those states, the FCC has confirmed that the German Federal Parliament ‘must retain 
functions and powers of substantial import’ to secure the constitutional principles and 
fundamental interests of the state.172 
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As a final arbiter in deciding issues of national constitutional law,173 one would not doubt that 
the FCC was a principal actor in determining the scope of transferred to the EU powers. For 
that reason, the FCC reserved the right to declare any legal act of the Community adopted 
without the approval of the Federal Parliament ultra vires and not binding in Germany.174 
Since democratic regime was still lacking in the Community, the FCC exercised its power to 
identify whether or not the actions of EU institutions fell within the limits of the competences 
conferred on them.175 Although this approach was not regarded as friendly,176 the FCC, being 
a ‘subsidiary guardian of the European Legal Order’,177 maintained an overview of all acts of 
the EU institutions, including those of the ECJ, in a ‘co-operative relationship’.178 This would 
mean that to preserve the unity of the EU legal system, the Court would not adjudicate on 
issues stemming from EU law prior to consideration of the case under Article 267 TFEU by 
the Court of Justice. This might be сonsidered as respectful treatment of the position of the 
ECJ, which was also demonstrated by the FCC in Honeywell, in which, having triggered an 
ultra vires review, the Court examined the applicability in Germany of the ECJ’s decision in 
Mangold v Helm,179 which dealt with question of the employment of senior workers. The ECJ 
was asked to scrutinise provisions of German law on part-time work and fixed-term 
contracts180 which domesticated the Council Directive of 28 June 1999,181 and compatibility 
with Article 6 of the Council Directive of 27 November 2000, 182  which had not been 
transmitted into German law.183 This lack of incorporation did not have decisive impact on the 
outcome of the case, but the ECJ reaffirmed that the state should avoid enacting any 
conflicting measures during the period prescribed for transposition of a Directive. 184 
Therefore it was concluded that the national authorities were responsible for annulling any 
provisions of the national regulations that contradicted EU law.185  
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As soon as the ruling of the ECJ was obtained, the FCC, in exercising its role as ‘guardian of 
the constitutional order’186 examined in Honeywell187 whether Mangold was ultra vires, and 
so inapplicable in Germany. The Court elaborated a strict approach188 to the exercise of its 
power in ultra vires review by reducing its application to: 
  
‘‘sufficiently qualified’ violation of competences, which […] leads 
to a structurally significant shift in the structure of competences 
between Member States and a supranational organisation’.189 
 
Since this represented a high bar, the probability of the FCC declaring the EU normative act 
ultra vires was almost nil,190 as it would be difficult to generate any clear criteria to qualify 
for this standard of review.191 Given that in Mangold neither a breach of the principle of 
conferral nor a significant shift in the allocation of powers was observed,192 the claim that the 
ECJ acted ultra vires was dismissed. 193  The FCC, having thus undergone considerable 
changes in its approach to ultra vires review, paved the way to harmonisation of the 
relationship between the German and the European legal orders. 
 
Along with the oversight role of the FCC, the CJEU was also authorised to monitor 
compliance by the member states with their obligations under EU law to ensure the coherence 
of the Community legal system. In Tanja Kreil v Bundesrepublik Deutschland194 concerning 
military service by women in Germany, the ECJ ruled that any provisions of national 
legislation exempting women from posts involving the use of arms were in breach of the 
Council Directive of 9 February 1976 on equal treatment, including in the workplace.195 
Although issues of security and the organisation of armed forces were matters for the member 
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states,196 this did not prevent the Community from retaining a certain degree of control.197 The 
ECJ stressed that any derogation from the principle of equal treatment must accord with the 
principle of proportionality and be justified by reasons of public security.198 The intention of 
the German government to provide a degree of protection to women did not have to exclude 
them from an access to various types of employment.199 Thereafter, the German government 
reviewed its position200 and amended201 the provisions of the Basic Law to bring its national 
legislation in line with EU law.  
 
To secure effective enforcement of EU law, in Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and 
others v Italian Republic the ECJ has recognised the option to hold member states responsible 
for breaches of EU law by obliging them to pay compensation to individuals for infringement 
of their obligations stemming from the Treaties.202 In striving to strengthen legal certainty 
within the EU, in Köbler the ECJ extended states’ liability for violations of EU law,203 
particularly those originating from Article 267(3) TFEU, under which domestic courts are 
obliged to bring the case before the Court for a preliminary ruling. However, even if the ECJ 
was empowered to sanction member states for non-compliance with or incorrect application 
of EU law, it would not be able to hold it responsible directly, as the cases of liability would 
be decided in national legal proceedings. 
 
Thus, even having transferred certain sovereign powers to a supranational organisation, 
Germany reserved the right to determine the limits of its relationship with the Community by 
reviewing the compatibility of acts of the European institutions with the requirements of the 
German Constitution. To minimise potential conflict situations between the courts it would 
seem prudent that their subsequent relationship has been based on mutual trust which to 
ensure that EU law is uniformly and consistently applied by national authorities, and to 
prevent any actions of EU institutions going beyond those powers assigned to them by 
national governments. 
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1.2.3	Constitutional	identity	review		
 
Having confirmed in Maastricht that ultra vires review exclusively fell within its jurisdiction, 
the FCC reaffrimed this approach in Lisbon204 in which it acknowledged the constitutionality 
of the German act205 approving the Lisbon Treaty.206 To guarantee the ‘inviolable core content 
of the Basic Law’s constitutional identity’ pursuant to Articles 23(1) and 79(3) of the Basic 
Law, the FCC has introduced a new form of review, namely constitutional identity review, 
which does not conflict with the principle of ‘sincere cooperation’ stipulated by Article 3a(3) 
of the Lisbon Treaty, and was to be exercised in accordance with the Basic Law’s openness to 
European Law, and the principle of subsidiarity under Article 3b(3) of the Lisbon Treaty. 207 
The FCC has thus maintained its power to declare EU law inapplicable in the national legal 
system if the European institutions overstepped their competences or the acts infringed the 
German Constitution.208 
 
In carrying out the ‘responsibility for integration’, the FCC with a view to protecting the 
fundamentals of state’s constitutional system has recognised the necessity to leave to the 
member states a ‘sufficient space […] for the political formation of the economic, cultural and 
social living conditions’209 and therefore limited the delegation of sovereign powers to the 
EU, particularly in criminal law, the use of force by the police and the military, fiscal 
decisions on public revenue and expenditure, the social state, and on issues of cultural 
importance, for example in family law, the education system and on dealing with religious 
communities.210  Since it is not possible to determine precisely all the areas that may be 
significant for a constitutional state, the CJEU would require the assistance of the national 
courts211 to specify what should be considered as a part of the constitutional identity of the 
member states to prevent any disproportionate intrusion into their national legal order by EU 
institutions,212 and to reduce jurisdictional conflicts between the courts, which tend to occur in 
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their practices as will be demonstrated below in Data Retention.213  
 
From the adoption of the first Federal Data Protection Act in 1977,214 Germany followed a 
policy of providing strong security guarantees against any encroachment by the state on 
fundamental right to respect for private life.215 Given that the exercise of freedom that ‘may 
not be totally be recorded and registered’ was recognised as a part of the constitutional 
identity of Germany, 216  the legislation217 transposing the Directive 2006/24 concerning data 
retention 218  into the Telecommunication Surveillance Act 219  and the Criminal Procedure 
Code220 was held to be void by the FCC due to its incompatibility with Article 10(1) of the 
Basic Law ensuring the confidentality of communications.221  
 
As the FCC did not itself turn to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU 
on the validity of the Directive, requests were made by the High Court of Ireland and the 
Constitutional Court of Austria to clarify whether the challenged Directive allowing the 
storing of personal data was compatible with the rights to privacy and data protection laid 
down in the EUCFR.222 On 8 April 2014, the Court of Justice held that the Directive was 
invalid because the EU legislature by adopting it ‘has exceeded the limits imposed by 
compliance with the principle of proportionality in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the 
Charter’.223 The Directive on Data Retenion was struck down, and the national measures 
implementing it were quashed, which eventually strengthened the privacy protection.224 This 
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illustrates that, when it comes to maintaining congruence between EU law and national 
constitutional law, the CJEU is willing to respond to concerns raised by the member states. 
Such an approach reaffirmed the obligation of EU institutions to show respect for the national 
identities of states, as stipulated in Article 4(2) TEU.  
 
Despite these positive trends, however, certain conflicting situations between the courts still 
emerge as can be seen in Melloni which concerned the execution of a European Arrest 
Warrant when the person was convicted in absentia. By its Order of 15 December 2015, the 
FCC declined to authorise any acts in such circumstances, because a trial in Germany in the 
absence of accused would be in violation of Article 1(1), 23(1) and 79(3) of the Basic Law, 
even though the Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant225 had been 
transposed into German law.226 
 
Having triggered its ‘identity control’ over the implementation of issued by Italian authorities 
European Arrest Warrant, that in essence amounted to an indirect review of the Framework 
Decision,227  the FCC overturned the decision of the Higher Regional Court in Düsseldorf that 
accepted the extradition of a convicted felon from Germany who had been tried and sentenced 
in absentia.228 The FCC held that the surrender of a convicted person to another member state 
of the EU, where no guarantees for a new hearing of a case with presentation of the evidence 
were provided, would deprive the applicant of a right to an effective legal remedy, and 
remitted the case for consideration.229 Christian Tomuschat has argued that the extradition 
endangering the constitutional principles and posing a threat to fundamental rights of the 
individual would contravene not only the German legislation, but the main principles of the 
functioning of the EU enshrined in Article 6 TEU.230 
 
Given the position of the FCC, which was at odds with a ruling of the CJEU231 in a previous 
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analogous case brought by Spain,232 Mathias Hong has opined that the FCC will ensure the 
protection of the right to human dignity ‘not only against conflicting Union law if necessary, 
but also parallel to its European protections’.233 Remarkably, unlike the Spanish authorities 
which reduced the level of protection of the contested right 234  to secure effective 
implementation of EU law, but not contrary to the constitutional gurantees, 235 the FCC’s 
message to the CJEU was that ‘it is not willing to buy the Melloni case-law’ against its 
traditions of the protection of fundamental rights under the Basic law.236 Asteris Pliakos and 
Georgios Anagnostaras have argued that to mitigate conflict with the national judiciaries, the 
CJEU should reconsider its approach in Melloni to give more space to member states to apply 
their national guarantees for the protection of fundamental rights, particularly in cases where 
issues of constitutional identity are at stake.237  
 
Despite criticism of the FCC decisions in Lisbon 238  and Melloni,239  it was not the only 
constitutional body that upheld ‘the flag of national autonomy’240 by guarding those exclusive 
powers at domestic level. The same approach has also been taken in the Constitutional Court 
of the Czech Republic,241 the Italian Constitutional Court,242 and the Polish Constitutional 
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Tribunal. 243  According to Daniel Sarmiento, such warning signals coming out from the 
member states should not only be regarded as a ‘sign of nationalism’, but also as confirmation 
of significance of the problems being addressed by the EU.244 
 
By limiting the application of EU legal acts in the national legal system, the FCC confirmed 
that the authority of the CJEU as an exclusive adjudicator on EU law matters245 will not be 
unconditionally accepted, and might even be challenged as long as there is a risk of abuse of 
power by European institutions. Even though it is difficult to avoid jurisdictional clashes 
between the courts, as the FCC considers the Basic Law as a standard for review whereas the 
CJEU observes the fundamental rights from the perspectives of EU law,246 it has been argued 
that, to maintain their mutually supportive interaction, EU institutions would likely opt for 
coordination of their activities with the constitutional principles of the member states,247 and 
the national authorities would be required to accept the supremacy of EU law.  
 
	
1.3	Accession	of	the	EU	to	the	ECHR	
 
The early commitment of the EC to the protection of fundamental rights can be seen in the 
case law of the ECJ from the very beginning of its existence. Although the authority of the 
ECJ in deciding human rights cases was challenged in the courts of the member states, the 
Court continued to show its adherence to the promotion of fundamental rights issues in order 
to preserve the supremacy of Community law.  
 
Given that the absence of a uniform document of the fundamental rights at the Community 
level could endanger the position of individuals, the necessity of providing sufficient 
guarantees ‘against Community authority’ was evident.248 Since all EU member states were 
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already bound by the ECHR, the need to enhance the protection of fundamental rights either 
by including a catalogue of human rights, 249  or through accession of the EU to this 
international treaty, which was first discussed by the Commission in 1979, has emerged. 250  
However, even though the Commission expressed strong confidence that adherence to 
fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the ECHR could be beneficial, further 
consideration of the proposal was postponed for almost twenty years. 
 
The most notable step was made in 1996 when the ECJ was asked to rule pursuant to Article 
218(11) TFEU on the compatibility of accession with the Treaty.251 Although negotiations 
were not begun, two main questions were raised before the ECJ: one on Community 
competence to conclude such agreements, and the other on the compatibility of accession with 
the provisions of the Treaty, in particular those relating to the jurisdiction of the ECJ.252 
 
In approaching these issues, the ECJ referred to Article 3b of the Treaty, under which the 
Community was expected to operate ‘within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the 
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it’.253 The Court did not answer the second question 
because of insufficient information being available, but it held that, despite the lack of the 
Treaty provisions either ‘to enact rules on human rights or to conclude international 
conventions in this field’, Article 235 of the Treaty could not serve as a basis for widening the 
scope of Community powers.254 Given that accession to the Convention might result in a 
modification of the system for the protection of human rights and would cause the ‘entry of 
the Community into a distinct international institutional system and the integration of all 
provisions of the Convention into the Community legal order’, it was pointed out that 
amendments to the Treaty would be required due to the constitutional significance. 255 
Delivering its Opinion 2/94 on 28 March 1996, the ECJ did not allow the Community to join 
the ECHR.256  
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The European Parliament’s Resolution of 16 January 1997 on the general outline for a draft 
revision of the Treaties,257 drew attention to the absence of both a legal basis for the accession 
of the EU to the Convention and the possibility of direct access to the ECJ by individuals if 
fundamental rights were violated by EC institutions, thus giving impetus to preparatory work 
aimed at incorporating the legal norms for the protection of human rights into the Treaties. 
 
The ECJ’s finding in Nold, which recognised the protection of fundamental rights guaranteed 
in the ECHR and constitutional traditions common to the member states, was codified in 
Article 6(2) of the Maastricht Treaty. Later, Article 7 of the Treaty of Amsterdam extended the 
competence of the Council in respect of Article 6(2) of the Maastricht Treaty by establishing 
the possibility of suspending certain rights of the member states in the event of a ‘serious and 
persistent breach by a member state of principles in Article 6(1)’. 258 The jurisdiction of the 
ECJ to review the actions of Community institutions to ensure their compliance with 
Convention provisions and constitutional traditions was recognised in Article 46(d) of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. All this made a significant contribution to the explicit consolidation and 
promotion of fundamental rights in the Treaties. 
 
However, given that the acts of the EC were not covered by Article 1 ECHR, an overall 
protection of fundamental rights in the Community could not be assured, and the status quo 
could not be preserved because it was not possible to maintain the same level of legal 
certainty in the case law of the ECJ.259 Even those proposals that were made were subject to 
criticism insofar as the accession of the EU to the Convention was not thought to provide 
stronger protection of fundamental rights than under the ECJ as those rights constituted 
general principles of EU law, and the Convention had already been ratified by all member 
states.260 It was also argued that the incorporation of a catalogue of rights into the Treaty 
would jeopardise national sovereignty.261 This situation in which EU citizens could be left 
without any protective mechanisms if the ECJ did not guarantee a sufficient level of 
protection of the fundamental rights needed to be resolved. 
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1.3.1	Adopting	a	catalogue	of	fundamental	rights	 	
 
In the absence of a single document detailing the fundamental rights in the Community, the 
number of diverging interpretations of the Convention rights could increase and thus discredit 
the reputation of both courts.262 In Hoechst AG v Commission,263 because Community law did 
not provide for greater protection of places of business against those guarantees envisaged by 
Article 8 of the Convention, the ECJ, being inspired by the ECtHR’s ruling in Niemetz v 
Germany,264 relied on the Strasbourg Court’s approach by incorporating its interpretation of 
the Convention into its own jurisprudence.265 Having emphasised that ‘for the purposes of 
determining the scope of that principle [Article 8] in relation to the protection of business 
premises, regard must be had to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights 
subsequent to the judgment in Hoechst’, the ECJ adjudicated the case by extending the right 
of the inviolability of the home to places of business.266 
 
To minimise conflicting interpretations of the Convention, there emerged the need to adopt a 
catalogue of fundamental rights that would broaden the scope of rights recognised in the 
ECHR and adapt them to the economic demands of the society. In view of this, President of 
the CJEU, Koen Lenaerts, suggested assigning the Convention a central place in any future 
document of fundamental rights within the EU, thereby preserving the legal orders of the 
contracting parties and the EC.267  
 
In June 1999, the European Council268 began drawing up of the EUCFR which was approved 
at the Nice European Council Summit on 7 December 2000.269 As a minimum standard, the 
Charter allowed extensive use of national and international human rights instruments for the 
protection of EU citizens. 270  Since the EUCFR did not supersede the protection of 
fundamental rights provided by member states, it was applicable to the states when they were 
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enforcing EU law, otherwise those cases fell within their own jurisdiction. 271  Having 
incorporated not only all the rights under the ECHR, but also a list of modern rights that 
reflected the changes in the society, scientific and technological developments, and those 
rights that result from the constitutional traditions, the international treaties, Community 
treaties, and the case-law of the CJEU and of the ECtHR, 272 it eventually exceeded the scope 
of the Convention guarantees and, according to Georg Nolte and Helmut Philipp Aust, made a 
conciliatory move towards ‘convergence between developments on the European and the 
universal level’.273 Article 52(3) of the EUCFR stipulates that ‘the meaning and scope of 
those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention’. This contributed 
considerably to the promotion of congruence in understanding of the Convention standards by 
the courts. Moreover, the insertion into the Preamble of the Charter the reference to the case-
law of the ECtHR might signal a positive shift towards harmonisation of the interpretation of 
the Convention by the CJEU in accordance with the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence. 
 
The EUCFR, as a legal instrument aiming to ensure a comprehensive protection of 
fundamental rights within the EU against abuses committed by EU institutions, was intended 
to form the second part of the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. 274 
However, it never entered into force due to the failure in the ratification procedure,275 and so 
its legal standing remained unclear, and it was referred to as a soft law276 on an occasional 
basis.277 For the first time in its practice, the Strasbourg Court sought support in this document 
when deciding Christine Goodwin v the UK.278 By comparing Article 9 of the Charter with 
Article 12 of the Convention, the ECtHR acknowledged that, in defining the fundamental 
right to marry, the Charter has deliberately omitted reference to ‘men and women’.279 Having 
observed that since the adoption of the Convention the institute of marriage had undergone 
certain social changes, the ECtHR did not consider it reasonable to restrict same sex marriage 
     ______________________________ 
271  Case C-370/12 Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland und The Attorney General [2012] ECR 
2012. 
272  EUCFR (n 55), Preamble; International Covenant on Social and Economic Rights (opened for signature 16 
December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) UNTS 3. 
273  Georg Nolte and Helmut Philipp Aust, ‘European Exceptionalism?’ (2013) 2(3) Global Constitutionalism 
407, 427. 
274  [2004] OJ C 310/1 (never ratified). 
275  For further discussion see, eg, Francesca Vassallo, ‘The Failed EU Constitution Referendums: The French 
Case in Perspective, 1992 and 2005’ in Finn Laursen (ed), The Rise and Fall of the EU's Constitutional 
Treaty (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) 411-431. 
276  Christoph Bush, ‘Fundamental Rights and Private Law in the EU Member States’ in Christoph Busch and 
Hans Schulte-Nölke (eds), EU Compendium — Fundamental Rights and Private Law (Sellier 2011) 4. 
277  Timmermans (n 70) 154. 
278  Christine Goodwin v the UK [GC] [2002] ECHR 2002-VI. 
279  ibid [58], [100]. 
   43 
and left its regulation to the national laws of the contracting parties.280 Given that Article 9 of 
the Charter provided for a more extensive protection of the right to marry, the Court decided 
the case relying on its provisions. Such mutually beneficial cooperation, according to former 
judge at the ECJ, Christiaan Timmermans, confirms a tangible advance in strengthening the 
legitimacy of both courts.281  
 
In 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the legal status of the Charter was 
clarified. Under Article 6(1) it was given the same status as the Treaties, and the Commission 
endorsed a strategy on its effective implementation.282 Compliance with the strategy’s goals 
would be monitored through annual reports of the Commission drawing on case-law from the 
CJEU, ECtHR and national courts.283 The Fifth Annual Report284 showed that from the time 
the EUCFR has obtained mandatory status there has been an increasing rate of reference to it 
in the work of the EU institutions, particularly the CJEU, 285 which may indicate a ‘growth of 
the Court’s role as a human rights adjudicator’.286 The same positive tendency to invoke the 
provisions of the EUCFR has been seen in the jurisprudence of the national courts which, in 
submitting their requests for a preliminary ruling procedure to the CJEU, referred to it in 43 
cases in 2014287 in comparison with only 18 in 2010.288 This confirms that the domestic courts 
are playing a significant role in achieving a uniform interpretation of the fundamental rights 
enshrined in the Charter when implementing EU law. 
 
The European Commission, as the institution responsible for ensuring the effective 
application of the Charter, is authorised to initiate infringement proceedings under Article 258 
TFEU against member states for non-compliance with the provisions of the EUCFR, which 
may result in bringing the case before the CJEU. Such proceedings have been opened in 
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several cases.289 On 7 June 2012, the Commission brought the action before the Court of 
Justice claiming that the national scheme reducing the compulsory retirement age for judges, 
prosecutors and notaries was incompatible with the provisions of the Charter and the Council 
Directive of 27 November 2000 on equal treatment that forbade discrimination as regards 
employment or occupation on the grounds of age.290 Soon after the Court of Justice handed 
down its ruling in November 2012,291 Hungary adopted necessary measures292 to bring the 
national legislation in line with the EU standards, because of which the infringement 
proceeding was terminated in November 2013.293 
 
One would not doubt that the Charter has contributed significantly to the harmonisation of 
national legislation with EU law. However, given that the ECHR was not binding on the EU, 
it was not systematically considered by the CJEU in interpreting fundamental rights under the 
EUCFR.294 Since this variation might have a delegitimising effect on the CJEU’s position,295 
it was important to avoid any inconsistencies in courts’ practices296 and to develop a coherent 
system of fundamental rights protection. For that very reason, debates on accession of the EU 
to the Convention were expected to recommence. 	 1.3.2	Negotiation	process	
 
The Memorandum of Understanding between the CoE and the EU concluded in May 2007 
stated that early accession of the EU to the ECHR would strengthen human rights protection 
in Europe.297 The negotiation Directives recommended by the Commission in March 2010298 
opened the way for a discussion of the Agreement on EU accession to the Convention, and 
official confirmation of the mandate of the Commission in June 2010 heralded the beginning 
of joint debates.299 At a meeting held in Strasbourg in the following month,300 former Vice-
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President of the European Commission, Viviane Reding, and Secretary General of the CoE, 
Thorbjørn Jagland, highlighted that the EUCFR was a ‘good precondition’ for the 
establishment of the ‘missing link in Europe’s system of fundamental rights protection, 
guaranteeing the coherence between the approaches’ of the negotiating partners.301  
 
On 26 May 2010, the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) was granted an ad hoc 
mandate by the Committee of Ministers302 to draw up legal instruments for the accession of 
the EU to the Convention no later than 30 June 2011, and an informal working group drafted 
an agreement and supporting documents for the supervision of the execution of judgments of 
the ECtHR.303 The Report of the CDDH of 14 October 2011 stressed that, in light of the 
‘specific legal order of the European Union’, accession of the EU to the Convention would 
require amendments to the Treaties.304  
 
The ability of the EU to conclude agreements with international organisations was envisaged 
by Article 216 of the Lisbon Treaty, and the obligation of the EU to join the Convention was 
established by Article 6(2) and Protocol No 8 of the Lisbon Treaty,305 and Article 59(2) and 
Protocol No 14306 of the Convention eventually comprised the legal basis for EU accession. In 
2012 the Committee of Ministers instructed the CDDH to proceed with the negotiations with 
the EU in ad hoc group,307 and agreement on draft revised instruments was achieved in April 
2013.308 
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1.3.3	Opinion	2/13	of	the	CJEU	
 
In view of the constitutional significance of the accession,309  in accordance with Article 
218(11) TFEU, the European Commission asked the CJEU to express its opinion on the 
compatibility of the draft Agreement with the Treaties. 
 
 1.3.3.1			Prior	involvement	procedure		
 
Delivering its opinion on 18 December 2014, the Court of Justice acknowledged the 
incompatibility of the Draft Accession Agreement (DAA) 310  with Article 6(2) TEU, 
explaining the potential negative effect that it might have on the autonomy and specific 
characteristics of the EU.311 There were a number of controversial aspects identified. First, a 
prior involvement procedure in cases in which the EU would be a co-respondent was 
mentioned, as foreseen by Article 3(6) DAA. Having accentuated the importance of 
preserving ‘the competences of the Union or the powers of its institutions’ as required by 
Article 2 of Protocol No 8 to the Lisbon Treaty, the Court of Justice expressed its discontent 
over the absence of any provisions in the DAA that would exclude the possibility of prior 
adjudication of issues concerning EU law by the Strasbourg Court.312 It was suggested to 
ensure that the EU was aware of all cases pending before the ECtHR to secure the prior 
involvement of the CJEU in the procedure on compatibility of EU law with the provisions of 
the Convention or Protocols, to which the EU will be a Party.313  
 
From the CJEU’s point of view, limiting its power to rule only on the validity of a legal norm 
contained in secondary law314 would not preserve its exclusive competence to interpret EU 
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law.315 It was argued that efficient operation of EU judicial system could be guaranteed if EU 
secondary law would also be subject to interpretation by the CJEU on its compliance with the 
commitments of the EU resulting from the accession to the Convention.316 
 
It may seem surprising that the Strasbourg Court would be asked to adjudicate on the 
conformity of an EU act with the norms of the ECHR, even if the ruling of the CJEU had not 
initially been obtained.317 Although such scenario should not be excluded, this would be 
equated to ‘conferring on the ECtHR the jurisdiction to interpret the case-law of the Court of 
Justice’.318 Given that under Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts are required to bring the 
matter before the CJEU only if there is no judicial remedy under national law against its 
decisions, the Strasbourg Court will apparently not consider the preliminary ruling procedure 
as an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35(1) of the Convention. It is thus 
reasonable, since the individuals are not allowed to initiate such requests directly, to oblige 
domestic courts to turn to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling in any case dealing with EU law 
which will be submitted to the ECtHR.  
 
Christiaan Timmermans believes that the CJEU must be able to examine the question at first 
hand.319 Being an avenue which must be exhausted under Article 35(1) of the Convention, it 
has to be available to individuals so as not to deprive them of access to the Strasbourg 
machinery. In view of this, Advocate General Kokott proposed ensuring the ECtHR’s role as 
a subsidiary control mechanism under the ECHR to preserve authority of the CJEU as the 
‘only reliable’ to assess the compatibility of EU law with the fundamental rights under the 
Convention.320 
 1.3.3.2			Protocol	No	16	to	the	Convention321	
 
In light of need to secure the autonomy of the preliminary ruling procedure envisaged by 
Article 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice considered that Protocol No 16, which introduced the 
advisory opinion mechanism for the highest courts of the contracting parties to refer questions 
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on the interpretation of the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention or 
Protocols to the Strasbourg Court, might threaten the effectiveness of the procedure embedded 
in the judicial system under the Treaties.322  Although Protocol No 16 is facultative in nature, 
and DAA does not anticipate its further ratification by the EU, Kokott argued that those 
member states which would become a party to it may be inspired to file a request for an 
advisory opinion on EU fundamental rights to the ECtHR rather than the CJEU.323  The lack 
of explicit formulation in DAA of the relationship between these mechanisms could affect the 
supreme authority of the CJEU to interpret EU law.324 Therefore, to avoid this challenging 
situation the issue of the CJEU’s prior involvement discussed earlier should initially be 
regulated. 
 1.3.3.3			Article	344	TFEU	
 
The CJEU also expressed concern with the formulation of Article 5 DAA as contradicting 
Article 344 TFEU which restricted submission of a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those allowed by the 
Treaties.325 The Court of Justice pointed out that even if Article 5 of the Agreement did not 
recognise the proceedings before the CJEU as a means of conflict resolution within the 
meaning of Article 55 of the ECHR, it reserved the possibility for the member states or the 
EU to refer to the ECtHR under Article 33 of the ECHR.326 In view of this, the Court of 
Justice was convinced that only the exclusion of the ECtHR’s authority over any such 
disputes will avoid collision with the objectives of Article 344 TFEU and Article 3 of Protocol 
No 8 to the Lisbon Treaty, and preserve the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU to adjudicate 
disputes between member states, and between member states and the EU on compliance with 
the ECHR.327 
 
The Advocate General proposed that the EU and the member states at the time of EU’s 
accession to the Convention declare their intention not to bring a case against each other 
before the ECtHR under Article 33 if it concerned matters of EU law, on pain of infringement 
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proceedings under Articles 258 to 260 TFEU. 328 	1.3.3.4		Co-respondent	mechanism	
	
Article 1(b) of Protocol No 8 to the Lisbon Treaty describes the co-respondent mechanism, 
which is an instrument to ‘ensure that […] individual applications are correctly addressed to 
member states and/ or the Union, as appropriate’ and ‘avoid gaps in participation, 
accountability and enforceability in the Convention system’,329 anticipating accession of the 
EU to the ECHR. The Court of Justice expressed its discomfort with the authority of the 
Strasbourg Court to decide on requests of member states to become co-respondents.330 Since 
the conditions to be met for their participation were established in the ‘rules of EU law 
concerning the division of powers between the EU and its member states’,331 this would entail 
a review by the ECtHR of EU law.  
 
From the point of view of the Court of Justice, such assessment of the plausibility of states’ 
arguments would affect the distribution of powers between the EU and the member states332 in 
much the same way as would be the case in the context of Article 3(7) DAA, which permitted 
the ECtHR to rule on the question of sharing liability between the respondent and co-
respondent by holding only one responsible for the Convention violation.333 The Court of 
Justice argued that any exemption from liability must be made in accordance with EU law and 
be subject to supervision by the CJEU, which has the exclusive competence to decide on the 
compatibility of the agreement between the respondent and co-respondent with the relevant 
rules of EU law.334  
 
Advocate General Kokott stressed that such a discretionary power of the ECtHR to decide on 
the admission of co-respondents could make their further participation in this procedure 
uncertain.335  Since the co-respondent mechanism in its present form disregarded specific 
characteristics of the EU and EU law, 336  it was proposed for the purpose of effective 
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communication of potential co-respondents to exclude the assessment criteria envisaged by 
Article 3(5) DAA.337 
 
 1.3.3.5		Common	Foreign	and	Security	Policy	(CFSP)	
 
The main concern of the CJEU, according to Koen Lenaerts, related to the need to 
safeguarding the autonomy of the EU legal order in the area of CFSP338 in which the CJEU, 
pursuant to Article 24(1) TEU and Article 275 TFEU, has a limited authority.339 Given that the 
main responsibility for any infringements of the ECHR within the CFSP lies with the courts 
and tribunals of member states in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU and Article 274 TFEU, 
there is a danger that ‘serious tension with the constitutional idea of Union’ might arise.340 It 
seems thus reasonable that, if the CJEU is competent under the Treaties to interpret EU law in 
the context of the CFSP, its prior involvement in the examination of those cases should be 
guaranteed.341  
 
Under DAA, on EU accession to the ECHR, the ECtHR will be responsible for examining 
acts of EU institutions as to compatibility with the ECHR, including in the area of CFSP.342 It 
will eventually be competent to hold EU to account for any violations stemming from the 
ECHR, covering even those that the CJEU was not empowered to examine. 343  Daniel 
Halberstam has argued that the Strasbourg Court, having acquired this power, will become the 
‘European Union’s constitutional court’.344 The main question this raises is whether the EU 
would recognise such jurisdiction of the ECtHR, and to what extent it correlates with the 
autonomy of EU law.345 The CJEU opined that a review of EU acts, even if limited to 
compliance with the Convention rights, could not be entrusted to a non-EU body which 
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operates outside the judicial framework of the EU.346 It was concluded that DAA did not take 
into consideration specific characteristics of the EU legal system as regards the judicial 
review of the acts and actions by the EU within the framework of the CFSP.347  
 
Kokott has emphasised that, because the principle of autonomy of EU law presumes that in 
the event of EU’s accession to the ECHR, the powers of EU institutions remain untouched 
and any interpretation of EU law given by international court would not affect the EU legal 
order,348 there would be no threat to the supranational structure of the EU if the jurisdiction of 
the Strasbourg Court in this sphere was subsequently to be recognised.349 Even the lack of 
necessary adjustments within the EU required to secure the autonomy of EU law should not 
call into question the necessity to acknowledge the jurisdiction of an international court as it 
may strengthen the legal protection of individuals.350  
 
Given that the CJEU has not ruled so far on the extent of its authority within the CFSP,351 
remaining uncertainties may give rise to jurisdictional conflicts between the courts. To avoid 
this problem, it is of utmost importance to ensure the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU over 
all disputes, including those originating from the CFSP, that are forwarded to the Strasbourg 
Court.352  
 
There is little doubt that, in declaring the incompatibility of DAA with Protocol No 8,353 the 
CJEU intended to preserve the autonomy of the EU and was inspired by the idea of excluding 
any intrusion into the sphere of exclusive competences of EU institutions rather than by the 
idea of mutual collaboration with the ECtHR to enhance the effectiveness of fundamental 
rights protection. In light of the obligation imposed on the EU under Article 6(2) TEU to 
accede to the ECHR, a friendlier approach to future accession which would address the 
concerns raised by the CJEU would seem prudent. 
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1.3.4	Prospects	of	accession:	relationship	between	the	CJEU	and	the	ECtHR	
 
Being perceived as a threat to the ‘idea of a unified European human rights law architecture’, 
Opinion 2/13 of the CJEU caused a wave of negative comments within the legal 
community.354 Former President of the Strasbourg Court, Dean Spielmann, has argued that the 
CJEU’s ‘unfavourable opinion is a great disappointment’ as it slowed down the process of EU 
adherence to the standards of fundamental rights protection envisaged by the ECHR.355 Given 
that currently the citizens are deprived of the right to subject the acts of the EU to the same 
external judicial control which is applied to the member states, he argued that it is important 
to overcome the challenges outlined by the CJEU and not to view them as an obstacle to EU 
accession.356  
 
Despite concerns expressed on a number of draft’s provisions, Kokott presumed it more 
practical to declare DAA compatible with the Treaties in case adjustments that would likely 
preserve specific characteristics of the EU’s legal order are introduced as required in Opinion 
2/13.357 Koen Lenaerts, President of the CJEU, strongly supported the necessity for finalising 
accession negotiations.358 He emphasised that under no circumstances could the accession be 
considered redundant; on the contrary: ‘external review by the Strasbourg Court will be of 
great advantage’ for bridging the gap between the EU and the ECHR in the protection of 
fundamental rights in Europe, and Guido Raimondi, President of the ECtHR, proposed to 
work with the CJEU to proceed with the accession.359  
 
According to Article 218(11) TFEU, if the opinion of the CJEU is adverse, the agreement may 
not enter into force unless corresponding amendments are introduced or the Treaties are 
revised. The negotiations between the parties to reach consensus on the provisions of the 
Accession Agreement should thus continue. A more radical approach was proposed by 
Leonard Besselink, who recommended an amending Protocol to the TEU which would 
authorise the accession ‘notwithstanding’ Opinion 2/13.360 This would completely subvert the 
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CJEU’s authority, and Pieter Jan Kuijper has invited to show ‘some good will to the Court’ by 
modifying DAA to accommodate those problems articulated by the CJEU.361  
 
Opinion 2/13 highlights the concern that EU accession might challenge the autonomy of the 
Union’s legal order, as the ECtHR would be allowed to supervise the compliance of EU 
legislation with the Convention.362  It is widely discussed in the academic literature that, 
having acquired a ‘vertically integrated but cooperative’ nature, the relationship between the 
two European courts will be changed.363  Fisnik Korenica referred to the hierarchisation, 
viewing the CJEU in the role of the constitutional domestic court of the EU, and the ECtHR 
as a ‘supreme court’ in respect of the CJEU.364  
 
Christian Timmermans was convinced that the ECtHR would be the ultimate adjudicator as 
regards infringements stemming from the ECHR. 365  Relying on Article 35(1) of the 
Convention, which would require the CJEU to deal with the case before it was referred to the 
ECtHR, Kirsten Schmalenbach has also opined that the Strasbourg Court would always 
decide the case in the last instance by examining whether the CJEU had correctly interpreted 
the Convention rights.366 
 
Given the subsidiary nature of the ECHR mechanism, the Strasbourg Court will not, however, 
have direct authority over the CJEU as it does not have the power to repeal EU law that had 
been found incompatible with the ECHR.367 This would mean that such an external control 
represents a fragile system of appeal. The CJEU will remain unique in its exercise of judicial 
review in cases that come before the ECtHR and its competence would not be affected, and 
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the autonomous legal order of the EU would be secured in much the same way as that of each 
contracting party to the Convention.  
 
 
1.4	 The	 equivalent	 protection	 doctrine	 in	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	
ECtHR	
 
Given that the accession of the EU to the ECHR is still pending, the effective protection of 
fundamental rights cannot be completely assured, and so it is important to establish 
constructive dialogue between the CoE and the EU that will exclude any jurisdictional 
tensions between the CJEU and the ECtHR, safeguard the supremacy of EU law, and 
guarantee individuals equal or higher standards of fundamental rights protection than those 
enshrined in the ECHR.368 To achieve this, the Strasbourg Court has announced that it will not 
exercise its competence to review cases brought against the EU, but has reserved the right to 
review the acts and omissions of EU institutions indirectly by holding member states 
responsible for implementing EU measures.369 
 
By transferring powers to the EU, national governments widened the competence of the 
Union in the field of human rights. Despite this, the European Commission of Human Rights 
held in X v Federal Republic of Germany that:  
 
‘when a member state, having submitted itself to contractual obligations, 
concludes a later international agreement that does not allow for further 
observations of its obligations under the earlier Treaty, the state still is 
responsible under the preceding Treaty’.370 
 
The EU, not being a signatory to the ECHR, did not have any responsibility under this 
international treaty. 371  The cases involving the EU were subsequently regarded by the 
Commission as ratione personae inadmissible, 372  and this gave rise to the concept of 
equivalent protection that was first presented in M & Co v Federal Republic of Germany.373 
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This was a case which dealt with the enforcement of the Commision’s decision of 14 
December 1979374 to impose a fine for a breach of Article 101 TFEU on a German company 
importing equipment which was produced by a Japanese firm in a manner which restricted 
competition. The respondent Government argued that it was not responsible for examining 
before issuing a writ for the execution of a judgment of the ECJ whether it had been rendered 
in violation of the Convention rights enshrined in Article 6.  
 
The responsibility of Germany could not result from this treaty, as all Community acts would 
have fallen then under the Convention’s control machinery. However, the exercise of 
transferred in this sphere powers to the EC did not exclude the state liability under Article 1 of 
the ECHR for all acts of their domestic organs infringing the Convention provisions, 
otherwise it would have undermined the effectiveness of enshrined therein guarantees.375 In 
view of this, the European Commission of Human Rights affirmed that ‘the transfer of powers 
to an international organisation was not compatible with the Convention provided that within 
that organisation fundamental rights will receive an equivalent protection’.376 
 
When evaluating whether the EC afforded such protection, the European Commission of 
Human Rights, relying on the case law of the ECJ and the commitment of the Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission of the EC to the protection of human rights, concluded that a 
sufficient level of guarantees of individuals has been provided.377 Since it was presumed that 
the Community legal order ensured efficient protection of fundamental rights, no judicial 
review of the compatibility of the acts of EU institutions with the ECHR was allowed if no 
discretion was left to member states over their enforcement. The European Commission for 
Human Rights acknowledged that it was ‘not competent ratione personae to examine 
proceedings before or decisions of organs of the European Communities, the latter not being a 
Party to the European Convention on Human Rights’.378 
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1.4.1		 Matthews	v	United	Kingdom379	
 
In Matthews, the Strasbourg Court has explicitly reaffirmed the necessity of securing the 
Convention rights, even after the transfer of powers to international organisation. The case 
deals with the issue of voting rights in European Parliament elections. The applicant, a British 
citizen resident in Gibraltar, claimed a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No 1 to the ECHR in 
that she was not allowed to vote in the elections in 1994. Referring to Decision of the Council 
76/787/ECSC380 and the Act of 1976,381 the applicant challenged the limitations on the right to 
vote set out in Annex II to this Act which had the status of a treaty which the United Kingdom 
has freely joined.382 Given that the alleged violation stemmed from the Community primary 
law over which the ECJ did not have jurisdiction383 the ECtHR could not invoke the doctrine 
of equivalent protection. 
 
Because the Convention had been extended to Gibraltar by declaration of the United Kingdom 
on 23 October 1953,384 and Protocol No 1 had been applicable in Gibraltar since 25 February 
1988,385 there was territorial jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR. Therefore, those obligations 
resulting from the Act of 1976 and the Maastricht Treaty that brought about changes in the 
competences of the European Parliament were binding on the United Kingdom pursuant to 
Article 1 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No 1.386 The European Commission of 
Human Rights held that, although the EC was not a contracting party to the Convention and 
its acts could not be referred to the ECtHR, member states continued to carry responsibility 
for any violation under the Convention even after having transferred powers to the 
international organisation as long as it related to the EC primary law.387 The United Kingdom 
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was thus found to be in breach of Article 3 of Protocol No 1 for not securing the right to free 
elections in Gibraltar and was obliged to amend its legislation to meet the Convention 
requirements.388 
 
In reviewing the acts of the Community indirectly by scrutinising those measures adopted at 
the national level, the ECtHR established its authority over claims stemming from 
Community primary law. Since no other mechanism against violations originating therefrom 
existed, the ECtHR would continue to retain its role as a principal observer of the Convention 
rights in Europe, but maintaining the application of equivalent protection doctrine (see 
below), which was intended to limit the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court in respect of any 
alleged violations resulting from EU secondary legislation. 
 1.4.2		 Bosphorus	v	Ireland389	
 
Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland clarified how the 
relationship between the ECHR and EU law is currently regulated. It concerned the seizure by 
the Irish authorities of aircraft leased by a Turkish company, Bosphorus Airways, from 
Yugoslav Airlines390 under the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council on the Former 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) pursuant to Resolution 820 (1993)391 adopted under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. 392  The Council implemented it through Regulation No 990/93 
concerning trade between the EEC and the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro).393  
 
Bosphorus Airways challenged the applicability of Article 8 of the Council Regulation before 
the Irish High Court, which recognised the decision of the Minister to impound the aircraft 
ultra vires.394 On appeal from Ireland’s Ministry of Transport, the Supreme Court was asked 
to refer the issue for preliminary ruling to the ECJ to determine whether Article 8 of the 
Regulation No 990/93 could be invoked in respect of an aircraft,  
 
‘which is owned by an undertaking the majority or controlling interest in 
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which is held by an undertaking in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro) where such aircraft has been leased by the owner for a term 
of four years from 22 April 1992 to an undertaking the majority or controlling 
interest in which is not held by a person or undertaking in or operating from 
the said Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)’.395  
 
Having not considered the impounding as ‘inappropriate or disproportionate’, the ECJ 
justified the application of Article 8 of the Regulation by the general interest of the 
international community to bringing an end to the armed conflict and violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.396  The 
Supreme Court, affirming in its judgment of 29 November 1996 the binding nature of the ECJ 
decision, allowed the appeal of the Ministry of Transport.397  
 
Claiming a violation of a right under Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention to the 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions, the applicant filed a complaint with the European 
Commission of Human Rights in March 1997, which was forwarded to the Strasbourg Court 
in November 1998398 when Protocol No 11399 came into effect. The ECtHR had to determine 
whether the actions of the state should be qualified as voluntary, as argued by the petitioner, 
or an obligation resulting from membership of an international organisation.400 If the latter, 
this would have entailed the need to evaluate the equivalence of the human rights protection.  
 
The government of Ireland argued that, for the purpose of adhering to its international 
obligations, it was obliged to comply with the Security Council Resolution and implement the 
EC Regulation that constituted a lawful basis for a such interference.401 Given that it was 
important to preserve the distinctive nature of the EC and its legal system, the Strasbourg 
Court while awaiting the accession of the EU to the ECHR decided to follow the approach 
applied in M & Co. 402  By acknowledging that the fundamental rights in the examined 
organisation were secured in a manner which could be considered ‘at least equivalent’ to that 
provided by the Convention, the Court held that the respondent state did not infringe the 
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requirements of the ECHR when giving effect to its obligations originating from membership 
of the EC.403 The Strasbourg Court clarified that ‘equivalent’ meant ‘comparable’, which did 
not imply ‘identical’ protection as it was not intended to substitute entirely the protection 
under the ECHR, but was focused on achieving the similar results in the interests of the 
international cooperation.404  
 
The responsibility of the state under the Convention could only be invoked if it operated 
within the discretion conferred on it by the international organisation, the compatibility of 
which with the ECHR might be controlled by the Convention institutions.405  If the existence 
of such discretion was not identified, the ECtHR would need to decide whether the equivalent 
protection doctrine was applicable to a given case. Any of finding on equivalence would be 
subject to control by the ECtHR with a view to revealing probable changes in the protection 
of the fundamental rights.406 The state would be presumed to be acting within the scope of the 
Convention obligations when implementing Community law, and the acts of the EC would be 
exempt from conformity review by the Strasbourg Court, as long as this protection did not 
prove to be ‘manifestly deficient’.407  Should this happen, the Convention would carry out its 
role ‘as a constitutional instrument of European public order’408 in the area of human rights, 
and the states would be held responsible under the ECHR.  
 
Given that the ECtHR has not yet shed light on the ‘manifest deficiency’ concept, its very 
nature remains opaque. 409  Former judge at the ECtHR, Georg Ress, mentioned in a 
Concurring Opinion in Bosphorus that this presumption could be rebutted when the ECJ 
either lacked competence or misapplied rights guaranteed under the Convention, or the locus 
standi was interpreted in a very restrictive way.410 Paul De Hert and Fisnik Korenica have 
argued that the insufficient protection of fundamental rights in the Community, for instance, 
in the event the case was not reviewed by judicial mechanisms of the EU might be covered by 
this concept.411 This was affirmed by the ECtHR in Fritz and Nana v France, in which it 
emphasised that a refusal to introduce a preliminary ruling might amount to infringement of 
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Article 6 of the Convention. 412   
 
In light of the lack of the regulation of this issue, it is important to elaborate a more detailed 
approach specifying the precise conditions for defining the existence of a manifest deficiency. 
This would also require to tackle the problem of the burden of proof, 413 which was to some 
extent touched upon in Klausecker v Germany.414 
 1.4.3		 Klausecker	v	Germany	
 
The case concerned a refusal of the applicant’s employment in the European Patent Office 
(EPO). His appeal to the President of the EPO415 was rejected pursuant to Articles 106 and 
107(1) of the Service Regulations for Permanent Employees of the EPO under which only 
staff members were granted the right to lodge internal appeals.416 Given that, under Article 3 
of Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of the EPO417 and Article 8 of the European Patent 
Convention,418 the EPO possessed certain privileges needed to perform its functions without 
any influence on the part of the member states, and thus was immune from the jurisdiction of 
the German courts.419 The applicant’s direct complaint under Article 19(4) of the Basic Law to 
the FCC was also dismissed,420 as no act of public authority, as stipulated in subparagraph 4 
Article 93(1) of the Basic Law and Article 90(1) of the Law ‘On the FCC’, was at issue. 
 
The Administrative Tribunal of the International Law Organisation, 421  the highest 
jurisdictional organ to resolve disputes between the EPO and its staff members, similarly 
rejected the appeal because of the lack of competence in respect of individuals who had not 
     ______________________________ 
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been recruited.422 An offer from the EPO to bring the case to arbitration was declined by the 
applicant, who argued that such a procedure was in breach of the Convention procedural 
guarantees.423 He filed a case with the Strasbourg Court against Germany, claiming a violation 
of Articles 6(1) and 13 of the ECHR, due to the lack of access to domestic courts, and 
asserting that the EPO legal order did not provide the protection of human rights equivalent to 
that envisaged by the Convention.424 The Strasbourg Court, having justified the interference 
with the right of access to German courts on grounds of public interest, did not find a 
violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 6(1).425 It held that the offer of arbitration 
constituted a ‘reasonable alternative means’ of examination on the merits of the complaint, 
and did not disclose a ‘manifestly deficient protection of fundamental rights within the 
EPO’.426 Imposed limitations had been recognised proportionate, and Germany could not be 
held responsible for these deficient procedures. Thus, the Klausecker suggests that the burden 
of proof in contesting the presumption of equivalent protection lies with the applicant,427but 
the remaining uncertainties as regards the standard of review that will be appled in such cases 
still have to be addressed by the ECtHR in order to avoid any doubts about the accuracy of its 
judgments. 
 1.4.4	Further	application	of	the	doctrine	in	light	of	the	EU	accession	to	the	ECHR	
 
Given that the negotiations on accession of the EU to the ECHR are currently suspended, the 
application of the equivalent protection doctrine might be beneficial for maintaining 
harmonious cooperation between the two judicial institutions, and for protecting the interests 
of the state not to have to renounce its obligations stemming from the membership of 
international organisation to comply with the requirements of the Convention.  
 
In this context, experts took particular interest in whether it would be rational to continue 
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applying this doctrine after accession of the Union to the Convention.428 Since DAA did not 
elaborate on how this problem should be resolved, it has been discussed in the legal literature 
that the exercise of this doctrine, which might impede the development of the protection of 
fundamental rights in Europe, should be subsequently abandoned.429 Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, 
Traja, Botoucharova, Zagrebelsky and Garlicki, in their Joint Concurring Opinion in 
Bosphorus, criticised the way the equivalent protection doctrine is being applied, claiming 
that the ECtHR has ‘raised the possibility of inequality between Conracting States’ by 
creating ‘different obligations’ for the states dividing them into those which had already 
acceded to it and those who had not.430 Tobias Lock argued that it would not be fair to exclude 
EU acts from the scrutiny by the ECtHR as such privileged status would differ from that of 
EU member states which are already parties to the ECHR.431 
 
There is no ground for maintaining this regime, as it might threaten the very aim of the 
Convention ‘to achieve greater unity in the maintenance and further realisation of human 
rights’.432 This is particularly significant for individuals as they still lack access to EU judicial 
institutions and are not allowed to appeal all EU acts to the CJEU. The action for annulment 
pursuant to Article 263(4) TFEU aims to provide an avenue to bring a case against a 
regulatory act not entailing implementing measures. If such a measure falls within the 
competence of EU institutions, the action could be brought against it directly under Article 
277 TFEU, and the question of its applicability could be raised before the CJEU. Otherwise, a 
review of measures adopted by the member states to implement the contested EU legal act 
should be brought before national courts, which would be expected to refer the issue to the 
CJEU for a preliminary ruling in accordance with Article 267 TFEU.433  
 
Accroding to Advocate General Mengozzi, the preliminary ruling procedure is a means of 
cooperation between the domestic courts and the CJEU rather than a judicial remedy for the 
complainants.434 Francis G Jacobs, former AG of the Court of Justice, has commented that 
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even if the preliminary ruling procedure contributed to the uniform interpretation of 
Community law and assisted in further integration of EC legislation into the legal orders of 
the member states, it did not facilitate access of individuals to justice in the EU435 as the 
submission of a request to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling falls within the discretionary 
competence of national courts. This is why neither the possibility of a direct review of the 
legality of EU acts, nor indirect review by means of the preliminary ruling procedure, which 
is not available to individuals, might strengthen their position before the CJEU. 
 
If the equivalent protection doctrine is set aside, the Strasbourg Court would then be granted a 
right to challenge the supremacy of EU law.436  Paul de Hert and Fisnik Korenica believe that 
the autonomy of EU law would be preserved if this doctrine continues to be applied,437 and 
that the Matthews approach, as proposed by Paul Gragl, which called for responsibility of 
member states for violations of EU primary law, remains intact.438 Given that such cases 
would require the Strasbourg Court to determine whether the violation resulted from primary 
or secondary law, it would be involved in the process of examining the distribution of powers 
between the EU and its member states, which might encroach on the autonomy of the Union’s 
legal order. 439  It seems therefore prudent that for the purpose of maintaining a stable 
coexistence between the CJEU and the ECtHR 440  and assuring individuals the most 
comprehensive protection of their rights in the European legal arena, further application of the 
equivalent protection doctrine is abandoned. It still remains to be seen, however, which 
consequences the anticipated accession of the EU to the ECHR can entail for the relationship 
between these courts, and how the Bosphorus doctrine will eventually be accommodated. 
 
1.5	Chapter	summary	
 
This chapter demonstrated how the supranational and national courts have managed to build a 
cooperative relationship to avoid potential jurisdictional clashes. The long history of 
collaboration between the courts of the member states and the CJEU originated in the 
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persistent efforts of the latter to preserve the supremacy of Community law against constant 
attempts by states to challenge it, and has affected the practice of the Court of Justice to the 
extent that over time it has elaborated its own body of case law on fundamental rights, and has 
been thus recognised as lawful in the protection of individuals at the Community level. 
 
The analysis of the relationship between the courts of the member states and the CJEU shows 
the existence of a longstanding problem of determining the constitutional limits to European 
integration. Member states have reserved the right to supervise the constitutionality of EU 
legislation by invoking various domestic review mechanisms, including fundamental rights 
reviews, ultra vires reviews, and constitutional identity reviews. These were elaborated in the 
jurisprudence of the FCC, which observing that Community law did not provide efficient 
protection of fundamental rights, established in Solange I its authority to review EU 
secondary law and to declare any EU act that was found to be incompatible with fundamental 
rights under the Basic Law inapplicable in the national legal system. Having constrained itself 
in exercising this power in Solange II, the FCC affirmed that the level of the fundamental 
rights protection in the Community was equal to that granted under the Basic Law, but 
nevertheless continued to control the limits of transferred sovereign powers to the EU through 
ultra vires review, as defined in Maastricht, and constitutional identity review, as outlined in 
Lisbon, to safeguard the constitutional principles of the state.  
 
Clearly, the idea of providing strong protection of fundamental rights in the German legal 
order and securing the constitutional identity of the state against the increasing power of the 
EU was proved to be central in the FCC’s jurisprudence. 441  The FCC, in resolving 
contradictions between EU law and the national constitutional law in favour of the latter, will 
always strive to preserve its role as a significant actor in controlling the process of Germany’s 
participation in the European legal space.  
 
As the legal systems of both the EU and its member states are interconnected, and their 
respective judicial institutions have supreme power within their own sphere of influence, the 
underlying principle of their relationship is not in establishing ‘subordination but about 
appropriately sharing and assigning responsibilities in a complex multilevel system’.442 Given 
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that this is of practical importance to harmonising judicial cooperation, the CJEU would be 
expected to be more attentive to those solutions adopted at the national level by revising its 
own position when required to achieve better compliance by national authorities with EU law. 
In the same vein, the courts of the member states that have reserved the right to review EU 
law should limit the exercise of that power so as not to undermine the unity of the EU legal 
system and the credibility of the CJEU. 
 
The chapter highlighted that such extended competence of the CJEU to deal with cases 
concerning fundamental rights may increase a risk of jurisdictional tensions with the 
Strasbourg Court. It has been discussed that accession of the EU to the Convention will 
contribute significantly to alignment of judicial practices of the courts and ensure coherence 
in their actions. Possible ways of addressing concerns expressed by the Court of Justice in 
Opinion 2/13 were suggested in order to proceed with accession negotiations. The chapter 
evaluated potential changes that might occur in the relationship between the CJEU and the 
ECtHR in the event EU accedes to the ECHR and examined the legitimacy of the use of the 
doctrine of equivalent protection in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. It has been argued that to 
contribute to maintaining a stable cooperation between the two regimes and strengthen the 
protection of fundamental rights in the EU it would not be rational after EU’s accession to the 
Convention to continue adhering to Bosphorus approach that is currently applied in respect of 
the EU. 
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CHAPTER	II	
INTERACTION	BETWEEN	THE	ECTHR	AND	NATIONAL	COURTS	
 
2.1	Introduction	
 
This chapter addresses challenges in the relationship between the Strasbourg Court and the 
courts of the ECHR contracting parties. It seeks to determine the rank of the Convention and 
the status of judgments of the ECtHR in the hierarchy of legal sources of the ECHR member 
states and evaluate the role of domestic authorities in Germany and Russia in implementing 
the ECtHR’s judgments and in harmonising the national legislation and judicial practices in 
accordance with the Convention standards.  
 
The chapter explores the extent to which member states adhere to their obligations under the 
ECHR and scrutinises how they settle tensions that emerge between the Convention and 
national constitutional law. It first provides an analysis of the effect of the ECtHR’s judgments 
in the German legal system, and shows how the FCC approaches the resolution of 
jurisdictional conflicts. It then describes how a balance of powers between the Strasbourg 
Court and the Russian Constitutional Court (RCC) has been struck, taking into account recent 
legislative changes and developments in the jurisprudence of the RCC, which has acquired a 
power to rule on the enforceability of ECtHR’s judgments. The chapter outilnes the extent to 
which the judgments of the Strasbourg Court that contradict the fundamental principles of the 
state’s legal order could be executed in the national legal system. Suggestions are made to 
avoid clashes between the ECtHR and national judiciaries, and improve their cooperation for 
the most effective implementation of the ECHR in member states. 
 
Finally, the chapter examines the challenges in applying the margin of appreciation doctrine in 
the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, reflects on concerns over the legitimacy of the 
European consensus concept, and proposes how to remove uncertainties in the use of these 
judicial instruments in the ECtHR’s practice.  
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2.2	Implementation	of	the	Strasbourg	Court's	judgments	in	Germany	
 
The principle of openness towards international law 443  which, according to Andreas 
Voβkuhle, combines ‘the exercise of state sovereignty with the idea of international 
cooperation’, 444  seeks to facilitate the integration of Germany in the international 
community.445 However, this approach was not effective enough, as the transfer of decision-
making powers to international organisation was circumscribed by the requirements of the 
Basic Law, and subject to the oversight of the FCC.446  
 
The incorporation of the ECHR into the German legal system was carried out in accordance 
with Article 59(2) of the Basic Law which reads: 
 
‘Treaties that regulate the political relations of the Federation or 
relate to subjects of federal legislation shall require the consent or 
participation, in the form of a federal law, of the bodies responsible 
in such a case for the enactment of federal law’. 
 
Since 1952, when Germany ratified the ECHR,447 it has obtained a status of non-constitutional 
federal law448 in the national legal system. As soon as the right of the individual petition under 
the Convention’s mechanism was recognised,449 complaints were submitted first to the FCC 
(thus exhausting domestic remedy as required under Article 35(1) of the Convention), and 
then to the European Commission and the ECtHR itself. 450  Given that the Basic Law’s 
openness to international integration was limited to functions of constitutional law,451 the 
jurisdictional tensions between the Strasbourg Court and the FCC which were conceived as 
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‘comparable institutions of jurisdiction as regards their functions, which adjudicate according 
to closely related catalogues of fundamental rights’ were inevitable, due to the existence of 
such parallel competence.452  
 2.2.1	Von	Hannover	v	Germany	
 
Although the number of adverse judgments from the Strasbourg Court in respect of Germany 
is relatively low,453 it has come into conflict with the FCC. The case at hand, Von Hannover v 
Germany, a series of cases which dealt with the protection of the privacy of public figures, 
illustrated how the FCC and the ECtHR clashed in balancing the positive obligation to secure 
the right to privacy as guaranteed under Article 8 of the Convention against a negative 
obligation not to infringe freedom of expression as stipulated in Article 10. 
 
Princess Caroline, the eldest daughter of Prince Rainier III of Monaco, made unsuccessful 
attempts in the national courts to obtain an injunction prohibiting publication of photographs 
disclosing the details of her private life.454 She appealed to the FCC, claiming that publication 
was a breach of the right to free development of her personality enshrined in Articles 1(1) and 
2(1) of the Basic Law.455 The FCC, paying particular attention to the public’s interest in the 
Princess’s behaviour that went beyond her representative functions, allowed the appeal in so 
far as it concerned the right to family protection, as guaranteed in Article 6 of the Basic 
Law.456  
 
In 2004, the applicant appealed to the ECtHR alleging a violation of the Convention rights 
under Article 8.457 The German government argued that the domestic courts, in defending the 
interest of the nation in knowing details of Princess’s private life because of her influence on 
society, attempted to ensure balance between the applicant’s right to a private life and freedom 
of the press.458 The Strasbourg Court in weighing these conflicting rights came, however, to a 
different conclusion. Having invoked its responsibility to provide protection of private life 
from the view of the development of one’s personality, the Court criticised the position of the 
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German courts, stressing that insufficient respect has been paid to the reputation and private 
lives of others.459 It held that there was neither contribution to public debate as no official 
functions were exercised, nor public’s legitimate interest in being informed of the applicant’s 
daily routine.460 The Court recognised that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the 
Convention as the German courts had not managed to balance these rights within the limits of 
the margin granted to the state.461  
 
Despite relying on the Strasbourg Court’s judgment before the German courts, the applicant’s 
later attempts to restrain publication of photographs were refused462 as the national authorities 
experienced difficulties in executing the ECtHR’s judgment.463 Therefore, the case was taken 
repeatedly in 2012 to the ECtHR due to the publication of photographs of the applicant’s 
skiing holiday accompanied by an article on the poor health of her father.464 The Strasbourg 
Court has observed that the national courts, in following the provisions of the Convention, the 
previous judgment of the ECtHR, and its relevant case law when determining whether the 
photos and article contributed to a debate of general interest, had made changes to their 
judicial practices to balance the competing rights of the applicant’s right to privacy and the 
publishing company’s freedom of expression.465 Having confirmed the legitimacy of public’s 
interest in knowing about the health status of the Prince Ranier of Monaco and his family’s 
reaction to that, the Court held in Von Hannover v Germany (no 2) that the national authorities 
had complied with their positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention.466 However, 
even if the German courts altered their position when reconciling these conflicting values, 
they still lacked the ability to provide adequate procedural protection for the applicants’ 
interests.467  
 
Princess Caroline returned to the Strasbourg Court in 2013, following the publication of more 
holiday photos.468 Reaffirming the positive shifts in the jurisprudence of the German courts in 
finding an equilibrium between the rights in Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention, the ECtHR 
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upheld the Government’s position that there was no connection between those photos and the 
article that accompanied them which could contribute to a debate of general interest, and 
acknowledged that the state, in giving due weight to the principle of proportionality, had 
managed to operate within the scope of the margin of appreciation granted to it.469 
 
Taking into account that these rights deserve equal respect,470 it still remains problematic in 
practice to achieve the right balance ‘between the competing interests of the individual and of 
the community as a whole’.471 Given the fact that the two courts are applying divergent 
methodological approaches in evaluating the conflicting interests, this might give rise to 
further inconsistencies in their judicial practices. Therefore, to prevent possible contradictions 
between the Strasbourg Court and the domestic courts which may compromise legal 
certainty,472 the ECtHR would be expected to leave broad discretion to member states to 
tackle such disputes, and the national courts would be required to attach more attention in 
their jurisprudence to Convention standards and the case law of the Strasbourg Court.  
 2.2.2	Görgülü	case	and	its	effect	in	the	domestic	legal	order	
 
Following a series of cases in Von Hannover v Germany the FCC acknowledged the necessity 
to determine the legal status of the ECHR and of the judgments of the Strasbourg Court in the 
German legal system. The FCC’s Görgülü case of 14 October 2004 was seen as a response to 
the Strasbourg Court’s first judgment in Von Hannover v Germany of 24 June 2004 that 
challenged the decision of the FCC of 13 April 2000 473  and had an immense practical 
significance as it shed light on the nature of the obligations of Germany arising from the 
participation in this international treaty.474 
 
The case concerned the custody of a child born out of wedlock. The applicant was denied the 
right to visit his child, who had been placed with a foster family,475 and his appeals lodged 
with the German courts had failed.476  In view of the FCC’s refusal on 31 July 2001 to 
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examine his constitutional complaint,477 Görgülü took the case to the ECtHR, which, having 
recognised a violation of the Convention right to private and family life stipulated in Article 8, 
eventually ruled in his favour on 26 May 2004.478 
 
In balancing the competing interests of the applicant and the rights of the child and foster 
family, the Strasbourg Court drew attention to the need to maintain the bond between a natural 
parent and their child, which could not be achieved if they were not permitted to see each 
other or only on a rare basis that would not assist in establishing the familial relationship 
between them.479 The Court held that the decision of the Naumburg Court of Appeal rejecting 
the applicant’s request for custody and suspending access to the child for one year was 
disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and thus represented a serious interference 
with the right to a family life.480 Under Article 46 of the Convention, Germany was required 
to make redress and at least grant the applicant access to the child.481  
 
Having stressed that the Strasbourg Court’s judgments have limited effect and are binding on 
Germany only as a subject of public international law, but not the domestic courts which are 
independent under Article 97(1) of the Basic Law, the Naumburg Higher Regional Court by 
Order of 30 March 2004482 suspended the temporary injunction on access rights issued by the 
Wittenberg Local Court on 19 March, and later cancelled this injunction as it lacked a legal 
basis under procedural law.483 
 
The complainant’s constitutional appeal challenging this Order and requesting a temporary 
injunction on access to the child was allowed. The FCC held that the ECHR and the case law 
of the ECtHR served as ‘guides to interpretation in determining the content and scope of the 
fundamental rights and constitutional principles of the Basic Law’ and should be taken into 
account by all state bodies in Germany, as long as they did not diminish the protection of the 
rights of individuals under the German Constitution. 484  It was emphasised that such an 
obligation would require the courts to ‘take notice’ or ‘at least duly consider’ the Convention’s 
guarantees and their interpretation by the Strasbourg Court when deciding a case if it does not 
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infringe constitutional law.485 The FCC justified this approach by reference to the status of the 
ECHR within the hierarchy of legal acts which, like other federal statutes, should be applied 
by the German courts in the interpretation of national legislation, including the fundamental 
rights and constitutional guarantees.486 This is equally important to avoiding any conflict with 
Germany’s obligations under international law and in complying with the provisions of 
Article 20(3) of Basic Law requiring judges to abide by the law in rendering decisions.487 
 
The FCC stressed that, although those guarantees under the Convention and its Protocols do 
not represent a ‘direct constitutional standard of review’,488 Articles 1(2) and 59(2) of the 
Basic Law constitute a basis for ensuring compliance with international obligations by 
Germany, especially those resulting from the ECHR, and for examining any allegations that 
national authorities either disregarded or did not take into consideration a decision of the 
Strasbourg Court when interpreting the fundamental rights enshrined in the Basic Law.489 
According to Christian Djeffal, this could make the ECHR ‘quasi constitutional’.490 
 
Having found a violation of the constitutional right to respect for family life under Article 6 of 
the Basic Law, the FCC revoked the decision of the Naumburg Higher Regional Court as it 
had failed to give due weight to the interpretation of the ECHR made by the ECtHR on 26 
February 2004.491 This unprecedented case had an enormous impact on the national legal 
order, as it reinforced the supervisory function of the FCC in its oversight of the application of 
the Convention (and its interpretation by the Strasbourg Court) by national courts. In so 
doing, it sought to prevent any liability of the state under international law,492 but clarified that 
such a relationship between international and domestic law that represents ‘two different legal 
spheres’ is subject to regulation only by domestic law pursuant to Articles 25 and 59(2) of the 
Basic Law,493 and in the event of collision the German courts would have to apply the Basic 
Law.  
 
Given that this might hinder further implementation of the ECtHR’s judgments in the German 
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485  BVerfGE 111, 307 (n 443), para 62. 
486  ibid [30]-[31], [53]. 
487  ibid [33]. 
488  ibid [32]; see Basic Law (n 97), art 93.1 sec 4.a; BVerfGG (n 124), art 90.1. 
489  BVerfGE 111, 307 (n 443), paras 62, 63. 
490  Christian Djeffal, ‘Dynamic and Evolutive Interpretation of the ECHR by Domestic Courts? An Inquiry 
into the Judicial Architecture of Europe’ in Georg Nolte and Helmut Philipp Aust (eds), Interpretation of 
International Law by Domestic Courts-Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence (OUP 2016) 179. 
491  BVerfGE 111, 307 (n 443), paras 28, 29, 64. 
492  ibid [61]. 
493  ibid [34]. 
   73 
legal system,494 new tensions between the courts could arise, particularly, as discussed earlier, 
in multipolar cases in which the rights of individuals are connected in a contradictory way. 
When balancing such conflicts of interest in family law, the law concerning aliens, and the 
law on the protection of personality,495 the Strasbourg Court would seek to reconcile their 
positions, which is, however, not its principal task, as it is mainly engaged in resolving 
disputes between the applicant and the state. In these cases it would be difficult to avoid 
contradictions between the ECHR and the domestic law because the ECtHR’s extensive 
interpretation of the rights of one party might сause a significant restriction of the rights of 
another under constitutional law, or might contradict the provisions of the Constitution.496  
 
The FCC has emphasised in Görgülu that in cases where the original proceedings were in 
civil law, which may not completely reflect the legal interests involved, the domestic courts 
should determine the extent to which the ECtHR’s judgments will be taken into account, and 
if they ‘do not follow the international – law interpretation of the law’, would have to justify it 
in an understandable manner.497 Jens Meyer Ladewig has expressed doubts as to whether 
having the opportunity to depart from accepted international obligations would correspond 
with the Convention requirement of Article 46(1), under which the contracting parties to the 
Convention are bound by the judgments of the ECtHR.498 The FCC clarified that there was: 
 
‘no contradiction with the aim of commitment to international law, if 
the legislature, exceptionally, does not comply with the law of 
international agreements, provided this is the only way in which a 
violation of fundamental principles of the constitution can be 
averted’.499 
 
This position of the Court has been criticised by the former President of the ECtHR, Luzius 
Wildhaber, who expressed his hope for a more ‘European sense of responsibility’ from 
Germany.500 Given that it is important to continue contributing to the development of effective 
protection of fundamental rights in Europe judgments of the Strasbourg Court would not be 
disregarded by national authorities without ‘good reason’,501 and even if a control over their 
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enforcement was reserved,502 the FCC confirmed its willingness to ‘help the ECtHR with 
implementing its decisions’.503 Hans-Jürgen Papier, former President of the FCC, described 
this relationship between the courts as cooperative in ‘carrying out similar tasks of protection 
of human and basic rights’.504 
 
It is thus clear that in those legal systems where the boundaries between national and 
international legal orders are explicitly delineated, and international law is subordinate to the 
Constitution, further collisions are inevitable. André Nollkaemper argued that even if 
international law is domesticated and forms a part of the national legal order, the institutions 
applying it are guided by national rather than international law.505 Former judge of the FCC, 
Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff, has opined that it would be difficult in such cases to meet the 
requirements of both international and national law, and the national court runs the risk of 
violating the international treaty by giving precedence to the constitutional guarantees at the 
cost of deviating from accepted under the ECHR obligations.506 It is therefore significant to 
ensure that national authorities interpret the provisions of national legislation found by the 
ECtHR to be incompatible with the Convention either in a way which is compatible, or amend 
it in line with the ECHR requirements.507 Jens Meyer - Ladewig expressed confidence that all 
German legislation, including the Basic Law, respected the Convention and its interpretation 
by the Strasbourg Court.508  
 
Needless to say that the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR have always had a great effect 
in the German legal system as public authorities have consistently demonstrated their 
eagerness to adapt national legislation and legal practices to the Convention standards.509 For 
instance, following Elsholz v Germany,510 Germany passed the Law on Family Matters of 16 
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December 1997511 that introduced changes to legal regulation of child custody. Amended 
provisions of Articles 1626 and 1684 of the German Civil Code512 were later challenged in 
Görgülü. It is also important to note that the Code of Criminal Procedure513 and the Code of 
Civil Procedure514 recognise the judgments of the ECtHR finding a violation of the ECHR as 
a ground for reopening domestic proceedings. 
 
As a contracting party to the Convention for more than 60 years, Germany has performed its 
duties under the treaty in a most diligent and efficient way.515 In attaching due weight to its 
Convention obligations, it has timely implemented adverse judgments of the ECtHR, 
amending national legislation and ensuring adherence of domestic courts to their 
responsibility to review cases in accordance with the decisions of the ECtHR.516 In light of 
this accumulated positive experience of Germany in enforcing judgments of the Strasbourg 
Court, other relatively new contracting parties to the Convention such as the Russian 
Federation, which still need to create an internationally positive image in complying with the 
Convention obligations, may be able to benefit from it.  
 
 
2.3	 Conflicts	 between	 the	 ECtHR	 and	 the	 Russian	 Constitutional	
Court		
 2.3.1	The	status	of	the	ECHR	in	the	Russian	legal	system	
 
Accession of the Russian Federation to the CoE was challenging and took several years due to 
grave human rights violations, notably ‘indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force by 
the Russian military [...] against the civilian population’ in Chechnya.517 Having encouraged 
the state to resolve the Chechnya conflict first, the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE 
(PACE) decided to suspend the consideration of Russia’s request to become a member state of 
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the Council.518 
 
To meet the necessary conditions for membership, Russia was required to undertake several 
measures, including introducing new laws in accordance with the CoE standards, bringing 
those accused of human rights violations to justice, reviewing the detention conditions.519 
Almost three years after the application was submitted, PACE, noting the efforts by Russia to 
end the Chechnya conflict, to be integrated into international and European organisations, to 
respect the rule of law, and to improve the legislative basis for the protection of human rights, 
reopened the procedure.520 By accentuating the importance of these positive developments, 
PACE expressed a strong belief that Russia would be able to meet the conditions established 
by Articles 3 and 4 of the Statute of the Council, and on 14 February 1996 the state was 
invited to become the 39th member of the CoE.521  
 
The Russian Federation acceded to the CoE on 28 February 1996, ratified the ECHR on 5 
May 1998 and accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ECtHR concerning the questions of 
interpretation and application of the Convention and its Protocols. 522   It was obvious, 
however, in the case of Russia that the ‘isolationist tendency of Soviet society in general and 
of the Soviet legal system in particular’ continued to dominate, 523  which is why full 
compliance with international human rights standards was still deficient. The primacy of 
international law over national law was established by Article 129 of the Basic Principles of 
Civil Law of the Soviet Union and the Republics of 1961.524  During the perestroika 525 
(restructuring) period, the Government of Mikhail Gorbachev expressed the intention to bring 
national legislation in line with the requirements of international law.526 In the letter of 28 
February 1989 to the UN Secretary-General, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet 
     ______________________________ 
518  ibid [11]. 
519  Muehlemann, Report on Russia’s Request for Membership in the Light of the Situation in Chechnya (Doc 
7230, 30 January 1995), para 16. 
520   PACE, Procedure for an opinion on Russia’s request for membership of the Council of Europe, Res 1065 
(1995) 26 September 1995; Muehlemann, Report on procedure for an opinion on Russia’s request for 
membership for the Council of Europe (Doc. 7372, 11 September 1995). 
521  CM, Invitation to the Russian Federation to become a member of the Council of Europe, Res (96) 2, 14 
February 1996; PACE, Opinion No 193 on application by Russia for membership of the Council of Europe, 
25 January 1996, para 7. 
522   Federal Law of the Russian Federation N54-FZ ‘O Ratifikacii Konvencii o Zawite Prav Cheloveka y 
Osnovnih Svobod y Protokolov k Nei’ [On the Ratification of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols] 30 March 1998 // RG N67, 7 April 1998, 
art 1. 
523   Gennady M Danilenko, ‘The New Russian Constitution and International Law’ (1994) 88 AJIL 451, 458. 
524   Zakon SSSR ob Utverzhdenii Osnov Grazhdanskogo Sudoproizvodstva Soyuza SSR y Soyuznih Respublik 
8 December 1961 // Bull of the USSR Supreme Soviet N50, St 526. 
525   Kristen Renwick Monroe, Perestroika!: The Raucous Rebellion in Political Science (Yale UP 2005) 4.  
526   Mikhail Gorbachev, The Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World (Pravda 1987) 13. 
   77 
Union, Eduard Shevardnadse, has underlined that the Union strived to strengthen international 
legal order by ensuring that international law and the obligations of the state take precedence 
over their internal regulations.527 
 
The principle of direct effect of international law envisaged in Article 1(2) of the Declaration 
of the Rights and Freedoms of Man and of the Citizen of 1991528 was inserted into Article 32 
of the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic of 12 April 1978529 by 
means of the Law of the Russian Federation N2708-I of 1992.530 In the wake of subsequent 
constitutional reforms in the 1990s, ‘a new openness in the field of international relations’ was 
observed.531 This was later reflected in Article 15(4) of the Russian Constitution of 1993, 
which reads: 
 
‘The commonly recognised principles and norms of international law and 
international treaties of the Russian Federation shall be a component part 
of its legal system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federation 
determines other rules than those stipulated by the law, the rules of 
international treaty shall apply’.532   
 
Despite such a friendly approach to international law, the exact legal status of the ECHR in 
the hierarchy of sources of law in the Russian legal system has not been defined. Within the 
meaning of Article 15(1) of the Constitution, which recognised that: 
 
‘[l]aws and other legal acts adopted by the Russian Federation may not 
contravene the Constitution of the Russian Federation that has supreme 
legal force, direct effect, and shall be applicable throughout the entire 
territory of the Russian Federation’,  
 
the ECHR would presumably rank below the Constitution if the term ‘other legal acts’ is 
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interpreted as including international treaties ratified by the state.533 Valery Zorkin, Chairman 
of the Russian Constitutional Court (RCC), argued that, under Article 15(4), the ECHR 
constituted an integral part of its legal system, but the supremacy of international treaties 
would not cover the Constitution itself as exclusive power to interpret it was vested in the 
RCC. 534 Given that the Strasbourg Court's interpretation of the Convention could not supplant 
the RCC,535 the legal status of the ECHR might be determined as having a priority over 
ordinary laws unless there was conflict with the Constitution.536  
 
Not only is the legal status of the Convention in the legal system of the Russian Federation 
ambiguous, but the legal nature of the judgments of the ECtHR might also be uncertain. In 
Resolution N4-P of 2 February 1996, the RCC clarified that, in light of the constitutional right 
to apply to international judicial bodies under Article 46(3) of the Constitution, the decisions 
of international bodies might lead to a review of cases that had been held to be in violation of 
international law.537 This would mean that not only international treaties, but also decisions of 
international bodies were recognised as an integral part of the Russian legal system. Gennady 
Danilenko commented that the RCC had created by means of this Resolution an obligation to 
give direct effect in the national legal system to the decisions of international bodies, 
including those of the ECtHR.538 
 
In Resolution N1-P of 25 January 2001, the RCC declared that, having recognised the 
jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court, the Russian Federation has pledged itself to bring its 
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judicial practice in line with the requirements of the ECHR and its Protocols.539 In Ruling 
N12 of 10 October 2003, the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation stated 
that the judgments of the Strasbourg Court in respect of Russia were binding on national 
authorities, particularly the domestic courts.540 The Supreme Court instructed the lower courts 
to take into account any judgments of the ECtHR in which an interpretation of the 
Convention’s provisions is given.541 The RCC has similarly affirmed in its Resolution N2-P of 
5 February 2007 that judgments of the Strasbourg Court, in which the interpretation of the 
rights and freedoms defined in the Convention is provided, constitute an integral part of the 
Russian legal system, and should therefore be taken into account by the federal legislature and 
law enforcement agencies.542  
 
However, neither the Supreme Court nor the RCC clarified whether this interpretation of the 
Convention’s norms should be applied as a source of law or whether it was merely 
recommendatory, and whether account should be taken only of ECtHR’s judgments 
exclusively concerning Russia, or whether it also covered case law regarding other countries. 
 
No uniform approach was elaborated so far as to how this direction ‘to take into account’ 
should be interpreted. It has been argued that it could be read as a moral duty ‘to have regard 
to, but not be obliged in any way to follow’. 543  Anton Burkov believes that, since the 
statement was made in a decision of the RCC, the interpretation of the Convention by the 
Strasbourg Court contained either in the judgments against Russia or other contracting parties 
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to the Convention is binding on the state. 544  This would mean that the RCC, having 
interpreted Article 15(4) of the Constitution broadly, acknowledged that the national courts 
are obliged to adhere to the case law of the Strasbourg Court, which composes a part of the 
Russian legal system. 
 
Bogdan Zimnenko has argued that the Strasbourg Court’s judgments may fairly be regarded 
as precedents of interpretation,545 because the ECtHR, when deciding the cases, interprets the 
norms of the Convention.546 By contrast, Irina Metlova has argued that, even if the ECtHR 
interprets the provisions of the Convention in each decision, its judgments are rendered in the 
context of a particular case, and interpretation of the Convention is not the reason for the case 
being heard.547 Based on this, it could be assumed that the nature of the judgments of the 
ECtHR is dual.548 This means that they are incorporated into the Russian legal system as acts 
of individual resolution of specific disputes, which are binding on the state concerned, and 
also as acts of official interpretation of the Convention that constitute a precedent for the 
resolution of similar future cases. 
 
This understanding was reaffirmed in the Ruling of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation of 27 June 2013,549 in which it held that the interpretation of the ECHR 
given by the ECtHR in a particular case in respect of Russia is binding on the courts as it 
serves the function of subsidiary argument, and when the domestic constitutional level of 
protection of human rights is lower than that provided by the ECHR. The interpretation of the 
ECHR given by the ECtHR in respect of other contracting parties to the Convention should be 
taken into account by national courts if the circumstances of the case under consideration are 
similar.550 Such a broad understanding of the state’s obligations arising from the Convention 
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goes beyond the meaning of Article 1 of the Federal Law ‘On the ratification of the ECHR’. 
 
Despite the Plenum of the Supreme Court clearly stating that the incorrect interpretation or 
application by national courts of principles and norms of international law and international 
treaties of the Russian Federation might be grounds for annulment or modification of the 
judicial act,551 in practice judges retain considerable discretion.552 This could unfortunately 
lead to conflict situations between the Strasbourg Court and the domestic courts, particularly 
the RCC, as has already taken place as a consequence of the ECtHR judgment in Konstantin 
Markin v Russia.553 
 2.3.2	Markin	v	Russia	
 
Former Judge of the RCC, Nikolay Vitruk, has argued that an unconditional acceptance of the 
case law of the Strasbourg Court in the Russian Federation ‘could seriously weaken the legal 
force of the Constitution’. 554  These concerns increased following the judgment by the 
Strasbourg Court in Konstantin Markin v Russia which highlighted the problem of competing 
jurisdictions of the ECtHR and the RCC. Markin, a divorced father of three and soldier in the 
Russian Army, was excluded from entitlement to parental leave. Having unsuccessfully 
claimed before the national courts for three years’ parental leave in order to take care of his 
children,555 he appealed to the RCC,556 challenging the constitutionality of the provisions of 
     ______________________________ 
551   Plenum of the Supreme Court, Ruling N12 of 10 October 2003 (n 540), para 9.  
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Federalnogo zakona ‘O statuse voennosluzhawih’, statyi 32 Polozheniya ‘O poryadke prohozhdeniya 
voennoi sluzhbi’ y punktov 35 y 44 Polozheniya o ‘Naznachenii y viplate gosudarstvennih posobii 
grazhdanam, imeyuwih detei’ [On refusal to review the complaint of Konstantin Aleksandrovich Markin 
regarding a violation of his constitutional rights under the provisions of arts 13 and 15 of the Federal Law 
‘On State Aid to Citizens who have Children’, arts 10 and 11 of the Federal Law ‘On the Status of Military 
Personnel’, art 32 of the Regulations ‘On the Military Service’, and arts 35 and 44 of the Regulation ‘On 
the Award and Payment of State Assistance to Citizens who have Children’] // The text officially was not 
published, available at <http://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/1690938/ > accessed 17 October 
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Article 11(13) of the Federal Law ‘On the Status of Military Personnel’557 and Article 32(5) of 
the Regulation on Military Service558 as incompatible with the equality principles enshrined in 
Articles 19(2) and (3), 38(2) and 55(3) of the Constitution as there was only provision for 
servicewomen. 
 
In its Resolution of 15 January 2009, the RCC held that those who were involved in military 
service had a constitutional duty to protect the public interest, and therefore enjoyed a special 
legal status which curtailed certain civil rights and freedoms.559  The RCC affirmed that 
military personnel who voluntarily accepted this status were obliged by Article 10(1) of 
Federal Law and Article 37(1) of the Constitution to abide by the national legislation in order 
to defend the interests of the state.560 
 
It has been emphasised that the contested provisions were not per se ‘incompatible with the 
Constitution’ 561  as, in accordance with Article 1(2) of the Convention concerning 
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation ‘any distinction, exclusion or 
preference in respect of a particular job based on the inherent requirements thereof should not 
be deemed to be discrimination’.562 Although the Russian legislation did not envisage three 
years’ parental leave for servicemen, it secured their right to three months’ leave to resolve 
childcare issues under certain circumstances.563 If a serviceman decides to look after the child 
on his own, the Federal Law ‘On Military Duty and Military Service’ guarantees him a right 
to early discharge for family reasons.564 Thus, any combination of military duties and the right 
to paid parental leave for men is prohibited.565 Having clarified that granting parental leave 
only to servicewomen the legislature deferred to their limited participation in military 
operations and the special role of motherhood, which corresponded to Article 38(1) of the 
Constitution, the RCC сoncluded that no violation of the equality of rights guaranteed under 
Article 19(2) and (3) of the Constitution had taken place.566 
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2015. 
557   Federal Law N76-FZ ‘O Statuse Voennosluzhawih’ [On the Status of Military Personnel] 1 June 1998 // RG 
N 104, 2 June 1998. 
558   Polozhenie o Poryadke Prohozhdeniya Voennoi Sluzhbi [Regulation on Military Service], enacted by 
Presidential Decree of 16 September 1999 N1237 // SZ RF 20 September 1999. N38, St 4534. 
559   RCC, Resolution N187-O-O of 15 January 2009 (n 556), para 2.1. 
560   ibid. 
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562  ILO Convention No 111 (adopted 25 June 1958, entered into force 15 June 1960) 362 UNTS 31. 
563  Regulation on Military Service (n 558), art 32 (7). 
564  Federal Law N53-FZ ‘O Voinskoi Obyazannosti y Voennoi Sluzhbe’ [On Military Duty and Military 
Service] 28 March 1998 // RG N 63-64, 2 April 1998, art 51 para 3в subpara 5. 
565 RCC, Resolution N187-O-O of 15 January 2009 (n 556), para 2.2 subpara 3. 
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The logic of the approach of the RCC in justifying restrictions on military servicemen because 
military service is accepted voluntarily is flawed; it begs the question of how a serviceman 
should behave if he began to raise his children whilst already in the military. It could be 
presumed that in this case the early termination of employment would be expected. 
 
The ECtHR, having overruled in 2010 the decision of the RCC in Markin, was strongly 
criticised by Valery Zorkin who warned ‘against over-politicising of the ECtHR’s actions’ and 
pointed out that the Strasbourg Court’s judgment showed a ‘lack of respect for Russia’s 
legislators’.567 The Russian government expressed its dissatisfaction with that the judgment of 
the ECtHR required the state to take measures to cease discrimination against servicemen as 
regards their entitlement to parental leave. 568  Given that the contracting parties to the 
Convention were free to choose their own ways of eliminating violations revealed by the 
ECtHR, Zorkin had some doubts over whether in the context of Article 46 of the Convention 
the Strasbourg Court was competent to recommend the respondent state to make the necessary 
changes to national legislation.569  He argued that the exercise of such power goes beyond the 
scope of competence established by the Convention, and could be perceived as a direct 
intrusion into national sovereignty. The question might arise as to what extent those decisions 
would be enforceable in the Russian legal system if the issue of constitutionality of the 
contested provision had already been decided by the RCC. Zorkin drew attention to the need 
for finding ways to safeguard the sovereignty of the state and show respect for the Convention 
in order to comply with its obligations. 
 
Having referred to the FCC’s position in Görgülü, in which it held that there is no 
contradiction with international law if the legislature does not comply with it to uphold 
‘fundamental principles of the constitution’, 570  Zorkin has called on Russia and other 
countries to rely on this German precedent when resolving such challenging situations insofar 
as it is based on the constitutional principle of state sovereignty and the principle of 
supremacy of the Constitution.571 
     ______________________________ 
567  Zorkin (n 534). 
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Claiming that each decision of the Strasbourg Court is not only a legal, but also a political act, 
Zorkin asserted that Russia should unconditionally implement only those judgments that were 
handed down in the interests of the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of its 
citizens, but if they encroach on national sovereignty and basic constitutional principles it 
should develop a defence mechanism against them.572 He underlined that the problem of 
contradictory decisions of the RCC and the ECtHR must be decided only through the prism of 
the Constitution.573 
 
Former President of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, as a guarantor of the Russian 
Constitution,574 declared in 2010 that it is of great importance to continue strengthening the 
authority of the RCC and the national judicial system to secure the protection of the rights and 
interests of the citizens through domestic legal mechanisms.575  He argued that, although 
Russia had entrusted the Strasbourg Court with the power to decide cases of human rights 
abuses, it had never transferred that part of its sovereignty that would give any international or 
foreign court the right to render judgments requiring the amendment of the national 
legislation. Medvedev warned against any such attempt and pointed out that in view of such 
tense relationship with the ECtHR Russia might even withdraw from its jurisdiction.576 
 
The Russian government, having not accepted the position of the ECtHR that found a 
violation of Articles 14 and 8 ECHR,577 appealed against the decision in Markin to the Grand 
Chamber, which delivered its verdict on 22 March 2012.578 Referring in its reasoning to 
various international documents such as those of the UN,579 the CoE,580 the EU,581 the case-
law of the CJEU582 and a comparative study of the legislation of thirty-three member states of 
the CoE,583 the Chamber confirmed that in a majority of European countries,584 progress in 
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guaranteeing equal sharing of responsibilities between men and women in children’s 
upbringing has been made.585  
 
Given the increased role of men in raising children and that the RCC did not justify the 
restrictions on servicemen by reference to a potential threat to the operational effectiveness of 
the armed forces,586 the Grand Chamber upheld the decision of the ECtHR, but this time no 
recommendations requiring an amendment to national legislation were made. Former Russian 
Judge at the ECtHR, Anatoly Kovler, has described this softened approach as ‘political 
correctness’,587 which reaffirms that the ECtHR is not a ‘fourth-instance court’, and so avoids 
‘the re-examination of issues of fact and law decided by national courts’.588  
 
Having obtained the final decision of the Grand Chamber, Markin, relying on subparagraph 4 
of Article 392(4) of the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation (GPK),589 which lists 
among the grounds for reviewing judicial decisions a violation of the ECHR established by 
the ECtHR, has filed a petition with the St. Petersburg Regional Court seeking to reopen the 
case. However, given that subparagraph 3 of this Article lists among the grounds for review a 
non-compliance with the Russian Constitution of the law in question declared by the RCC in a 
specific case, the St. Petersburg Regional Court refused to reopen the proceedings. The 
Regional Court observed that Markin had already been compensated for non-pecuniary 
damage and the decision of the Grand Chamber as regards the restoration of individual rights 
had been fully enforced. Reopening proceedings to review the claims for parental leave was 
not possible as Markin was no longer in the army having been medically discharged, and in 
any case his son was over three years old.590   
 
It is interesting to note that within the frame of Markin case the RCC ruled on compatibility of 
the legislation with the Constitution, while the ECtHR found a violation of the provisions of 
the Convention based on the law of the Russian Federation, which was not found by the RCC. 
The St. Petersburg Regional Court asserted that resolving such controversial constitutional 
     ______________________________ 
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and conventional issues did not fall within its competence.591 The Leningrad District Military 
Court disagreed with the conclusion of the Regional Court, 592  and the appeal has been 
transferred to the Presidium, which suspended proceedings and turned to the RCC to verify 
the constitutionality of Article 11 and subparagraphs 3 and 4 of Article 392(4) GPK.593 
 
In its Resolution of 6 December 2013,594 the RCC affirmed that subparagraph 4 of Article 
392(4), read in conjunction with paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 11 GPK, had not been contrary 
to Article 15 of the Constitution. These provisions did not prevent a court reopening a case 
after an unsuccessful application to the RCC alleging infringement of constitutional rights and 
freedoms if the ECtHR established a violation of the claimant’s rights under the ECHR.595 
The RCC emphasised that if a court of general jurisdiction concludes that it cannot execute 
the Strasbourg Court’s decision without acknowledging the incompatibility of particular legal 
provisions with the Constitution, which previously had not been found by the RCC to violate 
the constitutional rights of the applicant, it could suspend the proceedings and request that the 
RCC review the constitutionality. 
 
Following Markin, the speaker of the Parliament’s Upper House, Aleksandr Torshin, 
submitted to the state Duma a draft bill596 to amend the Federal Constitutional Law ‘On the 
RCC’ 597  in order to secure the supremacy of the Constitution. 598  This encouraged the 
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legislators to pass Federal Constitutional Law N9-FKZ in 2014, Article 1(19) of which 
inserted the following paragraph into Article 101 FKZ ‘On the RCC’:  
 
‘the court when reviewing the case under those specific circumstances 
envisaged by the procedural legislation in view of the adoption of a decision 
by an interstate body for the protection of human rights and freedoms, in 
which a violation of human rights and freedoms in the application of law or 
its certain provisions is recognised, if comes to a conclusion that the 
possibility of application of the relevant law can be resolved only after 
verification of its conformity to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, 
requests the RCC to review the constitutionality of this law’.599 
 
Khudoley has argued that in such a situation, the RCC, with a view to resolving the issue of 
applying this legal act for the implementation of the Strasbourg Court’s judgments, will be 
engaged in reviewing its own decisions.600 Even if the national legislation and the judicial 
practice of the RCC, as stated in Resolution N6-O of 16 May 2000, did not allow to subject to 
appeal the decisions of the RCC as it would be inconsistent with its nature as a body of 
constitutional control,601 the very fact that the RCC found no violation of the applicant’s 
constitutional rights cannot prevent the Court considering the request. 
 
Such a challenging situation was created by the RCC itself when it called on the federal 
legislature602 to amend GPK to guarantee adequate avenues for re-examination of a case, 
including reopening of proceedings in cases where a violation of the Convention was 
recognised by the ECtHR.603 Playing an essential role in the integration of the Convention and 
the Strasbourg Court's case law into the Russian legal system,604 the RCC secured the state’s 
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compliance with the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of 19 January 2000.605 
 
According to Khudoley, it would not be right to endow the RCC with a veto power over the 
decisions of the ECtHR because by verifying the constitutionality of the enforcement of 
judgments of the Strasbourg Court, the RCC will inevitably be interpreting the ECtHR’s 
decisions and therefore provisions of the ECHR, and this would violate Article 46 of the 
Convention.606 Since constitutional control over the decisions of international bodies was not 
allowed, and Article 125 (para 1 sec ‘г’) of the Russian Constitution permitted constitutional 
control only of those treaties that have not entered into force, Vitruk proposed to establish a 
rule for a mandatory verification of compliance of international treaties concerning human 
rights with the Constitution.607 
 
Extending the authority of the RCC risks conflict with Article 15(4) of the Constitution 
stipulating that ratified international treaties should be implemented in good faith, and with 
Article 27 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties under which ‘a party may not invoke 
the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’. 608 
Aleksandr Kokotov, Judge at the RCC, has argued that a decision of the Constitutionl Court 
which acknowledges the constitutionality of the contested legal norm which has been 
recognised as not compatible with the ECHR by the Strasbourg Court would not mean the 
blocking of implementation of the ECtHR’s judgment requiring the amendment of the 
national legislation. This would underline that the problem which led to a finding of a 
violation by the ECtHR lies not in the legislative act itself, but in the practice of its 
application and that the existing model of the legal regulation is inadequate, and so a decision 
of the RCC would not relieve the legislature of responsibility to implement the ECtHR’s 
judgment.609 
 
It was obvious in Markin that amendment of the legislation in question was possible, and the 
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Russian Ministry of Defence published a draft regulation in June 2011610 aiming to secure 
fathers’ rights to paternity leave and providing them with a monthly benefit as envisaged by 
law.611 However, the draft still limited the right to parental leave for servicemen, which could 
be granted only subject to certain conditions. Alignment of men’s and women’s rights could 
be achieved, but it would be difficult to ensure equal rights. Notwithstanding this, the draft 
has already passed the first reading in the Duma Committee on Defence, and will undoubtedly 
strengthen state support for families guaranteed under Article 7(2) of the Constitution. 
 
A new struggle between the Strasbourg Court and the RCC was provoked by the decision of 
the ECtHR in OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia.612 The ECtHR, having found a 
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention, ordered Russia to pay former Yukos 
shareholders €1.87 billion compensation for unfair tax proceedings. 613  Given that public 
officials expressed their doubts as regards the correctness of the ECtHR’s judgment, the state 
failed to comply with its obligations under the Convention.614  
 
In view of this, a group of deputies of the Duma submitted a request to the RCC to clarify the 
extent to which the judgment of the ECtHR that was contrary to the interpretation of the 
Russian legislation by the RCC which in its decisions of 2001615 and 2005616 confirmed the 
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constitutionality of the relevant provisions of the Russian Tax Code617 and the Federal Law 
‘On Enforcement Proceedings’618  could be enforced in Russia. The study suggests now to 
proceed with the analysis of the response of the RCC which attempted to resolve the 
jurisdictional tension between these judicial bodies. 	2.3.3	A	warning	message	from	the	RCC	
 
In its Resolution N21-P of 14 July 2015, 619  the RCC emphasised the importance of 
safeguarding the sovereignty of the state, the supreme legal force of the Constitution, and of 
prohibiting the incorporation of international treaties which might either restrict human rights 
or encroach on the country’s constitutional order. The Court declared that neither the ECHR 
nor its interpretation by the ECtHR which evaluated national legislation or required changes 
thereto could undermine the supremacy of the Constitution, and that it would be implemented 
only if its higher legal force was recognised.620 The Court relied in its reasoning on the 
decision in Görgülü in which the FCC made it clear that the state could withdraw from its 
obligations under international treaty, when such derogation represented the only way to avoid 
a violation of fundamental principles of the Constitution. 621  If the interpretation of the 
Convention by the ECtHR was carried out in contradiction of the object and purpose of the 
    _______________________________ 
Aktzionernogo Obwestva ‘Neftyanaya Kompaniya ‘YUKOS’ na narushenie konstitutzionnih prav y svobod 
polozheniyami punkta 7 statyi 3 y Statyi 113 Nalogovogo Kodeksa Rossiskoi Federatzii’ [On Refusal to 
Accept for Consideration the Complaint of Joint Stock Company ‘Oil Company ‘YUKOS’ on Violation of 
Constitutional Rights and Freedoms by the provisions of para 7 of art 3 and art 113 of the Tax Code of the 
Russian Federation] // Bull RCC 2005. N3. 
617  Federal Law N146-FZ ‘Nalogovii Kodeks Rossioskoi Federatzii’ [Russian Tax Code] 31 July 1998  // RG 
N148-149, 6 August 1998. 
618   Federal Law N229-FZ ‘Ob Ispolnitelnom Proizvodstve’ [On Enforcement Proceedings] 2 October 2007 // 
RG. N223, 6 October 2007. 
619  RCC, Resolution N21-P of 14 July 2015 ‘Po delu o proverke konstitutzionnosti polozhenii statyi 1 
Federalnogo Zakona ‘O Ratifikatzii Konventzii o Zawite Prav Cheloveka y Osnovnih Svobod y Protokolov 
k nei’, punktov 1 y 2 statyi 32 Federalnogo Zakona ‘O Mezhdunarodnih Dogovorah Rossiskoi Federatzii’, 
chastei 1 y 4 statyi 11, punkta 4 chasti 4 statyi 392 Grazhdanskogo Protzessualnogo Kodeksa Rossiskoi 
Federatzii, chastei 1 y 4 statyi 15, punkta 4 chasti 1 statyi 350 Kodeksa Administrativnogo 
Sudoproizvodstva Rossiskoi Federatzii y punkta 2 chasti 4 statyi 413 Ugolovno-Protzessualnogo Kodeksa 
Rossiskoy Federatzii v svyazi s zaprosom gruppi deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumi’ [On verification of the 
constitutionality of provisions of art 1 of the Federal Law ‘On Ratification of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols’, paras 1 and 2 of art 32 of the 
Federal Law ‘On International Treaties of the Russian Federation’, subparas 1 and 4 of art 11, subpara 4 of 
para 4 of art 392 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, subparas 1 and 4 of art 13, subpara 
4 of para 3 of art 311 of the Arbitration Procedure Code of the Russian Federation, paras 1 and 4 of art 15, 
subpara 4 of para 1 of art 350 of the Code of Administrative Procedure of the Russian Federation and 
subpara 4 of para 2 of art 413 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation in connection with 
the request of the group of State Duma deputies] // RG N6734, 27 July 2015. 
620   ibid, para 2.2 subpara 2. 
621  ibid, para 2.2 subpara 4. 
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ECHR, the respondent state had a right to refuse to execute those judgments insofar as it went 
beyond treaty obligations accepted by the state on ratification of the Convention. Accordingly, 
the judgment of the Strasbourg Court would not have a binding force within the Russian legal 
system if it resulted in a breach of peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens), in 
particular the principles of sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty, 
and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states.622  
 
Given that the expression of the consent of the Russian Federation to be bound by the 
international treaty in violation of the Constitution may be revealed only after the interstate 
body had rendered its decision which was found to conflict with the Constitution, the RCC 
stressed that the issue was not whether the international treaty was valid, but whether it was 
possible not to comply with the obligation to apply the provisions of the treaty according to 
the interpretation given to it by the interstate body.623 This would mean that the measures 
necessary for the enforcement of the judgment of the Strasbourg Court would not be taken in 
breach of the Russian Constitution.624 
 
In its finding, the RCC referred not only to the decision of the FCC in Görgülü which 
recognised the limited legal force of the judgments of the ECtHR,625 but also that of the 
Italian Constitutional Court in Maggio,626 the Austrian Constitutional Court in Miltner,627 and 
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice.628 It 
was stressed that in all cases of convention-constitutional conflict, the issue was not whether 
there was a contradiction between the ECHR and the national constitutions, but rather the 
collision between the interpretation of the ECHR by the ECtHR in a particular case and the 
interpretation of national constitutions by constitutional courts (or other higher courts vested 
with similar powers). 629  Resolution of such controversies in Russia is vested by the 
Constitution in the RCC, which only in exceptional cases will consider it possible to raise an 
objection, thus maintaining mutually respectful dialogue and contributing to the formation of 
the balanced practice of the ECtHR, and not isolating itself from the implementation of its 
decisions.  
     ______________________________ 
622  ibid, para 3 subpara 3. 
623  ibid, para 3 subpara 8. 
624  ibid, para 3 subpara 9. 
625  ibid, para 4 subparas 5-8. 
626  Corte Costituzionale, Maggio and Others v Italy (judgment no 264, 19 November 2012). 
627  VfGH, Miltner B 267/86, 14 October 1987, 11500/1987 EuGRZ 1988, 166. 
628  UKSC, R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 63. 
629  RCC, Resolution N21-P of 14 July 2015 (n 619), para 4 subpara 9. 
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To help regulate this legal conflict, on 15 December 2015 the President of the Russian 
Federation signed Federal Constitutional Law N7-FKZ630 that introduced amendments to FKZ 
‘On the RCC’ empowering the RCC to decide, on the request of federal executive authorities, 
issues of enforcement of the decision of interstate bodies for the protection of human rights 
based on the interpretation of the provisions of international treaties which conflict with the 
Constitution. Pursuant to Article 1 of this Law, the RCC would be entitled to make a ruling on 
implementation, in whole or in part, in accordance with the Constitution. 
 
It appears that this legal act, taken in combination with the Resolutions of the RCC N27-P of 
6 December 2013 and N21-P of 14 July 2015, may signal that Russia seeks to avoid serious 
complications in its relationships not only with the Strasbourg Court, but also with the CoE, 
where a judgment of the ECtHR suggests the amendment of national legislation that might 
cause a more significant violation of constitutional rights than the one objected to the ECtHR. 
 
Several concerns have been expressed in the academic community in respect of such a formal 
acceptance of non-compliance with the Convention obligations. Ilya Shablinksy, a member of 
the Presidential Human Rights Council, has argued that citizens of the Russian Federation 
would be ‘gradually isolated from international legal defenses’.631 In an article entitled Putin 
‘Outlaws’ European Justice in Russia’, Vladimir Kara-Murza, a Russian politician and 
journalist stated that this ‘effectively banishes international legal norms from Russian territory 
and denies Russian citizens access to European justice’.632 President of the ECtHR, Guido 
Raimondi, has clearly indicated that such a filter mechanism is not acceptable to member 
states of the CoE, and constant resistance to enforcing the judgments of the ECtHR should 
lead to withdrawal from the organisation.633 To avoid these consequences and to bolster the 
credibility of these judicial institutions, Andrej Hunko proposed to resolve emerging tensions 
     ______________________________ 
630   Federal Constitutional Court ‘O Vnesenii Izmenenii v Federalnii Konstitutzionni Zakon ‘O 
Konstitutzionnom Sude Rossiskoi Federatzii’ N7-FKZ [On Amending the Federal Constitutional Law ‘On 
the RCC’] 14 December 2015 // RG N6855, 16 December 2015. 
631   Peter Hobson, ‘Russia to rule on European Court of Human Rights Decisions’ The Moscow Times 
(Moscow, 10 December 2015) <https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russia-to-rule-on-european-court-of-
human-rights-decisions-51167> accessed 15 August 2016. 
632  Vladimir Kara-Murza, ‘Putin ‘Outlaws’ European Justice in Russia’ (World Affairs, 24 December 2015) 
<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/vladimir-kara-murza/putin-%E2%80%98outlaws%E2%80%99-
european-justice-russia> accessed 19 September 2016. 
633   -- Russia should leave the European Council, if he refuses to execute decisions of the ECHR (Ukrainian 
Crisis, 29 January 2016) <http://ukrainiancrisis.net/news/16804> accessed 17 October 2016; Susan Stewart, 
‘Council of Europe Can Do without Russia’ (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 13 May 2016) 
<http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/point-of-view/council-of-europe-can-do-without-russia.html> 
accessed 17 August 2016. 
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between the courts through ‘communication instead of mutual sanctions and demonisation’.634 
 
As this power of the RCC to be a final arbiter on enforceability of the Strasbourg Court’s 
judgments poses a threat to compliance with the state’s international obligations, the 
Commission for Democracy through Law has recommended removing Articles 104.4 (2) and 
paragraph 2 of Article 106 FKZ ‘On the RCC’635 to ensure the most effective protection of 
individuals. This seems to be particularly important given that no mechanism has been created 
so far that would force member states to implement judgments of the ECtHR, and which is 
why they continue to formulate their own rules and selecting for enforcement only those 
judgments that best serve their interests. 
 
 2.3.4	Anchugov	and	Gladkov	v	Russia636		
 
The RCC first exercised its authority to decide on enforcement of judgments of the ECtHR 
which contradict the Russian Constitution in Anchugov	 and	 Gladkov. The case deals with the 
alleged violation of the right to vote of two convicted prisoners. The ECtHR challenged the 
provisions of the Russian Constitution envisaged in Chapter 2, the amendments to or revision 
of which under Article 135(2) would require a special procedure for the adoption of new 
Constitution, and in so doing has triggered another open conflict with the RCC. 
 
The applicants, both Russian nationals sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment for multiple 
offences, claimed that the ban on any prisoners voting in parliamentary and in presidential 
elections irrespective of the seriousness of the committed crime and the length of the 
sentence, infringed a number of their constitutional rights.637 Anchugov and Gladkov argued 
that this ban, affecting some 743,300 prisoners, could not be considered as part of the 
punishment as it was not specified in the Russian Criminal Code.638 Despite being convicted, 
they remained members of civil society and held Russian citizenship, which entitled them to 
     ______________________________ 
634   Andrej Hunko and Rene Jokisch, ‘Russlands Ausschluss aus dem Europarat Wäre ein Großer Fehler’ 
[Russia’s exclusion from the Council of Europe would be a Big Mistake] (IMI Standtpunkt 2016/022, 7 
June 2016) <http://www.imi-online.de/2016/06/07/russlands-ausschluss-aus-dem-europarat-waere-ein-
grosser-fehler/> accessed 13 September 2016. 
635   CDL-AD(2016)016-e ‘Russian Federation-Final Opinion On the Amendments to the Federal Constitutional 
Law on the Constitutional Court adopted by the Venice Commission at its 170th Plenary Session’ (Venice, 
10-11 June 2016), para 33. 
636   Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia App nos 11157/04 and 15162/05 (ECHR, 4 July 2013). 
637   ibid [18]. 
638   ibid [81], [82]. 
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exercise their right to vote. 639  
 
The Government’s argument was based on the necessity of increasing civic responsibility and 
respect for the rule of law, and ensuring the proper functioning of democratic institutions.640 
By denial of voting rights to prisoners it intended to avoid any negative effect of criminal 
leaders on the freedom of prisoners’ choices in elections, and to strike a balance between the 
public interest in having law-abiding people as representatives of society, and the private 
interests of individuals excluded by law from the election process.641 
 
In 2004 the RCC found that, under FKZ ‘On the RCC’ it had no jurisdiction to determine 
whether certain provisions of the Constitution were compatible with the others, and refused to 
accept Gladkov’s complaint of a violation by Article 32(3) of the Constitution of his 
constitutional rights enshrined in Articles 3(3), 6(2), 17(1) and (2), and 19.642 The RCC has 
stated that, under Article 16(2) of the Constitution, no other provisions of the Constitution 
may contradict the fundamental principles of the Russian constitutional system, and that its 
provisions constitute a consistent systematic unity.643 Accordingly, the requirement of Article 
32(3) could not be interpreted as infringing the principles of free elections and universal 
suffrage (Article 3(3), 32(1) and (2) and 81(1)) as well as not meeting the criteria for 
permissible restrictions of constitutional rights and freedoms (Article 55(3)).  
 
In approaching the issue of disenfranchisement of prisoners, the Strasbourg Court applied two 
principles: discretionary and legal. In Hirst v United Kingdom (no 2) the ECtHR stressed that 
the imposed ban covering a ‘wide range of offenders and sentences, from one day to life and 
from relatively minor offences to offences of the utmost gravity’ was incompatible with 
Article 3 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention as it lacked proportionality and did not pursue a 
     ______________________________ 
   639  ibid [84]. 
640   ibid [89], [102]. 
641   ibid [88] - [90]. 
642   RCC, Ruling N177-O of 27 May 2004 ‘Ob otkaze v prinyatii k rassmotreniyu zhalobi grazhdanina 
Gladkova Vladimira Mikhailovicha na narushenie ego konstitutzionnih prav chastyu 3 statji 32 Konstitutzii 
Rossiskoi Federatzii’ [On refusal to accept a complaint of the citizen Gladkov Vladimir Mikhailovich on 
violation of his constitutional rights by art 32(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation], para 2 //  
<http://www.lawrussia.ru/texts/legal_123/doc123a320x420.htm> accessed 27 August 2016. 
643 RCC, Resolution N12-P of 19 April 2016 ‘Po delu o razreshenii voprosa o vozmozhnosti ispolneniya v 
sootvetstvii s Konstitutziei Rossiskoi Federatzii postanovleniya Evropeiskogo Suda po Pravam Cheloveka 
ot 4 Iyulya 2013 goda po delu ‘Anchugov y Gladkov Protiv Rossii’ v svyazi s zaprosom Ministerstva 
Yustitzii Rossiskoi Federatzii’ [On resolving the question of possibility of execution in accordance with the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation of the judgment of the ECtHR of 4 July 2013 in Anchugov and 
Gladkov v Russia in connection with the request of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation] // RG 
N6963 (95). 5 May 2016, para 4.1 subpara 4. 
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legitimate aim.644  In Scoppola v Italy the Grand Chamber, having observed that under Italian 
law voting restrictions were applied to serious offences ‘against the state or the judicial 
system, or offenses punishable by a term of imprisonment of three years or more’, concluded 
that disenfranchisement in Italy was not an automatic and indiscriminate, and that a decision 
was based on the particular circumstances of each case, and so the Italian authorities managed 
to operate within the limits of the margin of appreciation.645 
 
By emphasising the importance of this right for ‘establishing and maintaining the foundations 
of an effective and meaningful democracy’,646 the Strasbourg Court granted contracting states 
a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere, but under its own supervision.647 In Anchugov 
and Gladkov v Russia, the Strasbourg Court stated that the blanket restriction covered a wide 
range of criminal offences including minor ones, and that it was applied automatically and 
indiscriminately regardless of the length of the sentences and gravity of the offence.648 Since 
no analysis of the interdependence between the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment 
and the deprivation of the right to vote had been conducted, and neither were there convincing 
arguments presented that could justify those serious limitations on voting rights under Article 
32(3) of the Constitution, it was thus evident that the state had exceeded the margin of 
appreciation. 649 
 
The Strasbourg Court recognised that changing the ban would require amendment of the 
Russian Constitution (Articles 64, 134 and 135 of the Constitution),650 but this does not 
exempt the state from responsibility for all acts and omissions under Article 1 ECHR. Having 
acknowledged a violation of the right to vote that was guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No 
1 of the Convention, but prohibited for prisoners under Article 32(3) of the Constitution, the 
ECtHR recommended that Russia either introduce legislative changes to clarify the 
restrictions, or leave it to the courts to evaluate the proportionality of the limitations.651 
 
On 19 April 2016, at the request of the Ministry of Justice, the RCC has decided on the 
enforcement of the ECtHR’s judgment in Gladkov. Given that there was no consensus among 
     ______________________________ 
644   Hirst v the United Kingdom (no 2) [2005] ECHR 681, paras 77, 79. 
645   Scoppola v. Italy (no 3) (GC) App no 126/05 (ECtHR, 22 May 2012), paras 106, 108, 110. 
646  Hirst (n 644), para 58. 
647  Anchugov (n 636), paras 95, 97. 
648  ibid [100], [105],[106]; Resolution of the RCC N12-P of 19 April 2016 (n 643), para 3 subpara 3. 
649  Anchugov (n 636), paras 103, 106-110. 
650  ibid [ 111]. 
651  ibid [107], [111]. 
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the forty-three member states of the CoE on the issue of voting rights for prisoners, the RCC 
held that there were no reasons for interpreting the prohibition in Article 32(3) as applying 
only to certain categories of prisoners, for example, those convicted of serious offences.652 
There were likewise no grounds for interpreting it as implying, as Anchugov and Gladkov had 
done, the discretionary authority of the federal legislature to remove the restrictions in respect 
of all convicted offenders other than those sentenced to life imprisonment.653  The RCC 
clarified that the ban on suffrage in respect of those serving a sentence of imprisonment, but 
not those serving other types of punishment comparable in its nature to imprisonment did not 
indicate a general and indiscriminate restriction on suffrage affecting all citizens deprived of 
their liberty by a court decision.654  
 
Since the ban under Article 32(3) of the Constitution is imperative, in accordance with 
Articles 3(1) and (3), 15(1) and (4), 32(1) and (2), 46(3), 79 of the Russian Constitution the 
RCC has not recognised the possibility of executing the ECtHR’s judgment by amending the 
legislation to allow not automatic restriction of voting rights on convicted persons. 655 
However, it has confirmed that the judgment could be implemented in terms of general 
measures that ensure fairness, proportionality and differentiation in applying those restrictions 
as under Article 32(3) of the Constitution and the provisions of the Criminal Code of the 
Russian Federation the sentence of imprisonment, and so the disenfranchisement could not be 
imposed for minor offenses committed by offenders for the first time, and for crimes of 
medium gravity and grave crimes could be imposed by a court as a more severe type of 
punishment among those specified by Special Part of the Criminal Code, which could entail a 
deprivation of voting rights.656 
 
In its finding the RCC stated that the Russian Federation may not conclude international 
treaties that do not comply with the Constitution, and if it did so, they could not be enforced 
in Russia.657 Russia acceded to the ECHR, believing that Article 32(3) of the Constitution was 
consistent with the provisions of Article 3 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention, and therefore 
did not require any changes.658 In view of this, the RCC affirmed that acknowledging by the 
Strasbourg Court a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No 1 was based on the interpretation that 
     ______________________________ 
652  Anchugov (n 636), para 42-45; RCC, Resolution N12-P of 19 April 2016 (n 643), para 4.3 subpara 5, 6. 
653  Resolution N12-P of 19 April 2016 (n 643), para 4.4 subpara 1. 
654  ibid, para 5.1 subpara 8. 
655  ibid, paras 1, 3 s ’conclusion’. 
656  ibid, para 2 s ‘conclusion’. 
657  ibid, para 4.2 subpara 4. 
658  ibid. 
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diverged from the meaning which was accorded to it by the CoE and the Russian Federation 
as a contracting party, and thus the state had the right to insist on the interpretation of Article 3 
of Protocol No 1 as it was when the treaty came into force in Russia.659  
 
The RCC believes that proposed interpretation of Article 32(3) will assist in avoiding similar 
conflicts concerning restrictions on voting rights of prisoners.660 It has pointed out that the 
federal legislature should consistently implement the principle of humanism in the criminal 
law to optimise the system of criminal punishment, including through transferring certain 
types of prison regimes to alternative forms of punishment, even implying forced 
confinement, but which did not entail restrictions on voting rights. 661  For that purpose, 
changes would be required in criminal and penal legislation under which those serving a 
sentence of imprisonment for crimes of negligence and crimes of small and medium gravity 
would be subject to a separate type of criminal penalty not entailing limitations under Article 
32(3) of the Constitution.662  
 
In this Resolution the RCC confirmed thst the judgments of the Strasbourg Court, particularly 
those proposing to make changes in the national legislation, would not challenge the 
supremacy of the Constitution in the Russian legal system. This means that the 
implementation of judgment in Anchugov would be acceptable if the interpretation by the 
ECtHR of Article 3 of Protocol No 1 to the ECHR on which it was based is consistent with 
the provisions of the Russian Constitution concerning individual rights and freedoms and the 
fundamentals of the constitutional system.663 
 
Secretary General of the CoE  has reacted to the decision of the RCC in a friendly way, stating 
that ‘Russia was and remains [an] integral part of the European legal space, which commands 
an equal dialogue and readiness to compromise’.664 By stressing that the possible way of 
resolving the present conflict could be the amendment of the legislation, ‘which would 
alleviate the existing restrictions on the right to vote’, Thorbjørn Jagland called on the Russian 
Parliament to elaborate appropriate solutions for executing the Strasbourg Court’s 
     ______________________________ 
659  ibid, para 4.2 subpara 6. 
660  ibid, para 5.4 subpara 3. 
661  ibid, para 5.5 subpara 1. 
662  ibid, para 5.5 subpara 4. 
663  ibid, para 4.4 subpara 2. 
664  -- ‘Secretary General Comments on Russian Constitutional Court Judgment Today’ (Council of Europe 
Portal, 19 April 2016) <http://www.coe.int/en/web/secretary-general/-/secretary-general-comments-on-
russian-constitutional-court-judgment-today> accessed 17 October 2016. 
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judgment.665 
 
To achieve balanced cooperation between the conventional and constitutional legal orders the 
state concerned would be expected to adhere faithfully to its obligations under the 
Convention, and the Strasbourg Court would be required to show respect for the national 
identity of the contracting party.666 While celebrating the 20th anniversary of the RCC in 2011, 
former President of the Strasbourg Court, Jean-Paul Costa, argued that the protection of 
human rights in Russia had advanced from the day of ratification of the ECHR, and even if 
conflicts between the courts were inevitable, they had a common aim, and it is thus important 
to preserve a permanent dialogue, and not consider the recognition of a violation of the human 
rights as a ‘defeat of the state, but rather a triumph of the human rights and the state governed 
by the rule of law’.667 
	
2.4	Margin	of	appreciation	in	the	jurisprudence	of	the	ECtHR		2.4.1	Legal	limits	of	the	margin	of	appreciation	
 
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation which has evolved in the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, seeks to afford some latitude to contracting parties for the purpose of complying with 
their obligations under the ECHR.668  It is an important ‘tool to define relations between the 
domestic authorities and the Court’ 669  and allows states with diverse legal and cultural 
traditions the flexibility to coordinate their respective spheres of influence, safeguard their 
autonomy and avoid conflict situations with the ECtHR.670 Jean-Paul Costa has argued that 
the application of the doctrine confirms that the Convention does not require a ‘strict 
uniformity throughout Europe in the protection of human rights’ and does not imply the 
‘wholesale standardisation of national institutions, procedures and practices’.671 According to 
Yutaka-Arai Takahashi, this indicates that the Convention’s mechanism for the protection of 
     ______________________________ 
665   ibid. 
666   Resolution of the RCC N12-P of 19 April 2016 (n 643), para 1.2, subpara 2. 
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669   A and Others v United Kingdom [2009] ECHR 301, para 184. 
670   R Macdonald, ‘The Margin of Appreciation’ in Ronald Macdonald, F Matscher and H Petzold (eds), The 
European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 1993) 123. 
671   Jean-Paul Costa, ‘On the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments’ (2011) 7 Eu 
Const Law Rev 173, 180. 
   99 
human rights is ‘complementary but subsidiary’ to those existing in national systems.672 
 
The margin of appreciation doctrine is not legally defined in the text of the Convention, 
although the Protocol No 15 to the ECHR673 (not yet in force) refers to it, and a great many 
scholars have attempted to define its nature.674 Sir Humphrey Waldock, former British Judge 
at the ECtHR, has shared his understanding of the doctrine as ‘one of the most important 
safeguards developed by the Commission and the Court to reconcile the effective operation of 
the Convention with the sovereign powers and responsibilities of governments in a 
democracy’.675 Paul Mahoney, current British Judge in Strasbourg, referred to the margin of 
appreciation as ‘the natural product of the distribution of power between national authorities 
and the Strasbourg Court’.676 Steven Greer compared the margin of appreciation with the 
‘room for manoeuvre’ which national authorities have,677 and Howard Charles Yourow has 
defined the doctrine as an ‘error which the Strasbourg organs will allow to national 
legislative, executive, administrative and judicial bodies before it is prepared to declare a 
national derogation from the Convention’.678  
 
Given this lack of unanimity on the essence of the doctrine, it is difficult to describe how it 
works, but some indication can be drawn from the Commission and from the ECtHR case 
law.679 The idea of the margin of appreciation stems from Greece v United Kingdom680 in 
1958, in which the appropriateness of application of Article 15 of the Convention was 
contested. The case raised the question of whether the Commission was competent to 
determine the presence of an existential threat, and the scope of derogation by the state from 
its Convention obligations. The respondent Government was granted a ‘certain measure of 
discretion in assessing the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’.681 
 
     ______________________________ 
672   Arai-Takahashi (n 19) 3. 
673  Protocol No 15 amending the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(adopted on 16 May 2013, opened for signature on 24 June 2013) CETS No 15. 
674   For the major but not exhaustive list of the literature on this issue see Yutaka Arai -Takahashi (n 18) 1. 
675   Humphrey Waldock, ‘The Effectiveness of the System Set Up by the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ (1980) 1 HRLJ 1, 9. 
676  Paul Mahoney, ‘Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court of Human Rights: Two 
Sides of the Same Coin’ (1990) 11 HRLJ 57, 81. 
677   Steven Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention 
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678   Howard Charles Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human 
Rights Jurisprudence (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996) 13. 
679   ibid 3. 
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Known in its early years as a ‘power of appreciation’,682 this doctrine has been also referred to 
in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.683 In Lawless v Ireland, the Strasbourg Court invoked 
Article 15 in respect of the applicant’s claims alleging a violation of Articles 5 and 6, due to 
the use of preventive administrative detention by the Irish government, which had adopted 
those measures in response to Irish nationalist terrorist attacks that threatened the safety of the 
nation.684 What is interesting about this case is that the ECtHR upheld the Government’s 
actions without referring to the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine in its decision.685 
 
The term was first used by the Strasbourg Court in Ireland v the United Kingdom, in which 
the ECtHR, having left a wide margin of appreciation to the national authorities that were ‘in 
principle in a better position than the international judge to decide both on the presence of 
such an emergency and on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to avert it’,686 
justified actions by the British government during the conflict in the Northern Ireland between 
1971 and 1975, including mass arrest, detention and internment without trial. The Court held 
that, in the context of Article 15(1) ECHR, these were indispensable in protecting society 
against terrorism.687 
 
The ECtHR has further extended the application of the doctrine to other types of cases going 
beyond the derogation clauses mentioned in Article 15.688 To balance individual freedoms and 
collective interests,689 any interference with Convention rights by a public authority should be 
grounded in the provisions of law, pursue a legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic 
society as required by Articles 8-11 ECHR. Provided that these requirements are met, there 
would be no breach by the respondent state of its obligations under the Convention. This is 
why the measures adopted for achieving its objectives were carefully examined through the 
prism of proportionality, which was described by Arai Takahashi as ‘the other side of the 
margin of appreciation’.690 
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In Klass and others v Germany,691 dealing with the restriction of the right to privacy in the 
interests of the national security, the ECtHR stressed that the domestic legislation being 
challenged 692  that allowed the adoption of surveillance measures by national authorities 
without notifying the persons concerned and that did not provide remedies against those 
measures before the courts,693 was necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of 
disorder and crime, and did not find it to be in conflict with Article 8. 694  The Court 
acknowledged that the national legislature enjoyed a certain discretion in organising 
surveillance, that did not allow, however, the adoption of disproportionate measures ‘in the 
name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism’.695  
 
A reasonable question might arise in respect of the scope of the discretion which the national 
authorities are permitted to exercise, and the extent to which it could limit the fundamental 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention. Given that the ECtHR, when 
determining the breadth of margin to be vested in national authorities for interpreting the 
Convention provisions, pays attention to such factors as the circumstances of the case, the 
subject-matter, the possible existence of ‘common ground between the laws of the 
Contracting States’, 696  the results may be quite broad in some cases and considerably 
narrower in others. Since this directly links to the degree of strictness of the external control 
by the Strasbourg Court, it seems sensible to examine the scope of this margin of appreciation 
that could be afforded to member states. 
 
In its jurisprudence the ECtHR has referred to a ‘wide margin’, in Lautsi v Italy,697 a ‘certain 
margin’, in Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria, 698  and simply a ‘margin of appreciation’ 
without specifying further details, in Handyside v UK.699  
 
The greatest impact of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation has been seen with respect to 
Article 9 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No 1. Lautsi v Italy, in which the 
applicant challenged these provisions, raised the issue of compatibility of the right to freedom 
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of religion with the presence of religious symbols in public schools. Having observed that 
education should provide an ‘open school environment which encourages inclusion rather 
than exclusion, regardless of the pupil’s social background, religious beliefs or ethnic origins’ 
and that schools should not be ‘the arena for missionary activities or preaching’,700 the ECtHR 
held that such practice of displaying religious symbols in classrooms was a breach of the 
Convention and required the respondent state to preserve confessional neutrality because 
school attendance was compulsory regardless of religion.701 
 
In 2010 the Italian government appealed to the Grand Chamber, which delivered its decision 
on 18 March 2011. Observing the absence of a European consensus on the presence of 
religious symbols in public schools, it held that the state has been allowed a ‘wide margin of 
appreciation’ to ensure religious pluralism.702 Since religious symbolism was an integral part 
of the state’s identity, contracting parties were allowed to decide on their own what 
significance to confer on it and what practical implications this would entail.703 In viewing the 
presence of the crucifix as a passive religious symbol rather than forced participation in 
religious activities,704 the Grand Chamber allowed the appeal, concluding that the respondent 
state had not transgressed the limits of the margin of appreciation in complying with its 
obligations under the Convention.705  
 
The need to balance conflicting rights, particularly the right to freedom of expression (Article 
10 ECHR) and freedom of religion (Article 9), was addressed in Otto-Preminger-Institut v 
Austria, which concerned the issue of blasphemy. The Otto-Preminger-Institut, a private 
association promoting entertainment through audio-visual media, claimed that seizure and 
subsequent forfeiture of the film Das Liebeskonzil amounted to a violation of Article 10.706 
The ECtHR, observing there was no ‘uniform conception of the significance of religion in 
society’ across Europe, granted member states a ‘certain margin of appreciation’ for defining 
the extent of interference with the right to freedom of expression which is ‘directed against 
the religious feelings of others’.707 
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In Handyside v United Kingdom the owner of the publishing firm alleged a violation of 
Article 10 having been fined for publishing the book The Little Red Schoolbook containing 
information on sexual matters for adolescents which was considered offensive by the UK 
authorities. 708  The ECtHR, having pointed to the absence in the domestic law of other 
contracting states of a ‘uniform European conception of morals’,709 concluded that even if the 
seizure of the copies of the book pursued a legitimate aim and was prescribed by law the 
respondent state enjoyed a ‘margin of appreciation’ in determining the extent to which the 
protection of morals in that society required the adoption of particular measures.710 
 
This lack of clarity and consistency in the application of the doctrine quite often provoked 
conflict situations between the Strasbourg Court and the contracting parties to the Convention. 
One would argue that in those cases where the respondent state was granted a margin of 
appreciation, the ECtHR’s intrusion into the states’ affairs was more reserved, but this is 
unfortunately not the case. Given that the ‘domestic margin of appreciation goes hand in hand 
with a European supervision’,711  the ECtHR remains an exclusive supervisory institution 
empowered to determine whether national authorities have acted within the prescribed 
limits712 or have overstepped them.713 Kratochvil has argued that a state’s discretion does not 
facilitate the resolution of disputes as the Strasbourg Court conducts its own analysis714 to 
verify whether, as in Gorzelik and Others v Poland, the decisions of national authorities are 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and the reasons presented for justifying them are 
sufficient. 715 He observed that, including in those cases716 where the ECtHR did not explicitly 
refer to this doctrine when adjudicating the cases, it provided the proportionality analysis.717  
 
According to Steven Greer, the ECtHR has not been consistent in applying this doctrine, due 
to its ‘casuistic, uneven, and largely unpredictable nature’.718 Possible tensions between the 
ECtHR and the contracting parties could be avoided if the consequences of invoking the 
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margin of appreciation and the depth of the ECtHR’s subsequent scrutiny were understood,719 
for instance, the Strasbourg Court has on several occasions linked ‘a more extensive European 
supervision […] to a less discretionary power of appreciation’.720 It is thus important, as 
proposed by Eva Brems, to control the use of this doctrine, which has been compared by 
Jeffrey Branch to a ‘black box’,721 in order to prevent ‘any arbitrariness and uncertainty’ in the 
application of the Convention standards,722 and not jeopardise the core of the rule of law 
principle.723 
 2.4.2	Search	for	a	European	consensus	
 
The Strasbourg Court, when applying the margin of appreciation doctrine, has sought uniform 
standards of interpretation of the Convention rights among contracting states to guide its 
assessment of whether disputed measures are proportionate to the objectives pursued. This 
search remains difficult because of a lack of regulation. Even though the term ‘European 
consensus’ has not been legally defined, the ECtHR has suggested that it should be read in 
light of the ECHR as ‘the basis for the evolution of conventional standards through the case-
law of the ECtHR’.724 This originates from Tyrer v United Kingdom, in which the ECtHR for 
the first time made a reference to ‘the commonly-accepted standards in the penal policy of the 
member states of the CoE’.725 
 
As a ‘mediator between the dynamic interpretation and the margin of appreciation’,726 this 
European consensus, according to Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, seeks to strengthen legitimacy 
‘through ensuring the Court’s subsidiary function and preventing unacceptable judicial 
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activism’.727 Analysis of the case law of the ECtHR has shown that the Court in an attempt to 
reveal the emergence of common standards among the states referred not only to the 
comparative analysis of their practices, but also to a wide range of other sources such as 
international law,728 EU law,729 case law of the CJEU,730 CoE documents,731 the legislation of 
European and non-European-states732 and expert analysis.733 
 
Despite making explicit use of these tools in its judicial practice, the Strasbourg Court did not 
disclose, however, the extent to which they should be taken into account in examining the 
existence or absence of common standards. Laurence Helfer expressed concerns734 over the 
coherence in applying by the ECtHR these ‘specialised international instruments’.735 Since 
this might damage the credibility of this judicial mechanism for the protection of human 
rights, 736  Monika Ambrus has drawn attention to the importance of adopting a more 
transparent approach to defining the conditions for carrying out such comparison, particularly 
in terms of occurrence, thoroughness and interpretation of results.737 She argued that, when 
looking for a European consensus, the Strasbourg Court was not consistent in applying a 
comparative law method.738 
 
Former Austrian Judge at the ECtHR, Franz Matscher, in his dissenting opinion in Öztürk v 
Federal Republic of Germany, claimed that conducted in the case comparative analysis should 
have been ‘of a far more detailed nature than those carried out so far by the Convention 
institutions’.739 The lack of a systematic approach to the process of determining the scope of 
the Convention rights has also been criticised by Paolo Carozza, who stressed that it is 
unacceptable to simply arrive at a conclusion on the presence or absence of a consensus.740 As 
an example he cited Rasmussen v Denmark, in which the ECtHR stated that ‘the contracting 
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states’ legislation regarding paternity proceedings shows that there is no such common 
grounds and that in most of them the position of the mother and that of the husband are 
regulated in different ways’.741 It failed to specify the number of states surveyed, by whom, 
and the sources used. Given that the scope of the margin of appreciation will be determined, 
including on the basis of the results of this comparison, it is important to ensure that it was not 
‘casual, superficial, and incomplete’.742 
 
As this could weaken the legitimacy of the ECtHR’s judgments, Monika Ambrus proposed to 
encourage the Court to make its arguments more explicit743 and to interpret the obtained 
results in a logical and consistent manner to exclude any controversial reading of fundamental 
rights norms, while keeping up with the dynamic reality. This was also underlined by the 
Strasbourg Court itself in Tyrer, where the Convention was said to be a ‘living instrument 
which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’.744 The use of evolving 
interpretation leads to a more extensive comparative analysis which may assist the ECtHR in 
its endeavours in this area. Since the ECtHR when interpreting the Convention, relies on 
‘subsequent - domestic and international, state and social – practice’, which, as argued by 
Georg Nolte, ‘gives it the possibility […] to openly change its own jurisprudence’,745 this 
study will explore that concern, using a series of cases concerning the legal status of 
transsexuals. 
 
In the 1986 case of Rees v United Kingdom the Strasbourg Court found that, at that time, there 
was little common ground among contracting states on the status of transsexuals. 746  It 
returned to the issue in 1990 in Cossey v United Kingdom, and found no improvement, but 
acknowledged that the legal rules were in a transitional stage, and granted the state a wide 
margin of appreciation in this area.747 In a joint dissenting opinion, Judges Macdonald and 
Spielmann, disagreed, however, with the conclusion of the ECtHR that there have been only 
‘certain developments since 1986 in the law of some of the member states of the Council of 
Europe’, 748  arguing that there were ‘clear developments’ in the recognition of the post-
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operative gender status.749 
 
In the 1998 case of Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom750 the Strasbourg Court did not 
find ‘any common European approach’ to the issue, but in the 2002 case of Christian 
Goodwin v United Kingdom the ECtHR confirmed that in light of significant, although by no 
means uniform, developments since its last ruling of the ‘increased social acceptance of 
transsexuals’ it decided to keep up with the ‘international trend in favour […] of legal 
recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals’. 751  Thus, by 
accentuating the necessity to attach considerable attention ‘to the changing conditions within 
the respondent state and within contracting states generally and respond, for example, to any 
evolving convergence as to standards to be achieved’, the ECtHR reaffirmed its adherence to 
practical and effective interpretation of the Convention.752 
 
Given that the process of seeking the European consensus is still obscure and lacks 
methodological precision and transparency,753 this might lead to divergent interpretation of the 
results of the comparative analysis. The legitimacy of this concept has been widely discussed 
in the legal literature.754 Howard Yourow has commented that there was little rationality in the 
application of this judicial technique by the Strasbourg Court as the ‘contours of the 
consensus analysis are too vague, the substantive content of the doctrine is too elusive and it 
can be invoked to reach both pro-rights and pro-state holdings without the benefit of 
developing substantive doctrinal consistency’.755 
 
Setting standards for the Convention rights based on the ECtHR’s monitoring of the common 
trends among member states would not guarantee the rights of those whose interests were not 
embraced by the European consensus, thus weakening the protection afforded them. 
Konstantion Dzehtsiarou has opined that depending on the establishment of common 
standards among states756 may not be the best means of development of fundamental rights, 
given their historical, political, cultural differences and divergent approaches to the 
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understanding of the scope of the Convention rights. Daniel Regan believes that the 
Strasbourg Court should abandon further use of the European consensus concept, emphasising 
that it was not the most relevant instrument for defining the content of fundamental rights and 
freedoms under the ECHR.757 This is why he argued for use of comparative law by the 
ECtHR to determine the general principles common to the law of contracting states that 
would make it possible to achieve an autonomous interpretation of the fundamental rights by 
the Court.758  
 
As the remaining gaps leave substantial space for the Strasbourg Court’s discretion, only if a 
uniform approach to the application of European consensus in the ECtHR’s practice is 
adopted, it would attract wide support and make a significant contribution to establishing 
greater consistency and predictability. Given that the application in the practice of the 
Strasbourg Court of analysed judicial techniques is crucial for sustaining a balance between 
the subsidiary nature of the ECHR protection mechanism and the protection of fundamental 
rights by member states, the Strasbourg Court would be required to address discussed 
uncertainties shortly in order to avoid being accused of the arbitrary exercise of power. 
	
2.5	Chapter	summary	
This chapter has examined the challenges that the contracting parties to the Convention face 
in the reception of the ECHR and in the implementation of the ECtHR’s judgments in their 
legal systems. The analysis showed that the Convention has the same legal status as other 
federal laws in the hierarchy of their domestic legal sources, while being subordinate to their 
constitutions. It has been observed that despite divergent legal traditions, attitudes of national 
authorities to international treaty obligations and political dynamics in the legal orders of the 
member states, there is a growing tendency among the national courts to take into account the 
interpretation of the Convention by the ECtHR.  
 
However, the chapter has also discussed that the contracting parties to the Convention, when 
incorporating this international treaty in their legal systems, did not pay much attention to 
constitutional issues, which eventually led to confrontation between the ECtHR and the courts 
of the ECHR member states, particularly the FCC and the RCC, in their resolution of disputes 
on fundamental rights. A number of recommendations has been made to improve the 
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cooperation between the courts and reduce the risk of new jurisdictional contradictions. It has 
been argued that to avoid situations, in which judgments by these judicial institutions may run 
counter to each other, the ECtHR would be expected to recognise the primary role of the 
member states in guaranteeing the rights under the Convention, and the national courts, in 
turn, as the ‘natural judges of international law’759 would be required to achieve coherent 
approaches to the understanding of the Convention provisions and rely not only on the case 
law of the Strasbourg Court, which provides interpretations that ‘should be highly persuasive 
for domestic courts empowered to apply international law and/ or seeking ensure that the state 
complies with its international obligations’, but also on the decisions of domestic courts of 
other states to determine whether there exists ‘any subsequent practice indicating the 
agreement of states parties as to interpretation’.760  
 
The chapter addressed controversial issues related to the application of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine and the European consensus concept in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. It 
accentuated that, due to remaining uncertainties in the use of these judicial techniques when 
defining the scope of the discretion to be granted to member states, the Strasbourg Court 
should accommodate the concerns about their legitimacy in order not to subject to doubts the 
accuracy of its judgments. 
 
The observations in this chapter showed that the contracting parties to the Convention, having 
recognised the fundamental importance of the European system for the protection of 
fundamental rights, were ready to seek lawful solutions to occurring in cooperation between 
the Strasbourg Court and their domestic courts conflicts for the sake of maintaining a well-
functioning system. However, they reserved the right to determine the extent to which the 
treaty obligations will be complied with. Given that, as discussed in the chapter, the exercise 
by the RCC of its recently acquired authority to rule on the enforcement of the ECtHR’s 
judgments might not only jeopardise the domestic implementation, but question further 
participation of the state in the Convention, it appears quite likely that new tensions between 
the courts will emerge in the future, particularly as the ECtHR in departing from its primary 
mission to adjudicate individual cases has shifted its focus to a more abstract review of the 
Convention provisions by identifying the structural problems in the national legal orders of 
the member states, which the following chapter will analyse in detail. 
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CHAPTER	III	
CHALLENGES	OF	THE	PILOT	JUDGMENT	PROCEDURE	
	
3.1	Introduction	
 
This chapter discusses the process of constitutionalisation of the ECtHR, the legitimacy of its 
recently developed pilot judgment procedure, and reflects on the changes that have occurred 
in the national legal systems of Poland, Germany and Russia with respect to rendered by the 
ECtHR pilot judgments. By analysing Broniowski v Poland, Rumpf v Germany and Burdov v 
Russia (no 2), it will show how the challenges in the implementation of these pilot judgments 
by member states hamper effective cooperation between the ECtHR and the national 
judiciary. 
 
It argues that further application of the pilot judgment procedure, which was intended to 
reduce the ECtHR’s caseload, might weaken the position of individuals seeking access to the 
ECtHR and threaten the sovereignty of the states. The chapter focuses on the importance of 
improving the enforcement of the Strasbourg Court’s judgments among the contracting parties 
to the Convention, and developing a system of legal remedies capable of effectively rectifying 
those alleged violations of fundamental rights at the national level. It also discusses how to 
strengthen the effectiveness of national judicial review procedures, and provides several 
suggestions on how to improve the functioning of the constitutional complaint mechanism. 
By involving the national courts in promoting, respecting and protecting fundamental rights, 
most infringements would be addressed domestically, and this could considerably reduce the 
number of the ECtHR’s pilot judgments. 
 
	
3.2	Origins	and	legitimacy	of	the	pilot	judgment	procedure		
 
In the previous analysis of the cooperation between the courts in Europe, it has been observed 
that the CJEU and the ECtHR quite often exercise powers that were exclusively vested in 
courts authorised to perform constitutional review, due to their specific functions. It has been 
argued in the academic community that the CJEU has acquired a status of the ‘constitutional 
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court of the EU legal order’.761 To clarify this, Giulio Itzcovich referred to the concept of the 
constitution proposed by András Jakab, in accordance with which it possesses ‘the highest 
rank in a legal order in the sense that the validity of all other norms is measured on them’.762 
He believed that it could be addressed to the exclusive competence of the Court of Justice in 
annulment proceedings brought under Article 263 TFEU763 and in preliminary proceedings on 
the validity of EU law under Article 267(b) TFEU. As far as the ECtHR was concerned, it has 
been claimed that both the Convention, which has been referred to as ‘a constitutional 
instrument of European public order (ordre public)’, 764  and the Strasbourg Court itself 
‘perform functions that are comparable to those performed by national constitutions and 
national constitutional courts in Europe’. 765  It could be presumed that in respect of the 
Convention this was attributed to the status it enjoys in the legal systems of the contracting 
parties. As the Austrian example illustrates, after the 1964 amendments to the Austrian 
Constitution of 1945, 766  the ECHR acquired constitutional status, but was nevertheless 
incorporated into domestic law, as observed in the decision of the Austrian Constitutional 
Court in Miltner, with certain limitations. In Netherlands, pursuant to Article 94 of the Dutch 
Constitution,767  all clashes between the Constitution and the ECHR must be resolved in 
favour of the latter. This would also mean that the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
ECHR could be directly invoked before the Dutch courts, which would prioritise them over 
conflicting national law, including constitutional law.768 
 
As far as the ECtHR is concerned, in light of its increasing engagement in identifying the 
systemic problems in the legal systems of the member states and making recommendations 
for improving the national legislation rather than constraining itself to identifying the 
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infringements of the Convention through administration of justice in individual cases, it is, 
according to Wojciech Sadurski, becoming ‘more constitutional now than before’.769 This 
could be linked to the application of the pilot judgment procedure (PJP), a development of 
which was triggered by the end of the Cold War when former communist countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, the political and legal systems of which were still in transition,770 joined 
the CoE.771 The standards of human rights protection in these countries did not meet the 
requirements stipulated by the Statute of the CoE, but they were invited to accede to the CoE 
quickly without bringing their legislation into line with the provisions of the Convention,772 
despite the ECtHR having ruled in Maestri v Italy that ‘in ratifying the Convention the 
contracting states undertake to ensure that their domestic law is compatible with it’.773 As a 
result of this rapid expansion of the CoE in the 1990s,774 the ECtHR faced a steady flow of 
complaints coming from the new contracting states. Since this had a tremendous impact on its 
workload, there emerged a need775 to establish an effective mechanism capable of addressing 
the increasing number of analogous cases at the ECtHR.776 In response to this problem, the 
governments of the states, the Committee of Ministers, and the Strasbourg Court itself 
decided to develop cooperatively the PJP.777 
 
The history of the PJP goes back to the European Ministerial Conference on Human Rights 
held on 3-4 November 2000 in Rome that sought to enhance the ECtHR’s efficiency by 
adopting new mechanisms and improving domestic implementation of the Convention. 778 On 
account of this, the Steering Committee for Human Rights, the role of which is to increase the 
effectiveness of the control mechanism set up by the Convention, introduced a package of 
reform proposals, among which was the proposal for the PJP that was to be applied to ‘clone 
cases’779 to encourage respondent states to provide individuals with an efficient remedy, due 
     ______________________________ 
769   Sadurski (n 91) 449. 
770   Wildhaber (n 90) 163. 
771   Paraskeva (n 92) 1, 3; Fyrnys (n 92) 1231. 
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Compatible  With Reinforcement?’ (1998) 8 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 313, 333. 
773  Maestri v Italy (2004) 39 EHRR 832, para 47. 
774   Paraskeva (n 92) 3. 
775   Helen Keller, Andreas Fischer and Daniela Kühne, ‘Debating the Future of the European Court of Human 
Rights after the Interlaken Conference: Two Innovative Proposals’ (2010) 21(4) EJIL 1025, 1034. 
776   Paraskeva (n 92) 4. 
777   Oana Nedelcu-Surdescu, ‘Brief Analysis of the Operation of the Pilot Judgment Procedure Before the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)’ (2011) I (1) RSERI 24, 25. 
778   CoE, ‘Proceedings of the European Ministerial Conference on Human Rights and Commemorative 
Ceremony of the 50th Anniversary of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 3-4 November 2000                              
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/Proceedings/Rome_en.pdf> accessed 17 November 2014 
779   CDDH, Guaranteeing the long-term effectiveness of the European Court of Human Rights. Final report 
containing proposals of the CDDH adopted by the CDDH on 4 April 2003, CM (2003)55, 8 April 2003; 
Addendum to the Final report containing CDDH proposals (long version), CDDH (2003)006 Addendum 
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to persistent structural problems at the national level. 
 
In September 2003, the ECtHR presented a Position Paper which stressed the need to address 
the problem of identical cases at the Court that constituted a significant proportion of its 
workload.780 The Strasbourg Court’s concerns requiring the amendment of the Convention to 
provide a legal basis for future application of the PJP were rejected by the Steering 
Committee, which asserted that, as the procedure was still evolving, it could be applied by 
reference to the existing text of the Convention.781   
 
At the meeting of the Committee of Ministers in May 2004 several instruments for increasing 
the efficiency of the ECtHR were introduced:782 the Committee adopted the Recommendation 
on improvement of domestic remedies,783 which invited states to guarantee effective legal 
remedies in national legal orders in respect of those judgments of the ECtHR that identified 
structural problems; approved the Resolution on judgments revealing an underlying systemic 
problems,784 which called on the ECtHR to determine ‘what it considers to be an underlying 
systemic problem and the source of that problem, in particular when it is likely to give rise to 
numerous applications, so as to assist states in finding the appropriate solution and the 
Committee of Ministers in supervising the execution of judgments’; and also adopted Protocol 
No 14 amending the control system of the Convention and establishing the filtering 
mechanism to cover systematic cases, that, unfortunately, has neither provided the legal 
framework for the operation of the PJP nor has been ratified by the Russian Duma.785 
 
In its Report to the Committee of Ministers, the Group of Wise Persons, which had been set 
up in 2005 to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the Convention,786 called on the ECtHR to 
    _______________________________ 
Final, 9 April 2003, 25. 
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Rights – Implementation of the declaration (adopted by the Committee of Ministers at its 112th session 14-
15 May 2003), CDDH(2003)026, 26 November 2003, paras 20-21. 
782  Adopted at the conference documents are available at 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=143001&Site=CM> accessed 15 July 2015. 
783  CM, Rec (2004) 6, 12 May 2004. 
784  CM, Res (2004) 3, 12 May 2004. 
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786  Warsaw Declaration. Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe, 
CM(2005)79 final, 17 May 2005, para 2. 
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ensure the fullest possible use of the PJP. 787 Given that it was still under development and 
even the term ‘pilot judgment’ has not been legally defined, a rational question could arise as 
to how legally justified those pilot judgments would be, in the absence of any clear legal 
basis. In such cases, the Strasbourg Court relied on Article 46(1) of the Convention, under 
which states that recognised the jurisdiction of the ECtHR accepted their responsibility to 
abide by the final judgment of the Court when it finds a violation of the Convention.788 
 
At the High-level conference on the future of the ECtHR in 2010 the Secretary General of the 
CoE, Thorbjørn Jagland, welcomed the idea of the PJP, and proposed to codify it either in the 
‘Convention, or in the future Statute of the Court’ to guarantee its proper application in 
future. 789  The Interlaken Declaration adopted at the Conference highlighted the need ‘to 
develop clear and predictable standards for this procedure as regards selection of applications, 
the procedure to be followed and the treatment of adjourned cases, and to evaluate the effects 
of applying such and similar procedures’.790 
  
On 21 February 2011, the ECtHR adopted Rule 61 791  which detailed the process of 
application of the PJP. It stated that, if a systemic dysfunction is found which has given rise or 
may give rise to similar complaints, the ECtHR could make use of it either on its own motion 
or at the request of one or both parties.792 Once the applicability of the PJP is recognised, a 
prior processing of application chosen for rendering a pilot judgment would be given,793 and 
the Court can set a time limit by which the respondent state must give effect to the 
recommendations made by the Court in the pilot judgment.794 The Court could also adjourn 
consideration of all similar applications during that period, but reserve the right to reopen 
them at any time.795 If a friendly settlement is reached by the parties, the agreement should 
include a declaration on the implementation of the remedial measures specified in the pilot 
judgment.796 
     ______________________________ 
787  CM, Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers, CM (2006) 203, 15 November 
2006. 
788  Broniowski (n 42), para 192. 
789  SG of the CoE, Contribution of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to the preparation of the 
Interlaken Ministerial Conference, SG/Inf (2009)20, 18 December 2009, para 20. 
790  Interlaken Declaration (2010) High level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights 
(adopted on 19 February 2010), para 7b. 
791 Rules of Court, Rule 61 inserted by the Court on 21 February 2011 
<www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf> accessed 17 November 2014. 
792  ibid, art 1.  
793  ibid, art 2. 
794  ibid, arts 3-4. 
795  ibid, art 6. 
796  ibid, art 7. 
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By inducing member states to end systematic violations of human rights and encouraging 
legislative changes in their legal systems, the ECtHR might be accused of exceeding the limits 
of the powers entrusted to it failing to respect the sovereignty of the contracting parties, as the 
states no longer remain free to choose their own ways of complying with the obligations 
under the Convention.797 According to former Registrar of the Court, Erick Fribergh, the 
Strasbourg Court has been given a more political role in this procedure. 798  Gustavo 
Zagrebelsky, former Italian Judge at the Court, has also opined in a dissenting Opinion in 
Hutten-Czapska v Poland that the legitimacy of the PJP can be questioned as the Court, in 
providing specific suggestions to a state on how the problem could be solved, has usurped the 
role of the Committee of Ministers.799  
 
With regard to this, Philip Leach has argued that there are still some concerns over the 
transparency and the effectiveness of the supervision powers of the Committee of Ministers800 
which has failed to ‘exert enough pressure when supervising the execution of judgments’,801 
and this explains the overwhelming number of persistent violations recognised by the ECtHR. 
The Strasbourg Court may thus be adopting a ‘more assertive, or interventionist position’.802  
 
At the Bled Roundtable in September 2009, Fribergh emphasised the need to increase the 
‘political weight and expertise of the Committee of Ministers’, which can be seen as a ‘key to 
eliminating repetitive cases’ and ensuring a more determined approach to enforcement of the 
Strasbourg Court’s decisions.803 The Secretary General of the CoE has underlined that the 
current ECHR monitoring system requires reforming, which is why Thorbjørn Jagland has 
urged the Committee of Ministers to revise the working methods concerning its supervisory 
authority.804 
 
These changes in the nature of the competences of the Strasbourg Court might signal its 
deeper constitutionalisation, and so its primary mission to administer justice in individual 
     ______________________________ 
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800  Philip Leach, ‘Opinion: On Reform of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2009) 6 EHRLR 725, 732. 
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cases is called into question. Former Slovenian Judge at the ECtHR, Boštjan Zupančič, stated 
that the constitutional role of the ECtHR, which entails strategically focused case 
resolution,805 could not be compared to that of the courts of the ECHR member states which 
are granted competence to strike down legal acts that contradict the Constitution.806 Sadurski 
has claimed that the ECtHR is not ‘fully constitutional’ as it does not possess the authority to 
set aside domestic law that does not comply with the provisions of the Convention.807 Since 
the last word in the implementation of the ECtHR’s judgments lies with the authorities of the 
member states, the treaty-based obligation of the state under Article 46(1) ECHR to abide by 
the judgment of the ECtHR is merely of ‘an international character’.808 It is therefore not 
always possible to be certain that Convention rights are enforceable at the domestic level, due 
to the fact that there are only moral and political mechanisms of enforcement of the ECtHR’s  
judgments.809 
 
Effective implementation at the national level would require not only awarding appropriate 
compensation, but also the adoption of general measures to resolve revealed defects. Since 
this might present significant challenges for the respondent states,810 it is advisable that they 
take the ECtHR’s recommendations seriously or they risk being accused of not complying 
with the Convention obligations.811 It thus seems sensible not just steadily to increase the 
amount of funds available to ensure that the compensation to victims is paid promptly (the 
case of Russia illustrates that the state has never encountered any difficulties on account of its 
financial responsibility),812 but to eliminate the root cause of a problem that gives rise to 
consistent violations at the national level.813 It goes without saying that it is rather more 
important to bring about effective changes in  the legal systems of the contracting parties than 
     ______________________________ 
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simply comply with compensatory duties.814 This is why the application of the PJP which, 
according to former President of the ECtHR, Luzius Wildhaber, sought to ‘address a problem 
affecting large numbers of persons through a judgment in an individual case’,815 might be 
valuable, otherwise the responsibility of the state under Article 46(1) of the Convention would 
be simply regarded as a ‘tax for impunity’816 or a ‘taх for a violation of human rights’.817  
 
If the use of the PJP increases in the future, the Strasbourg Court should address the concerns 
over its effectiveness. First of all, to assist the state authorities in identifying the existence of a 
problem, the Court should disclose the meaning of ‘structural or systemic problem’ for its 
further resolution as a matter of priority. Secondly, the process of selecting cases for PJP 
should be more thoroughly regulated. Analysis of the Court’s judicial practice shows an 
absence of a uniform approach to choosing cases for a PJP, as no explanation as to why some 
cases were chosen, and others not was provided. Thirdly, since one of the elements of the PJP 
is the adjournment of similar cases pending before the Strasbourg Court, this may put the 
applicants in a vulnerable position818 with respect to ensuring individual justice pursuant to 
Article 34 of the Convention. Given that in anticipation of relevant legislative changes in the 
contracting parties the applications may be guarded for several years, there is an obvious 
danger of substantial delay in resolving individual cases819 and of greater non-enforcement of 
judgments as it would be unlikely to tackle long-standing structural problems in the national 
legal systems within the time-limit specified by the Strasbourg Court, which is not always 
realistic.820 It is therefore significant that the Strasbourg Court secures the applicants’ right of 
access to it. 
 
Tatiana Sainati argues that the ‘Court has prioritised efficiency concerns over individual rights 
in an effort to stay afloat amid a veritable flood of applications’.821 Robert Harmsen has 
similarly stressed that the PJP ultimately defends only the Court’s interests, and in so doing 
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jeopardises the ‘new-found centrality’ of individual in the international legal order.822 As a 
single case may not reveal all the twists and turns of a systematic problem, it seems 
reasonable to focus on the individual resolution of disputes. However, despite remaining 
uncertainties over the operation of the PJP, Lord Woolf, former President of the Courts of 
England and Wales, explicitly welcomed its use in combating systemic human rights 
violations in domestic legal systems concerning a large number of people.823 The study will 
now explore how this procedure is being applied in the ECtHR’s practice. 
 
3.3	 The	 impact	 of	 pilot	 judgments	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 on	 national	 legal	
systems	
 
The majority of judgments handed down by the ECtHR between 1959 and 2015 deal with 
property issues, excessive delay in judicial proceedings and the right to an effective 
remedy,824 and so the following pilot judgments Broniowski v Poland, Rumpf v Germany and 
Burdov v Russia (no 2) will be examined in light of their impact on the national legal systems 
in reference to the changes that were made therein in response to these judgments. 
 
 3.3.1	Broniowski	v	Poland	
 
To assess the effect of the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court on the Polish legal system, it 
is important to take a closer look at the process of incorporation of the Convention. Poland’s 
accession to the CoE in 1991 and its ratification of the Convention in 1992825 were regarded 
as vital contributions to the restoration of democracy and the rule of law in Poland. Helen 
Keller has argued that even if Poland did not meet the statutory requirements at the time of 
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accession, its efforts to comply with European standards for the protection of fundamental 
rights were feasible.826  
The 1997 Polish Constitution827 made an important step in converging with the Convention by 
inserting Article 91(1) that recognised ratified international agreements as a part of domestic 
law.828 Under Article 91(2) of the Constitution, if international agreement ratified on prior 
consent granted by statute contradicts provisions of statutes, it will have precedence over 
statutes. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal held that the ECHR that enjoyed a rank below the 
Constitution in the Polish legal system829 could be applied directly by national courts.830 Such 
a friendly approach to international law also recognised the interpretation of the Convention 
by the ECtHR, the jurisdiction of which was accepted in 1993. 831  According to Jacek 
Chlebny, even if Polish courts did not consider the case law of the Strasbourg Court as 
‘absolutely binding’,832 the Constitutional Tribunal, having declared that it must be taken into 
account in the evaluation of national regulations,833 regularly turned to its jurisprudence.834 
The Supreme Court has also invited judiciary to apply the practice of the Strasbourg Court as 
a source of Polish law.835 
 
However, despite positive moves towards the increasing acceptance of international law in the 
domestic legal system, the exact status of the ECHR and the case law of the Strasbourg Court 
within it is not explicitly defined and this creates considerable space for conflicts with 
national judiciary, and could even lead to judicial mistakes. Since ‘the mistrust vis-à-vis the 
national judges is tremendous’, Poland was ‘one of the best clients in Strasbourg’,836 and the 
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Convention control mechanism was perceived as a ‘regular means of seeking a popular 
justice’ and verifying the legitimacy of Polish public authority.837 This has been particularly 
observed when the state did not manage to address the persistent problem of excessively long 
proceedings caused by dysfunctional domestic legislation and judicial system.838 
 
The first pilot judgment, which was delivered by the ECtHR in 2004 in Broniowski v Poland, 
concerned the failure of Poland to pay compensation to people in the part of eastern Poland 
that became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic after World War  II,839 who had to 
abandon their property in the ‘territories beyond the Bug River’.840 Under Article 3 of the 
Agreement between the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the Government of the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on the repatriation of Poles from Ukraine and of 
Ukrainians from Poland,841 Poland acknowledged its obligation to provide compensation to 
more than 1.2 million people between 1944 and 1953.842 Under the Polish legislation, they 
had the right to receive a compensation for loss of their property until 1994,843 but this was 
discontinued with the entry into force of the Law of 29 December 1993 ‘On amendments to 
the Law ‘On the administration of the state treasury’s agricultural property’ and to other 
statutes’.844 Over the next few years the Polish authorities proved reluctant to deal with the 
problem of granting compensation for properties beyond the Bug River.845 
 
Despite the fact that some compensation that formed only an insignificant part of the whole 
value of the property belonging to the applicant’s grandmother was made, Broniowski applied 
to the European Commission of Human Rights in 1996; two years later, when Protocol No 11 
to the Convention entered into force, the application was transferred to the ECtHR. The 
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Strasbourg Court pointed out that there were 167 similar complaints pending, 80,000 people 
remained uncompensated and the number of new claims continued to increase.846 The ECtHR, 
having stressed that this represented a ‘threat to the future effectiveness of the Convention 
machinery’, found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 resulting from ‘malfunctioning of 
Polish legislation and administrative practice’.847 Due to the systematic nature of the problem, 
the Court considered it necessary to assist the respondent state in resolving the dysfunction by 
indicating that it must ‘primarily, either remove any hindrance to the implementation of the 
right of the numerous persons affected by the situation found, in respect of the applicant, to 
have been in breach of the Convention, or provide equivalent redress in lieu’.848 Since it 
would require the national authorities to take legislative and administrative measures to 
ensure that the conventional right to property of remaining Bug River claimants was 
guaranteed, the ECtHR decided to adjourn examination of the identical applications for as 
long as the appropriate general measures were adopted.849 
 
In December 2004, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, having taken into account the 
Strasbourg Court’s judgment in Broniowski, confirmed that the challenged provisions of the 
Law ‘On offsetting the value of property abandoned beyond the present borders of the Polish 
state against the price of state property or the fee for the right of perpetual use’850 contravened 
the Polish Constitution.851 On 5 July 2005, the Committee of Ministers adopted an Interim 
Resolution urging the Polish authorities to improve the entitlement plan regarding the 
claimants and to finish the legislative reform that has already been started.852 The new Law 
‘On realisation of the right to compensation for property left beyond the present borders of the 
Polish state’ that was enacted on 8 July 2005853 reflected those concerns expressed by the 
ECtHR and the Polish Constitutional Tribunal and provided an extensive set of measures to be 
applied in respect of the claimants.854  
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Following the year, in which the pilot judgment was rendered, the Polish government 
requested the Registrar to assist the parties in their negotiations to reach a friendly settlement 
that was eventually agreed in September 2005.855 As one might observe, the framework of the 
agreement went beyond the scope of the individual case insofar as strong emphasis was 
placed on securing future effective implementation of the new legislation. The Strasbourg 
Court attached close attention to the implementation of general measures necessary for 
addressing structural problem identified in the pilot judgment and redressing the damages 
caused by previous defective operation of the Bug River legislative scheme.856 
 
According to the information provided by the Polish Treasury in 2009, more than 19,000 
claimants benefited from the 2005 law.857 On account of this, the ECtHR, having held in the 
subsequent case of Wolkenberg and Others v Poland that the measures adopted by Poland 
were satisfactory,858 struck the case from its list to close the first ever PJP.859 
 
However, since more about 50,000 applications were awaiting confirmation of entitlement, it 
could be assumed that the Polish officials had not managed to secure the ‘effective and 
expeditious’ functioning of the compensation scheme or introduce a comprehensive set of 
measures necessary for complying with the recommendations of the Strasbourg Court for the 
implementation of the pilot judgment in Broniowski.860 Thus, due to remaining complex of 
systematic problems at the domestic legal order, which the state authorities still fail to 
address, the ECtHR will continue to apply the PJP in respect of Poland, and the ECtHR’s 
recent pilot judgment of 2015 in Rutkowski and Others v Poland861  highlighted that the 
problem of lengthy proceedings and the need to provide redress for the damage caused by 
such delays remained. 
 
    _______________________________ 
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Given that the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR have not yet been fully 
incorporated into the legal system of Poland, and the national authorities are not taking their 
obligations under the Convention seriously, this will cause a further flow of applications to the 
Strasbourg Court. Wladyslaw Czaplinski has opined that the rise of new abuses might be 
prevented if the status of international sources is precisely regulated,862 and the best practice 
of countries in complying with the ECHR and comprehensively implementing the ECtHR’s 
judgments is taken into consideration. 
 3.3.2	Rumpf	v	Germany	
 
According to Sebastian Müller and Christoph Gusy, a small number of adverse judgments 
from the ECtHR in respect of Germany, as compared with Poland and Russia,863 may be 
explained by the existence of a differentiated system of judicial review in Germany, and the 
constitutional complaint procedure guaranteed by the FCC.864 Given the increasing number of 
individual complaints handled by the FCC every year,865 there is no doubt about the capacity 
of this mechanism to eliminate infringements at the domestic level. It has been argued that the 
domestic court system, which is ‘highly developed in terms of its expertise, accessibility and 
acceptance within society’,866 has contributed enormously to the protection of basic rights in 
Germany and has assisted in decreasing the number of applications to the ECtHR.867 Germany 
has been found responsible under the Convention only in three cases in 2014868 and in six 
cases in 2015,869 and in even in those few cases the state has implemented the ECtHR’s 
judgments timely and effectively. Its positive experience in complying with the Convention 
obligations should undoubtedly encourage other contracting parties to the Convention that 
still face certain challenges in the enforcement process. 
 
     ______________________________ 
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868  ECtHR, Annual Report 2014 ‘Violations by Article and by Respondent State (2014)’ 176 
  <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2014_ENG.pdf> accessed 17 January 2017. 
869  ECtHR, Annual Report 2015 ‘Violations by Article and by Respondent State (2015)’ 196                                                                       
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2015_ENG.pdf> accessed 24 January 2017. 
   124 
Since the establishment of the ECtHR, a breach of the reasonable time requirement as set out 
in Article 6(1) of the Convention has been found in several judgments delivered against 
Germany, 870  among them König v Germany, 871 Eckle v Germany, 872  Deumeland v 
Germany,873 Süßmann v Germany,874 Pammel v Germany,875 Klein v Germany,876 Sürmeli v 
Germany, Herbst v Germany,877 Glüsen v Germany878 and Kurt Müller v Germany.879 
 
In Sürmeli v Germany, the ECtHR found that the remedies provided by the German legal 
system against excessive duration of judicial proceedings did not guarantee individuals 
effective protection as required under the Convention.880 Despite recognising that individuals 
could appeal to the FCC alleging a violation of their constitutional right to expeditious 
proceedings, the ECtHR pointed out that the FCC was not authorised either to establish time-
limits for the lower courts, which could be objected to as unconstitutional, or to propose any 
alternatives to accelerate the procedure.881 Having declared in Sürmeli that the problem was 
systematic in nature, the ECtHR has acknowledged a violation of Articles 6(1) and 13 of the 
Convention, due to the absence of an effective remedy that would have either speeded up the 
proceedings or afforded redress for delays.882 
 
Germany was urged to enact a bill providing a new remedy against this excessive timescale, 
which would at the same time decrease the workload of the FCC.883 It was proposed to 
introduce a ‘complaint of inaction’, to be submitted either to the court dealing with the case or 
to an appellate court, which could set a time-limit for adopting effective measures. 884 
However, even though the ECtHR stressed the importance of introducing the legislation, it 
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still held that the German government had not made progress in improving the position of 
individuals in domestic judicial proceedings.885 
 
Given that the number of similar applications in recent cases continued to grow, the ECtHR 
considered it reasonable to initiate the PJP for the first time in respect of Germany, in Rumpf. 
886 Rüdiger Rumpf, who operated a personal security service, having unsuccessfully lodged 
appeals with national courts against the decision of the Querfurt county authorities not to 
renew his gun licences,887 appealed to the FCC alleging a violation of Article 6 ECHR due to 
lengthy proceedings and the absence of legal remedy under German law. By the time the FCC 
delivered its final decision on 25 April 2007, finding the complaint inadmissible,888 the whole 
appeal process had lasted thirteen years.889  
 
Rumpf turned to the ECtHR, invoking Articles 6(1) and 13 of the Convention, and the Court 
delivered its pilot judgment on 2 December 2010, acknowledging this violation of challenged 
provisions.890 Setting a time-limit of one year for Germany to establish an effective domestic 
remedy, which would either expedite hearings in the national courts or provide adequate 
redress for delays, the ECtHR decided not to wait for the state to adopt the measures and 
continued to examine similar cases, to remind Germany of its obligations under the 
Convention.891 
 
To implement the ECtHR’s pilot judgment in Rumpf, Germany passed the Law ‘On judicial 
remedies in court proceedings and criminal investigations of excessive length’, which created 
a complaint procedure and guaranteed individuals the right to bring a claim for 
compensation.892 Under Article 1 of the Law, the affected party can file an objection to 
procedural delay, and for each year of excessive duration of proceedings at the national level 
has a right to receive compensation if other reparation was not sufficient.893 
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The Report on the application of a new regulation provided by the German government for 
the period 3 December 2011 to 31 December 2013 indicates that only a few complaints of 
delay and claims for compensation have been raised before the domestic courts since its entry 
into force,894  which might confirm that the structural problem of lengthy proceedings in 
Germany no longer presents a major challenge. 
 
The Report on the execution of judgment in Rumpf, issued by the Federal Ministry of Justice 
of Germany in 2013,895 provides information on the measures adopted by national authorities 
for complying with their Convention obligations and illustrates the effects of the new 
legislative act on the national legal order. It was evident that it strengthened the legal 
protection of individuals before the domestic courts insofar as the length of judicial 
proceedings in Germany had been shortened, and so the Committee of Ministers closed the 
examination of Rumpf case in its Resolution adopted on 5 December 2013, stating that the 
respondent state had removed the deficiencies in its judicial system and established an 
appropriate legal remedy within the time indicated in the pilot judgment.896 No other ECtHR 
judgment acknowledging a violation on the same grounds has subsequently been delivered.897 
 
As a member of the international community, Germany strives to comply diligently with its 
obligations under Convention by adopting measures required by the ECtHR for the effective 
implementation of its judgments, and also attaches considerable attention to the judicial 
practice of the Strasbourg Court in the draft process or for amending a law under 
consideration. 898  This explicitly indicates that Germany takes its participation in the 
Convention mechanism seriously, and other states should undoubtedly follow its example.  	3.3.3	Burdov	v	Russia	(no	2)	
In comparison with Germany, the Russian authorities have shown some reluctance to fully 
incorporate the norms of the Convention into its national legal system, or to comply with the 
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obligation under Article 46 of the Convention to implement the judgments of the ECtHR.899 
Chronic problems inherited from the Soviet era have had an immense impact,900 and since the 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR was accepted by Russia in 1998 the applications from its citizens 
have composed the largest part of the ECtHR’s caseload, and an extremely high number of 
judgments have been delivered by the ECtHR finding infringements of the right to a fair trial 
under Article 6(1) of the Convention and the right to property under Article 1 of Protocol No 
1.901 
 
In Burdov v Russia,902 a case that concerned non-enforcement of domestic judicial decisions, 
the applicant was ordered by the military authorities to take part in emergency operations at 
the Chernobyl nuclear plant between October 1986 and January 1997, during which time he 
was exposed to radioactive emissions. On account of health problems, he was entitled to 
various social benefits that the state failed to pay.903  Although some of his claims were 
satisfied, a number of decisions awarding the petitioner compensation remained 
unenforced. 904  Alleging a violation of Articles 6(1) of the Convention and Article 1 of 
Protocol No 1,905 Burdov filed a complaint with the ECtHR, which delivered its judgment on 
7 May 2002 upholding the claims. 
 
In December 2004, the Committee of Ministers adopted a Resolution concerning the 
judgment in Burdov906 which reflected on those individual and general measures that the 
Russian authorities had agreed to implement.907 Regardless of improvements in the national 
legislation and judicial practices highlighted by the Committee of Ministers, the 
Memorandum of 4 June 2007908 drew attention to the continuing failure of public authorities 
to ensure consistent execution of the domestic courts’ decisions. Since this represented one of 
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the most fundamental systematic problems being encountered, 909  PACE urged Russia to 
resolve the issue of extensive non-enforcement of judicial decisions rendered against the state 
by assigning it a ‘top political priority’, because the existence of such structural deficiency 
caused repeated violations of the Convention and could pose a serious danger to the rule of 
law.910 
 
The ECtHR, recognising the need to provide immediate redress for such persistent violations, 
applied a PJP in Burdov v Russia (no 2) in 2009.911 In addition to breaches of Article 6(1), 
Article 1 of Protocol No 1, there were numerous breaches of Article 13, due to the lack of 
effective domestic remedies in the national legal system.912 The ECtHR set a time-limit of six-
months, within which the remedial measure should be introduced, and one year in which to 
provide redress to all petitioners with similar cases pending before the ECtHR.913 The Court 
also decided to adjourn the consideration of clone cases for one year pending the adoption of 
the required measures.914 However, the Russian government did not meet those time frames, 
and the Committee of Ministers issued an Interim Resolution on execution of judgments of 
the ECtHR in 145 cases against the Russian Federation.915 This Resolution, while noting the 
positive developments in resolving the underlying problem, called on the Russian authorities 
to continue the implementation of legislative reforms to guarantee timely and effective 
execution of judicial decisions. 
 
To avoid being accused of systematic non-compliance with the ECtHR’s decisions, which 
might eventually lead to suspension of the membership in the CoE, the Russian Parliament 
passed two Federal laws ‘On compensation for violation of the right to trial within a 
reasonable time or the right to enforcement of a judgment within a reasonable time’916 and 
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‘On amendments to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation’917 which entered into 
force on 4 May 2010 and were intended to entitle the party to bring an appeal for 
compensation for non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of the courts’ decisions. 
 
Under the Compensation Act, a monetary award for a breach of the right to a trial or to 
enforcemenrt of a judgment within a reasonable time does not depend on whether this is the 
fault of the public authorities responsible.918 The Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation, in its Resolution N11 of 29 March 2016, clarified that a petitioner who appeals to 
the court for the compensation is not required to prove damage, as once the alleged violation 
is established, the cause of such damage will be presumed.919  Although the new federal 
legislation reduced the number of similar claims forwarded to the ECtHR, it did not meet all 
expectations, as it only allowed compensation for a violation of the right to enforce judicial 
acts ordering monetary payments to be recovered from the federal budget of the Russian 
Federation, but not others, which the state was obliged to perform in kind.920 The Supreme 
Court also confirmed that the Compensation Act could be applied only with respect to 
financial awards; 921 in all other cases there was still a lack of any effective remedy at the 
domestic level. 
 
In 2012 it became obvious that the adoption of these Acts did not address the systemic failure 
to enforce non-monetary awards922 and the ECtHR urged Russian officials to address this 
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persistent problem to prevent a further influx of analogous applications to the Court, and 
informed them that it was initiating the PJP in another group of cases.923 
 
Having observed that the Compensation Act did not cover the complaints of the fresh 
applicants, the ECtHR affirmed in Gerasimov and Others v Russia that structural dysfunction 
was leading to infringement of rights under Articles 6 and 13 ECHR and Article 1 of Protocol 
No 1, and called on Russia to ensure that within one year individuals were provided with an 
effective domestic remedy.924 It was presumed that this time-limit would be adequate in light 
of the previous experience with enforcing the first pilot judgment in Burdov v Russia (no 2). 
The examination of new similar applications was adjourned for a period of two years pending 
the adoption of a remedy.925 The ECtHR obliged the respondent state to grant compensation 
within two years for delays in execution of judicial decisions imposing obligations in kind in 
respect of applicants who had lodged their complaints with the ECtHR before the present pilot 
judgment was delivered.926 
 
In July 2015, the Russian authorities submitted a detailed action plan on the enforcement of 
pilot judgment in Gerasimov.927 This plan reflected the individual and general measures taken 
to comply with the recommendations of the ECtHR, among which was a draft Federal law 
prepared by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, which was submitted to the 
Duma in November 2015.928 Given that the draft law foresees that the Compensation Act and 
the changes introduced to other legislative acts have to be applied to cases dealing with 
enforcement of judgments imposing obligations in kind, it would apparently strengthen the 
responsibility of the authorities to solve the structural problem at the national level.929  
 
It should be stressed, however, that even if national authorities are likely to change the 
legislation within the required time, it is not always possible to enhance their adherence to 
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obligations accepted under international law. This creates serious obstacles both to 
comprehensive enforcement of the ECtHR’s judgments in the Russian Federation and to 
further adoption of necessary legislative reforms in its legal system, as indicated by the fact 
that the ECtHR continues to apply the PJP in respect of Russia. 
 
The contracting parties to the Convention did not demonstrate their willingness to enforce the 
judgments of the ECtHR, particularly those in which the ECtHR has found systematic 
problems in their legal orders, against which it has applied a PJP. Even if the PJP can 
stimulate positive changes in the legal systems of states, and thus ease the workload of the 
ECtHR, there are serious implications for individuals whose rights will be at stake if the 
ECtHR decides to adjourn the consideration of identical applications. The parties to the 
Convention should therefore focus on ensuring effective judicial protection of fundamental 
rights at the national level to avoid numerous applications being submitted to the Strasbourg 
Court and reduce the likelihood of the ECtHR applying the PJP against them. 
 	
3.4	Ensuring	effective	functioning	of	the	ECHR	control	mechanism	 
 
3.4.1 Improving the implementation of the ECtHR’s judgments 
  
The stability of the human rights protection system at the national and international levels is 
one of the important elements of the ECHR mechanism. Among the reforms aimed at 
increasing the effectiveness of the ECtHR’s functioning, the PJP was intended to involve all 
parties to the Convention in sharing the burden of the backlog of the ECtHR with the 
domestic authorities,930 as this study has illustrated with examples of the pilot judgments 
against Poland, Germany and Russia, in the light of which these countries made modifications 
to their national legislation, policies and legal practices to remove the cause of the problem.931 
 
The main challenge in the process of implementation of pilot judgments can be to elicit an 
effective response from the state concerned within the specified time. Since the response must 
go beyond the analysis of the origin of the problem revealed by the ECtHR and include 
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proposals for solving it, a permanent dialogue between the contracting party to the 
Convention and the ECtHR should be maintained. Given that the reliability of the national 
authorities in enforcing of the ECtHR’s judgments is important, the government’s attitude to 
the use of the PJP is scrutinised to find out whether the necessary corrective measures to 
address systematic problems could be undertaken.932 Consultation between the ECtHR and 
the respondent state is vital; however, the latter does not have the right to reject the 
application of the PJP, as its consent is not required. The PJP will only be successful if states 
are willing and able to collaborate and engage in a dialogue on the adoption of the remedial 
measures required by the ECtHR; otherwise, their failure to respond to the pilot judgments 
would discredit the whole procedure.933 
 
PACE pays close attention to structural problems in the legal systems of the ECHR member 
states that lead to repeteated violations of the Convention provisions. 934  Although the 
Committee of Ministers is the only body responsible for monitoring the execution of the 
ECtHR’s judgments, it was argued that the role of PACE should also be reconsidered; a better 
interaction between these two institutions of the CoE could be beneficial, not only for the 
process of enforcement, but for strengthening the protection of fundamental rights. 935  A 
specialised group, under the Committee of Ministers should be established, which would 
supervise the execution of the pilot judgments, assess the promptness and sufficiency of the 
measures adopted and share best practices among the contracting parties in implementing 
pilot judgments. 
 
Given that not all ECHR member states have been cooperative in fulfilling their Convention 
obligations and addressing the structural deficiencies in their legal systems, this had increased 
the workload of the ECtHR. It is thus important that states, firstly, identify the underlying 
cause of a systematic problem and remove it at the natonal level, and secondly, enhance the 
domestic judicial protection of individuals. Only then will the number of repetitive 
applications to the ECtHR be reduced, allowing the ECtHR to focus on more serious cases.936 
It appears that this would also be an indispensable precondition for abandoning the 
application of the PJP in the future. 
 
     ______________________________ 
932  Rules of Court (n 791), Rule 61, art 2.  
933  Leach and others (n 92) 174. 
934  PACE, Res(2006)1516 (n 910). 
935  Buyse (n 93) 1902. 
936   Harmsen (n 822) 36. 
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To achieve this, national authorities would be expected to execute the ECtHR’s judgments 
comprehensively, in terms of individual and general measures. In so doing, they will comply 
with the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of 12 May 2004 on the 
improvement of domestic remedies, which emphasised that all ECHR member states must 
ensure effective remedies in law and practice allowing individuals to obtain an adequate 
redress at the national level. It is therefore significant to build close cooperation between the 
ECtHR and the national courts, and to involve the executive and legislative branches in the 
implementation process insofar as either legislative amendments or even new regulations are 
to be introduced. Only their joint involvement in enforcing the ECtHR’s decisions can bring 
about effective changes in national legal systems and exclude the possibility of dealing 
repeatedly with clone cases. 
 
The adoption of specific rules to regulate the execution of judgments might help states in 
fulfilling their Convention obligations. However, in practice this is not always so, and Ukraine 
is an example of this. Given that from year to year it overwhelms the ECtHR with complaints 
from its citizens, 937  in 2006 a law was passed ‘On implementation of judgments and 
application of the judicial practice of the ECtHR’,938 but, unfortunately, it did not produce the 
anticipated results, as it did not increase the responsiveness of state authorities to eliminating 
ECHR violations. According to the statistical information provided by the Committee of 
Ministers in its Annual Report 2014,939 the number of cases against Ukraine pending before 
the ECtHR, including those concerning structural problems, continued to grow, and the 
number of judgments awaiting implementation was increasing. It seems thus, that the 
adoption of a law to confirm the state’s commitment to European integration in matters of 
justice and the protection of human rights is not enough to secure correct functioning of the 
Convention mechanism and a comprehensive implementation of the ECtHR’s judgments in 
the national legal order.940 Effective responses to judgments of the Strasbourg Court will only 
be obtained if there is a strong political will to adhere to the Convention’s standards and 
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937  ECtHR, Annual Report 2014 (n 355) 166. 
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940 CM, Interim Resolution on the execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in 232 
Cases against Ukraine relative to the failure or serious delay in abiding by final domestic judicial decisions 
delivered against the state and its entities as well as the absence of an effective remedy, 
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promote human rights-oriented policies. 
 
Countries which take seriously their responsibilities under the Convention, and in which the 
legal culture of compliance with international law is high, do not need detailed regulation of 
the execution of the ECtHR’s judgments. A large number of applications at the ECtHR from 
Russia and Ukraine, which shows the persistence of long-standing problems in their legal 
systems, does not necessarily have to be related to existing gaps in the legislation, but could 
be explained by a reserved attitude of national authorities to incorporating the Convention 
provisions into their legal systems that was considerably affected by the Soviet mentality.941 
Given that this resistance on the part of national judges to aligning their judicial practices with 
the ECtHR’s interpretation of the ECHR undermines their credibility, individuals tend to seek 
the protection of their rights at the ECtHR. Helen Keller has observed that in Poland: 
 
‘in certain administrative areas a (post-) communist mentality prevails 
in the work place and the context and substance of human rights is not 
yet fully present in the daily life of many civil servants. This gives rise 
to mistrust of the Polish judiciary and administration and explains why 
many Poles place their hope to Strasbourg’.942 
 
The example of the Russian Federation illustrated that at the very beginning the state had a 
strong incentive to become a member of the CoE and to join the European system for the 
protection of fundamental rights. However, once it was accepted, this initial willingness 
disappeared, and Russia was repeatedly called on by PACE 943  and the Committee of 
Ministers944 to eliminate continuing violations of the Convention. Anton Burkov explained 
that the national courts did not take for granted their obligations under the ECHR, and 
basically attempted to convince the CoE that the Convention was applied; they did not rely on 
the ECHR standards when deciding cases, and in their decisions quite often only mentioned 
the Convention norms without specifying the article, or made a reference to the ECHR in 
isolation from the case-law of the ECtHR. 945  Georg Nolte argued that domestic courts ‘rather 
     ______________________________ 
941  Nussberger (n 531) 650. 
942  Keller, ‘Reception of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) in Poland and Switzerland’ (n 826) 339. 
943  PACE, Resolution on the human rights situation in the Chechen Republic, Res (2004)1403, 7 October 
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(2005) 1455, 22 June 2005. 
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945  Anton Burkov, ‘How to Improve the Results of a Reluctant Player: The Case of Russia and the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ in Spyridon Flogaitis, Tom Zwart and Julie Fraser (eds), The European 
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2013) 156. 
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‘‘take colour’’ from their ‘‘national legal culture’’ when interpreting and applying a treaty, and 
do not refer to decisions from international courts and courts of other states parties in order to 
identify a ‘‘true autonomous international meaning’.946 
 
To begin to address this, the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers adopted on 12 
May 2004 on the ECHR in university education and professional training947 should be put into 
full effect. It invited member states of the ECHR to organise professional trainings for judges 
to facilitate a better incorporation of the Convention standards and the ECtHR’s case-law in 
the reasoning of the judgments rendered by domestic courts. When applying national law, it is 
important to ensure that national authorities take into account all the case-law of the ECtHR, 
not just that concerning their state. Doing so might assist them in preventing violations of the 
Convention provisions and reducing the number of complaints forwarded to the ECtHR.  
 
Given that ‘the effectiveness of national remedies for violations of the Convention rights is 
itself a direct indicator of the effectiveness of the ECHR in national legal orders’,948 there is 
an urgent need to ensure that domestic legal remedies are capable of effectively addressing 
alleged violations of Convention rights in the ECHR member states. This will undoubtedly 
have ‘quantitative and qualitative effects’ on the caseload of the ECtHR949 as the more cases 
are resolved at the national level, the fewer will be submitted to the ECtHR. Leo Zwaak has 
commented that infringements of the ECHR first of all have to be redressed at ‘home’ and the 
ECtHR should be an ‘ultimum remedium’.950 
 
It is therefore important to make sure that national judicial remedies are recognised by the 
ECtHR as effective enough that individuals may be required to exhaust them before lodging a 
complaint with it, but several uncertainties still remain regarding these in the context of 
Article 35(1) of the Convention. This study will address those that represent the greatest 
concern for the petitioners, as their applications to the ECtHR could be rejected as failing to 
meet the admissibility criteria because they either have not exhausted all available remedies at 
the national level, or they have invoked remedies which are not considered to be effective 
     ______________________________ 
946  Georg Nolte, ‘Introduction’ in Nolte and Aust (n 83) 3. 
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2004, para 3. 
950  Leo Zwaak and Therese Cachia, ‘The European Court of Human Rights: A Success Story?’ (2004) 11(3) 
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from the perspective of the ECtHR. By scrutinising national judicial review proceedures in 
civil, arbitration and criminal cases, it will attempt to suggest how to increase the availability 
and effectiveness of domestic judicial remedies. 
 
 3.4.2	National	judicial	review	procedures	
 
In the interview on ‘Preliminary results of the Constitutional Court’s work on the threshold of 
the 15th anniversary’, the Chairman of the RCC declared that to comply with the requirement 
of exhaustion of domestic remedies in the Russian legal system under Article 35(1) of the 
Convention it would be necessary to have recourse to the court of first instance and the court 
of cassation.951 However, the key question whether supervisory review proceeding, with its 
numerous instances and uncertain terms of application, was also covered by the Convention 
provision remained open. The study will touch upon this problematic issue through examining 
the case law of the ECtHR. 		3.4.2.1	Civil	procedure	
 
The first relevant discussions took place in 1999, when the ECtHR, in considering 
admissibility in Tumilovich v Russia, held that the supervisory review formed part of 
‘extraordinary remedies, the use of which depends on discretionary powers of the President of 
the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court and the Deputy Prosecutor General’.952  It was 
emphasised that, insofar as under Article 320 of the Civil Procedure Code of the RSFSR in 
force till 2002 953  the petitioner was not authorised to initiate legal proceedings in the 
supervisory instance independently, the effectiveness of such a remedy in the context of 
Article 35(1) of the Convention would be in doubt.954  
 
On 8 February 2006, the Committee of Ministers adopted an Interim Resolution concerning 
violations of the principle of legal certainty through the supervisory review procedure in civil 
     ______________________________ 
951  Interview with Valery Zorkin, ‘Predvaritelnie Itogi Deyatelnosti Konstitutzionnogo Suda RF na Poroge 15-
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   953 GPK RSFSR [Civil Procedure Code of the RSFSR] 11 June 1964 // Vedomosti RSFSR 1964, N24, 407. 
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proceedings in the Russian Federation.955 It invited the Russian authorities to adopt, within 
one year, general measures that would: prevent further breaches of the legal certainty 
requirement; set stricter time-limits for lodging requests for a supervisory review; limit the 
number of successive applications that could be submitted in the same case for review; and 
narrow down admissible grounds to cover only the most serious violations of law. The 
legislature was called on to bring the legal regulation of the supervisory review in line with 
international legal standards recognised by the Russian Federation.956 
 
In its Resolution N2-P of 5 February 2007, the RCC emphasised that if the judge suspends the 
execution of the appealed judicial decision, this act will not be implemented and available 
domestic remedies would not be deemed exhausted in the context of Article 46(3) of the 
Russian Constitution until the court of supervisory instance delivers its judgment.957 Unlike 
the ECtHR, this Court is auhorised to revoke the decision of the court which led to the 
infringement. This would mean that individuals would be allowed to bring a case before the 
ECtHR only after proceedings at the Court are finished, presuming that as a result of 
subsequent reforms the supervisory review meets the requirement of an effective remedy.958 
 
Considering this, substantial changes to the regulation of supervisory proceeding were made 
by Federal law N330-FZ that entered into force on 8 January 2008.959 Among the amendments 
introduced to new Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation (GPK) enacted on 1 
February 2003960 were the following: the discretionary power of the Deputy President of the 
Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to overrule the decision of a judge of the Supreme 
Court on a refusal to submit an appeal for a supervisory review and to transfer this appeal for 
consideration in the supervisory review proceedings was abolished and in Article 376(2) GPK 
the time-limit of six-months for bringing an appeal to the court exercising supervisory 
jurisdiction by those participating in the procedure and those whose rights and legitimate 
interests were affected by judicial decisions was introduced. Despite the fact that in its 
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Resolution of 12 February 2008, the Supreme Court pointed out that established time-limit 
was to be applied for appealing judicial decisions in all courts of supervisory instances and 
was not subject to renewal when the application was submitted to a higher court of 
supervisory instance after a refusal to transfer a complaint for a supervisory review,961 it was 
not clear how this would eventually be calculated by the Strasbourg Court.  
 
Having proclaimed its jurisdiction to evaluate in every case the effectiveness of any presented 
remedies in terms of ‘generally recognised rules of international law concerning the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies’,962 the ECtHR has been assessing the compliance of new 
rules with the requirement of Article 35(1). 
 
Despite showing respect to the amendments made that considerably improved supervisory 
review proceeding, the ECtHR held in Martynets v Russia in 2009 that existing earlier 
uncertainty has maintained as the binding courts’ decisions could be challenged in several 
consecutive supervisory review instances, which would make it difficult to determine the final 
point in domestic procedures.963 It was therefore not possible to recognise this procedure as an 
effective remedy in the national legal system, and the applicant’s complaint was rejected in 
accordance with Article 35(1) and (4) of the ECHR, as it was submitted six months after the 
date on which the decision of the court of cassation was delivered, which was considered 
final. 
 
As a response to the ECtHR’s concerns in respect of identified deficiencies in supervisory 
review proceeding, further changes were made in 2010 by Federal Law N353-FZ.964 Instead 
of one cassation and three stages of supervisory review proceeding, it introduced the appelate 
instance, two level proceedings in cassation instance, which under Article 377 GPK require 
the appeal to be first brought to the Presidium of the Regional Court and thereafter to the Civil 
Chamber of the Supreme Court, and the supervisory review instance. By virtue of this reform, 
     ______________________________ 
961  Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Resolution N2 of 12 February 2008 ‘O primenenii 
norm grazhdanskogo protzessualnogo zakonodatelstva v sude nadzornoi instancii v svyazi s prinyatiem y 
vvedeniem v deistvie Federalnogo Zakona ot 4 Dekabrya 2007 N330-FZ ‘O Vnesenii Izmenenii v 
Grazhdanskii Protzessualnii Kodeks Rossiskoi Federatzii'' [On the application of norms of civil procedural 
law in the court of supervisory instance in connection with the adoption and enaction of the Federal Law of 
4 December 2007 N330-FZ ‘On Amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation’] // 
RG N34, 16 February 2008, para 1 subpara 2. 
962  Berdzenishvili v Russia [2004] ECHR 2004-II, s ‘Law’. 
963  Martynets v Russia App no 29612/09 (ECHR, 5 November 2009). 
964  Federal Law N353-FZ ‘O Vnesenii Izmenenii v Grazhdanskii Protzessualnii Kodeks Rossiskoi Federatzii’ 
[On Amendments to the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation] 9 December 2010 // RG N5360, 
13 December 2010 (entered into force on 1 January 2012). 
   139 
which entered into force on 1 January of 2012, the multiplicity of supervisory instances that 
was previously criticised by the ECtHR was removed and, pursuant to Article 391.1 GPK was 
limited to review of judicial decisions by the Presidium of the Supreme Court, which could 
accept such appeals after the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court had examined them in 
cassation proceedings.965 Given that within the frame of the supervisory review only one level 
proceeding remained and the time for lodging an appeal under Article 391.2(2) GPK was 
shortened by three months, there was no danger that the case would go through multiple 
instances over an indefinite period.  
 
To evaluate how these changes affected the position of the ECtHR regarding the effectiveness 
of the amended cassation and supervisory review proceedings, the study will turn to the 
examination of recently delivered by the ECtHR judgment in Abramyan and Yakubovskiye v 
Russia.966 The Strasbourg Court, having analysed the new cassation procedure that absorbed 
the first two stages of the supervisory proceeding, affirmed that the six-month time period for 
reviewing judicial decisions that had entered into force was supposed to cover now both 
levels of cassation procedure, as compared to the previous practice of applying this time-limit 
to appeals lodged at three supervisory review instances.967 A Resolution of the Plenum of the 
Supreme Court 11 December 2012 stated that this time-limit would not be restarted after a 
cassation appeal was rejected and resubmitted to a higher cassation court.968 Although the 
legal regulation did not clarify how to calculate this six-month time-limit if the party has the 
right to file two cassation appeals, it was observed that the new time-limit was diligently 
complied with by the courts and the proceedings at both cassation levels were terminated 
within one year.969 Apart from the general six-month period envisaged for submitting both 
cassation appeals, the GPK has specified the time-limits for each stage of consideration in 
cassation proceedings, which would undoubtedly assist in identifying the final point in the 
procedure at the national level. 
 
The GPK has similarly foreseen the possibility for the parties under Article 381(3) GPK to 
complain to the President or Deputy President of the Supreme Court after the dismissal of the 
     ______________________________ 
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cassation appeal by a single judge of the Supreme Court that are empowered to dismiss the 
ruling issued by a single judge and to transfer the cassation appeal for consideration to the 
court of cassation instance. Alternatively, the parties may request the President or Deputy 
President of the Supreme Court under Article 391.11 GPK to initiate supervisory review 
proceeding within six months of the date on which the challenged decision became binding. It 
must be emphasised that such a complaint, which was an integral part of the former 
supervisory review proceeding, is now recognised as separate from the cassation procedure 
remedy, the use of which depends on the discretionary powers of state officials and not 
subject to the exact time limitations, and so would not be taken into account in the context of 
Article 35(1) of the Convention.970  
 
The ECtHR concluded that previous uncertainties in the supervisory review proceeding had 
been addressed by new cassation procedure;971 having recognised it as a remedy that would 
have to be exhausted, the Court called on individuals to make extensive use of it before 
bringing their cases to the ECtHR.972 Provided that the time-limits established by GPK are 
complied with and access to the Supreme Court is guaranteed, further successful functioning 
of the cassation appeal system will be ensured.973 Using this approach, in according with 
which any alleged infringements of the Convention first dealt with at the domestic level 
through review by the highest judicial body of the Russian Federation, cooperation between 
the conventional mechanism and the Russian national judiciary will be enhanced.974 
 
As far as supervisory review proceeding was concerned, the ECtHR stressed that, since it may 
be initiated only by the President or Deputy President of the Supreme Court and was thus 
subject to the power of public officials, this remedy was considered as an ‘indirect, 
extraordinary remedy which remains outside the normal frame of domestic remedies’.975 The 
legal stability might be preserved by profiting only from accessible legal remedies that could 
provide redress against any alleged violations of the Convention.976 The Strasbourg Court has 
reaffirmed this approach in its recent judgment in Kocherov and Sergeyeva v Russia.977 Given 
that supervisory review did not constitute an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 
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35(1) of the ECHR, the complainant’s petition in the case was rejected as it exceeded the 
time-limit required for bringing the case before the ECtHR.978  
 
Given that the court of the supervisory instance has overturned and modified a significant 
number of decisions of the lower courts, due to the erroneous application of law,979 national 
authorities have to address the revealed by the Strasbourg Court deficiencies urgently, so that 
its effectiveness under Article 35(1) of the Convention may not be jeopardised. As long as this 
issue remains open, the time-limit of six-months will presumably be calculated without the 
possibility of lodging a supervisory appeal, which is not available for the applicants under 
GPK. It would be prudent to inform the Strasbourg Court about any outcome of such 
proceedings in order to strengthen the position of individuals before the ECtHR against any 
unpredictable conclusions. 	3.4.2.2	Arbitration	procedure	
 
Following the reform introduced in 2012, the cassation and supervisory review proceedings in 
the courts of general jurisdiction were comparable to those already existing in arbitration 
courts. However, in contrast to the supervisory review proceeding regulated by GPK, which 
was not recognised by the ECtHR as an effective domestic remedy for the purposes of Article 
35(1) of the Convention, the ECtHR has explicitly affirmed that both cassation and 
supervisory review as regulated by the Arbitration Procedure Code of the Russian Federation 
(APK) in force since 1 January 2003 980  constituted remedies which did need to be 
exhausted.981 
 
In Glukhikh v Russia,982 the ECtHR recognised the Government’s objections regarding non-
exhaustion of domestic remedies as well-founded, concluding that the cassation appeal should 
have been lodged prior to bringing the case before the ECtHR in order to give the Russian 
courts a chance to address the alleged violation of the Convention first at the national level. 
The Court rejected the application under Article 35(1) ECHR for failing to make use of all 
available and effective legal remedies. 
     ______________________________ 
978  Abramyan (n 966), paras 74, 105. 
      979   RCC, Resolution N2-P of 5 February 2007 (n 578), para 9.2 subpara 5. 
980  Arbitrazhnii Processualnii Kodeks N 95-FZ [Code of Arbitration Procedure of the Russian Federation] 24 
July 2002 // RG N137, 27 July 2002 (APK). 
981  Abramyan (n 966), para 60. 
982  Glukhikh v Russia, App no 1867/04 (ECHR, 25 September 2008), para 1 s ‘Law’. 
   142 
 
In Kovaleva and Others v Russia,983  the ECtHR emphasised that the supervisory review 
proceeding has been regulated in a detailed way by APK untill amended in June 2014; 
particularly in accordance with Article 292, an application for a review could be lodged with 
the Supreme Arbitration Court by the parties or certain other persons within a period not 
exceeding three months from the date of entry into force of the last contested judicial 
decision, if all other judicial remedies were exhausted. Article 304(2) APK limited the 
grounds for supervisory review and included among others a violation of human rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by international treaties of the Russian Federation.984 Given that the 
binding judicial decisions could be challenged only in a single instance on the request of the 
party and within a limited period, the ECtHR concluded that the supervisory review was not 
considered as a separate, but as an ultimate domestic remedy within the meaning of Article 
35(1) of the Convention.  
 
As a result of amendments enacted in June 2014 by the Federal Law N186-FZ, 985  the 
Supreme Arbitration Court was superseded by the Supreme Court. The new regulation 
foresees now multiple stages of appealing judicial decisions in cassation instance. Decisions 
of Regional Arbitration Courts and of the Arbitration Courts of Appeal that have entered into 
force may be appealed within a period not exceeding two months from the date of their entry 
into force to Arbitration Courts of Districts, as set in Article 276(1) APK. The same judicial 
acts and the decisions of the Arbitration Courts of Districts can subsequently be challenged 
within two months, as stipulated by Article 291.2 APK, in cassation proceeding in the Civil 
Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (Article 291.1(1) APK). If the judge 
of the Supreme Court refuses to transfer a cassation appeal for consideration to the Civil 
Chamber, a third appeal within the frame of cassation proceedings is possible; it would need 
to be addressed to the President or Deputy President of the Supreme Court (Article 291.6(8) 
APK), who may dismiss the ruling issued by a judge of the Supreme Court and transfer the 
cassation appeal for consideration to the Civil Chamber. The time-limit for such an appeal 
was not prescribed by APK, but by analogy with the rules laid down by GPK, as interpreted 
by the Supreme Court, the two-months time-limit enshrined in Article 291.2(1) APK is likely 
to be common to both appeals. 
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In accordance with Article 308.1 APK, the rulings of the Civil Chamber handed down in 
cassation proceedings could be reviewed within three months, on complaint of the persons 
participating and certain other persons affected, in the supervisory instance by the Presidium 
of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. In a case where the judge of the Supreme 
Court, on examination of the supervisory appeal, refuses to transfer it for consideration to the 
Presidium of the Supreme Court, the President or Deputy President of the Supreme Court 
under Article 308.4(7) APK could disagree with the ruling issued by a judge of the Supreme 
Court and hand over the case to the Presidium. A time-limit within which the President or 
Deputy President could exercise this power was not, however, established by APK. If this 
procedure may be viewed as a second supervisory appeal, then the single three-months period 
prescribed in Article 308.1(4) APK could be applied to it. 
 
Apart from this, Article 308.10 APK secures the right of interested parties to file a complaint 
with the President or Deputy President of the Supreme Court to submit judicial decisions to 
the Presidium of the Supreme Court for a supervisory review to address fundamental 
violations of substantive law or procedural law which affect the legality of the contested 
judicial decisions. Article 308.10(4) APK established a time-limit for lodging this complaint 
of four months from the date when the challenged judicial decision came into force. One 
might assume that such a separate stage of consideration of the complaint within the frame of 
supervisory review could either be an alternative to the avenue of appeal to the President or 
Deputy President of the Supreme Court under Article 308.4(7) APK, or might even 
complement it. 
 
Relying on the past practice of the ECtHR, it may be that the renewed cassation procedure 
would be recognised as an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35(1) of the 
Convention. However, given that the analysed amendments to APK introduced a multistage 
system of revision of judicial acts within the frame of cassation and supervisory proceedings, 
the Strasbourg Court may question the effectiveness of these remedies as a whole without 
dividing them into separate stages. The major concern of the ECtHR may be the exercise of 
discretionary power by the President or Deputy President of the Supreme Court to revoke the 
decision of a judge of the Supreme Court to refuse to transfer the appeal for further 
consideration, which is not subject to any time-limits.  
 
In view of remaining uncertainties, which may threaten the stability of the judicial practice, it 
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is thus important to regulate this problematic issue in order to avoid any arbitrary decisions. 
Since the ECtHR has not so far expressed its opinion on the effectiveness of new cassation 
and supervisory review proceedings in light of the 2014 amendments, it would be reasonable 
to calculate six-month period without considering the need to file cassation and supervisory 
appeals, but nevertheless it is advisable to submit them and to report to the ECtHR on the 
results of such proceedings. If the ECtHR acknowledges these procedures in whole or in part 
as effective remedies, this might help meet the time-limit established by the Convention, and 
make use of all available domestic remedies as required by Article 35(1) ECHR.  
 3.4.2.3	Criminal	procedure		
 
As observed in Berdzenishvili v Russia, the supervisory review of judicial decisions in 
criminal proceedings under the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation (UPK) 
that came in force on 1 July 2002986 was not recognised by the ECtHR as an effective 
domestic remedy that had to be exhausted in terms of Article 35(1) of the Convention.987 The 
Strasbourg Court justified its position by stating that pursuant to the rules set out in Chapters 
48 UPK, which was repealed when Federal law N433-FZ988 entered into force, applications 
for a supervisory review could be brought at any time after the contested judicial decisions 
came into force, even years later. In view of this uncertainty about the time-limits for 
reviewing judicial decisions in the supervisory instance, the starting point for the calculation 
of the six-month time-limit was unclear. Apart from that, in accordance with Articles 401.8(3) 
and 412.5(3) UPK those specific powers of the President or Deputy President of the Supreme 
Court to overrule the decision of the judge to refuse to transfer the complaint to a supervisory 
review court, regarding which the ECtHR expressed its discontent, were sustained and not 
restricted by time constraints. 
 
From 11 January 2015 when Federal Law N518-FZ,989 which amended Articles 401.2 and 
     ______________________________ 
986  Federal Law N174-FZ ‘Ugolovno-Protzessualnii Kodeks Rossiskoi Federatzii’ [Code of Criminal 
Procedure of the Russian Federation] 18 December 2001 // RG N249, 22 December 2001. 
987  Berdzenishvili (n 962), s ‘Law’. 
988  Federal Law N433-FZ ‘O Vnesenii Izmenenii v Ugolovno-Protzessualnii Kodeks Rossiskoi Federatzii y 
Priznanii Utrativshimi Silu Otdelnih Zakonodatelnih Aktov (Polozhenii Zakonodatelnih Aktov) Rossiskoi 
Federatzii’ [On Amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation and the 
Annulment of Certain Legislative Acts (Provisions of Legislative Acts) of the Russian Federation] 29 
December 2010 // RG N5376 (297), 31 December 2010. 
989  Federal Law N518-FZ ‘O Vnesenii Izmenenii v Statyi 401.2 y 412.2 Ugolovno-Protzessualnogo Kodeksa 
Rossiskoi Federatzii y Priznanii Utrativshimi Silu Otdelnih Polozhenii Zakonodatelnih Aktov Rossiskoi 
Federatzii’ [On Amendments to Articles 401.2 and 412.2 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian 
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412.2 UPK, entered into force, the time-limit of one year for lodging cassation and 
supervisory appeals after contested judicial decisions became final was abolished. Given that 
this may undermine the principle of legal certainty, the probability that the ECtHR would 
recognise these procedures as effective domestic remedies for the purposes of Article 35(1) of 
the Convention is low.  
 
In Kashlan v Russia of 19 April 2016, the ECtHR evaluated the effectivenesss of renewed 
cassation proceeding. 990  Having emphasised that by removing the time-limit for lodging 
cassation appeals the binding judicial acts could be challenged for an indefinite period, the 
ECtHR came to the conclusion that the cassation procedure as amended in 2014 did not 
represent an effective legal remedy that had to be exhausted before filing a complaint with 
this Court.991 It seems thus that the Strasbourg Court will similarly not recognise the new 
supervisory review as an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 35(1) of the ECHR, and 
so applicants should lodge their complaints with the ECtHR without awaiting the outcome of 
these proceedings. 
 
 3.4.3	Constitutional	complaint	mechanism		
 
The experience of other contracting parties to the Convention, for instance Spain992 and the 
Federal Republic of Germany,993 has demonstrated that granting access to the courts that are 
empowered to exercise constitutional review considerably increases public trust in the 
national judicial system. Gerhard Dannemann has argued persuasively that the availability of 
the judicial remedy of a constitutional complaint in domestic legal systems ‘leads to a better 
observation of constitutional rights by the legislature, executive and judiciary’, and ‘marks an 
important step in the protection of human rights’.994  
 
According to the statistics provided by the ECtHR, the number of adverse decisions rendered 
by the ECtHR in respect of Spain since its jurisdiction was accepted in 1979 is very low, 
    _______________________________ 
Federation and Declaring Invalid Certain Provisions of Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation] 31 
December 2014 // RG N1, 12 January 2015. 
990  Kashlan v Russia App no 60189/15 (ECHR, 19 April 2016). 
991  ibid, para 29 s ‘Law’. 
992  Castells v Spain (1992) Series A 236, paras 24-32. 
993  X v Germany App No 8499/79 (Commission Decision, 7 October 1980). 
994  Gerhard Dannemann, ‘Constitutional Complaints: The European Perspective’ (1994) 43(1) Intl & Comp 
LQ 142, 144, 152. 
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which could be explained by the effective functioning of the domestic judicial system for the 
protection of fundamental rights.995  Mercedes Candela Soriano observes that since Italy does 
not provide a legal remedy equal to that of the Spanish amparo appeal that empowers the 
Spanish Constitutional Court to address alleged violations of fundamental rights embedded in 
the Spanish Constitution 996  prior to submission of applications by individuals to the 
Strasbourg Court, the number of complaints brought against it at the ECtHR has been 
greater.997 
 
In Germany, the constitutional complaint procedure, as accentuated by Sebastian Müller and 
Christoph Gusy, is very popular and, due to the FCC’s broad competences, it forms a 
powerful mechanism and the majority of violations of human rights are redressed at the 
national level.998 A comparatively small number of adverse judgments handed down by the 
Strasbourg Court in respect of Germany was seen ‘as a direct corollary of the FCC’s 
individual complaint procedure’.999 According to the statistical data provided by the FCC for 
the period between 17 September 1951 and 31 December 2015, the total number of 
constitutional complaints was 209,374, of which 4,872 were successful.1000 In 2015 alone, of 
5,884 constitutional complaints submitted to the FCC, 111 were successful.1001  
 
Under Article 93(1) [4a] of the Basic Law and Article 90(1) of the Law ‘On the FCC’ any 
individual may lodge a constitutional complaint with the FCC to verify whether the act of a 
public authority, which might be a judgment of a court, a legislation or an administrative act, 
complies with the provisions of the Basic Law. A complaint against a judicial decision must 
be submitted to the FCC within one month of the receipt of the decision,1002 after other 
remedies available in the domestic legal system have been exhausted.1003 
 
Given that the FCC may overturn decisions of the courts based on an unconstitutional law and 
     ______________________________ 
995  Statistics (n 48); J A Carrillo Salcedo, ‘The International Dimension of Human Rights During the Political 
Transition in Spain’ (1991) 1 Spanish YB Intl L 8-9. 
996  Constitución Española [Spanish Constitution] 29 December 1978, BOE no 311-1. 
997  Mercedes Candela Soriano, ‘The Reception Process in Spain and Italy’ in Sweet and Keller (n 65) 396, 397. 
998  Müller (n 30) 29, 43. 
999  ibid 30. 
1000  FCC, Annual Statistics (2015) 4 
<http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Verfahren/Jahresstatistiken/2015/statistik_2015_node.html
> accessed 24 October 2016. 
1001  ibid 20. 
1002  BVerfGG (n 124), art 93 (1). 
1003  ibid, art 90 (2). 
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has the power to quash those legal acts,1004 it has been argued that ‘a single person can alter 
domestic legislation through a constitutional complaint’.1005 Thus, the FCC, by guaranteeing 
individuals the possibility of restoring constitutional rights at the national level, considerably 
reduces the need to take cases to the ECtHR. However, in constitutional systems such as those 
of Russia and Poland, which do not make such an effective domestic legal remedy as a direct 
constitutional complaint procedure available to their citizens, their access to this powerful 
judicial institution for the protection of human rights is still restricted. Due to remaining 
constraints on the object of a constitutional complaint, the position of the applicants in 
constitutional proceedings is weak, as will be discussed below.  
 
The RCC, established in 1994, has proved to be an effective mechanism for improving the 
national legislation and securing protection of constitutional rights of individuals. 1006  In 
accordance with Article 125 of the Russian Constitution and Article 3(1) FKZ ‘On the RCC’, 
the Court, as a body of constitutional control, is empowered to resolve questions of the 
conformity of federal legislation and certain other normative acts with the Constitution. Given 
that the decisions of the courts are not listed among the acts of which the constitutionality 
could be verified, individuals are only granted the right to lodge an appeal with the RCC 
pursuant to Article 96 FKZ ‘On the RCC’ alleging a violation of constitutional rights and 
freedoms by the legal act that was applied in a particular case. This has to be filed within one 
year of the decision being issued, as stipulated in Article 97 FKZ ‘On the RCC’. Having 
accepted the complaint for consideration, the RCC notifies the court that applied the contested 
legal act in its decision and the body executing the court’s decision, which might suspend its 
execution until the RCC hands down its ruling.1007  Under Article 87 FKZ ‘On the RCC’, the 
challenged law or its provisions if recognised unconstitutional, will be repealed, and the case 
will be subject to review by the competent authority.1008 
 
The mere fact that a law does not comply with an international treaty of the Russian 
Federation that has come into force does not provide the basis for acceptance of the request 
for a constitutional judicial review, as the RCC is only authorised to examine the 
constitutionality of international treaties of the Russian Federation prior to their entry into 
     ______________________________ 
1004  ibid, art 95 (2), (3). 
1005  Müller and Gusy (n 30) 30. 
1006  See, eg, Alexei Trochev, Judging Russia: Constitutional Court in Russian Politics, 1990-2006 (CUP 
2008). 
1007 BVerfGG (n 124), art 98.  
1008  ibid, art 100 subpara 2. 
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legal force.1009 Therefore, verification of compliance with international obligations of the 
Russian Federation does not fall within the competence of the RCC.1010 
 
In Tumilovich the ECtHR pointed out that a refusal by the RCC to accept the case for 
consideration, due to a lack of competence, was not relevant for determining the jurisdiction 
of the ECtHR.1011 That part of the application was outside of the ECtHR’s ratione personae 
and in accordance with Article 35(4) of the Convention was rejected as not compatible with 
the provisions of the Convention.  
 
Since it has not so far been clarified whether it is compulsory to have recourse to the RCC 
before lodging complaints with the ECtHR, the effectiveness of this legal remedy in the 
context of Article 35(1) of the Convention remains to be determined. In approaching this 
issue, the RCC has declared in its Resolution N6-O of 13 January 2000 that in Dudnik the 
constitutional proceedings did not constitute one of the domestic legal remedies that must be 
exhausted before applying to international judicial bodies for the protection of human rights 
and freedoms.1012 Apparently, this is why the provision of Article 79(1) FKZ ‘On the RCC’, 
stipulating that the decisions of the RCC are not subject to appeal, did not prevent individuals 
from having recourse to international judicial mechanisms.  
 
No decision of the ECtHR has so far been found that would illuminate whether an appeal to 
the RCC was recognised as an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 35(1) of the 
Convention, although in Lebedev v Russia1013 the ECtHR touched on this issue. In dismissing 
the Government’s objection based on the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, because the 
case was brought before the RCC which delivered its ruling in the applicant’s favour on 22 
March 2005,1014 the ECtHR found that the declaration was made with a delay of almost four 
     ______________________________ 
1009  Russian Constitution (n 532), art 125 (2); FKZ ‘On the RCC’ (n 597), art 3(1). 
1010  RCC, Resolution N139-O of 4 December 1997 ‘Ob otkaze v prinyatii k rassmotreniyu zaprosa Soveta 
Federatzii o porverke konstitutzionnosti Federalnogo Zakona ‘O Perevodnom y Prostom Veksele’ [On 
refusal to accept for consideration the request of the Federation Council for review of the constitutionality 
of the Federal Law ‘A Bill of Exchange and Note’], para 4 subpara 2. 
1011  Tumilovich (n 952), para 2. 
1012  Resolution of the RCC N6-O of 13 January 2000 (n 601), para 5. 
1013  Lebedev v Russia (2008) 47 EHRR 34. 
1014  RCC, Resolution N4-P of 22 March 2005 ‘Po delu o proverke konstitutzionnosti ryada polozhenii 
Ugolovno-Processualnogo Kodeksa Rossiskoi Federatzii, reglamentiruyuwih poryadok y sroki 
primeneniya v kachestve meri presecheniya zaklyucheniya pod strazhu na stadiyah ugolovnogo 
sudoproizvodstva, sleduyuwih za okonchaniem predvaritelnogo rassledovaniya y napravleniem 
ugolovnogo dela v sud, v svyazi s zhalobami ryada grazhdan’ [On verification of  constitutionality of 
certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation regulating the terms of 
application of detention as a preventive measure on the stages of criminal proceedings following the end 
of the preliminary investigation and transferring the criminal case to the court in connection with 
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months after the decision on the admissibility of the complaint was adopted.1015 The ECtHR 
has clarified that the Government’s concern that the case had not been yet resolved at the 
national level by the RCC could have been relevant, if the respondent state had raised the plea 
of non-exhaustion in the interests of the proper administration of justice from the very 
beginning.1016  This has left open the question of whether recourse to the RCC, at least in 
some circumstances, is deemed to be an effective remedy in the context of Article 35(1) of the 
Convention.  
 
In much the same way as in the Russian legal system, it is stipulated in Article 79 of the 
Polish Constitution that: 
 ‘everybody whose constitutional freedoms and rights have been infringed, 
shall have the right to appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal for its 
judgment on the conformity to the Constitution of a statute or another 
normative act upon which basis a court or organ of public administration 
has made a final decision on his freedoms or rights or on his obligations 
specified in the Constitution’.  
 
Pursuant to Article 47.1 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act,1017 individual’s complaint alleging 
the unconstitutionality of a domestic legal act may be lodged within three months of the date 
when the final judgment was obtained, after all national legal remedies have been exhausted. 
Under Article 190 of the Polish Constitution, if the Constitutional Tribunal finds that the 
statutory provision which constituted the basis for the final judicial decision is 
unconstitutional, it will be repealed, and individual will be provided with a right to request the 
Constitutional Tribunal enable reopening of the procedure or revise it. However, since 
individuals cannot directly claim before the Polish Constitutional Tribunal that a decision of 
the court has infringed their constitutional rights, this considerably restricts their access to 
constitutional justice in Poland. 
 
Given that only ‘available remedies’, which are ‘accessible, capable of providing redress in 
respect of the applicant’s complaints’ should be exhausted in order to meet the requirement of 
Article 35(1) of the Convention,1018 the ECtHR held in Szott-Medyńska and Others v Poland 
that the constitutional review proceeding would be recognised as an effective remedy for the 
purposes of the Convention in a situation where the challenged decision of the court had 
    _______________________________ 
complaints of a number of citizens] // RG N3735, 1 April 2005. 
1015  Lebedev (n 1013), para 38. 
1016  ibid [39]-[40]. 
1017  Ustawa o Trybunale Konstytucyjnym [Constitutional Tribunal Act] 22 July 2016, DzU poz 1157. 
1018  Abramyan (n 966), para 74 
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directly applied the unconstitutional norm of the national legislation, and where procedural 
legislation provided for the possibility of either reopening of the case or overturning it based 
on the judgment delivered by the Constitutional Tribunal.1019 The ECtHR has made it clear 
that the possibility exists that the constitutional appeal can be recognised as an effective 
remedy in the Polish legal system in the context of Article 35(1) of the Convention. It is thus 
significant to address remaining limitations on lodging a constitutional complaint in order to 
guarantee to Polish citizens that their applications to the ECtHR will not be rejected for the 
reason of non-exhaustion of available domestic legal remedies.  
 
As long as access of individuals to constitutional justice in Poland is obstructed, the 
constitutional complaint procedure will obviously continue to be less popular and effective 
than in Germany,1020 which may explain the increasing number of applications against Poland 
submitted to the ECtHR. As Gerhard Dannemann has argued, ‘limiting constitutional 
complaints would simply shift the workload from national courts’ to the ECtHR,1021 and so it 
is of great importance to strengthen the functioning of the constitutional complaint 
mechanism in all those countries where individuals still lack access to such a ‘highly effective 
means of legal protection of fundamental rights and freedoms’.1022  That lessons should be 
learned from the best practices of the contracting parties to the Convention that have managed 
to secure applicants’ right to lodge complaints with the courts having the power of 
constitutional review not only against the statute or any other normative act that can be 
questioned as unconstitutional, but also against judicial decisions where a violation of the 
Convention is alleged. This will undoubtedly improve the position of individuals in 
constitutional proceedings and grant petitioners an opportunity to seek redress for a violation 
of their fundamental rights first before domestic courts.  
 
Given that there is no recognised legal practice requiring individuals to file a constitutional 
complaint before bringing a case to the ECtHR, applicants are recommended not to take into 
consideration the possibility of recourse to the courts exercising the power of constitutional 
review when they determine the six-month time-limit. 
 
 
     ______________________________ 
1019  Szott-Medyńska and Others v Poland App no 47414/99 (Decision as to the admissibility, 9 October 2003, 
not reported), s ‘Law’ (b). 
1020  Krzyzanowska-Mierzewska (n 837) 73. 
1021  Dannemann (n 994) 152. 
1022 ibid 151. 
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3.5	Chapter	summary	
 
This сhapter has examined the changing nature of the ECtHR’s powers. It has discussed how, 
from the moment the ECtHR started applying the PJP in its jurisprudence, it became more 
constitutionalised. It was observed that in exercising its adjudicatory authority the Strasbourg 
Court went beyond the frame of consideration of individual case towards examining structural 
problems at the national level that were giving rise to the increasing number of repetitive 
cases at the ECtHR. The analysis of the process of implementation of pilot judgments in the 
legal systems of Poland, Germany and Russia has shown that, in cases where state authorities 
have demonstrated willingness to bring about the necessary changes to national legislation 
and administrative practices to meet the Convention standards, the PJP has had a positive 
effect on the resolution of persistent problems identified in domestic legal systems. 
 
However, the legitimacy of the PJP being used in this way is still being questioned, as its 
application might undermine the sovereignty of the states and also limit individuals’ right of 
access to the ECtHR, as guaranteed by Article 34 ECHR, pending the adoption of the required 
measures by the states to deal with systematic problems. It was suggested that the ECtHR, if it 
intends to apply this procedure more widely in the future, rethinks the approach it adopts for 
reducing the caseload of the Court. 
 
The effective implementation of judgments of the Strasbourg Court is among the principal 
objectives of the Convention’s control mechanism. Its principal purpose, which is to ensure 
compliance of member states with the ECHR guarantees, will not be achieved if the same 
type of violation continues to occur after a breach has been found. The chapter highlighted 
that the member states, as the main actors responsible for addressing and seeking long-lasting 
solutions to identified structural problems, should take the most active role in enforcing the 
judgments of the ECtHR to ease the backlog of cases and to achieve the best possible progress 
in the development of human rights standards.  
 
Considering the examples of several contracting parties to the Convention, it was illustrated 
that there is an urgent need to improve the effectiveness of domestic judicial remedies in their 
legal systems as the remaining uncertainties in the legal regulation may have a destabilising 
effect on the protection of fundamental rights by domestic institutions. This would not only 
reassure individuals that violations of their fundamental rights could be redressed ‘at home’, 
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but would also minimise the negative consequences of the ECtHR being overloaded with 
complaints that indicate the existence of a systemic problem at the national level. Member 
states should rapidly address identified by the ECtHR deficiencies of domestic judicial review 
mechanisms and strengthen the position of individuals in constitutional proceedings in order 
to facilitate their access to justice.  
 
Having established such filters, the protection of fundamental rights by means of domestic 
judicial institutions would be further enhanced and a large number of cases would be 
adjudicated at the national level. Governments would, firstly, prevent any intrusion into their 
legal orders by external judicial mechanism and, secondly, increase the responsibility of state 
officials arising from obligations that are accepted under international law. If successful, this 
would reinforce the national system of fundamental rights protection and decrease the 
probability of the ECtHR rendering new pilot judgments. 
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CONCLUSION	
 
The analysis of the complex nature of the interactions between the ECtHR, the CJEU and the 
courts of the ECHR member states has revealed a lack of jurisdictional coordination between 
them that causes contradictions in their judicial practices. Since the resolution of the problem 
of jurisdictional competition has significant practical implications, it was the purpose of this 
study to contribute to improving the dialogue between these courts and to bridge the gap 
between the national, European and international judicial protection of fundamental rights. 
Having demonstrated the need to develop coherent approaches to reducing jurisdictional 
overlaps, this study has provided several suggestions as to how to avoid further tensions 
between these judicial actors operating in a multilevel system. 
 
By examining judicial practices of the courts, this study arrived at the conclusion that a 
further search for balance in these interconnections is required: firstly, to tackle the 
jurisdictional conflicts that occur in the process of interaction between the CJEU and the 
courts of the member states; secondly, to harmonise the relationship between the CJEU and 
the ECtHR, particularly in light of the anticipated accession of the EU to the ECHR; and 
thirdly, to prevent new confrontations between the ECtHR and the courts of the ECHR 
member states and the problems that arise from the application of the PJP. These points will 
be briefly touched on again here. 
 
As far as the partnership between the CJEU and the courts of the member states is concerned, 
the study has provided evidence of the competing jurisdiction of these judicial institutions in 
resolving disputes on fundamental rights. In striving to determine the perspectives of 
interactions between the CJEU and domestic courts, the author examined the mechanisms by 
which these courts control each other’s increasing powers. The results have confirmed that, 
even if the state concerned has accepted in principle the supremacy of EU law, when the EU 
operates within the limits of its powers, the courts of the member states reserve the right to 
supervise the activities of EU institutions by conducting a review of EU legislation. If it was 
revealed that the competences of the EU were exceeded, the national courts would declare any 
EU ultra vires act inapplicable in the national legal system. The CJEU, in turn, also has a 
leverage over the national judiciary. As discussed within the context of Köbler, the Court has 
asserted that member states will be held liable for any actions of the domestic courts that were 
undertaken in breach of obligations originating from EU law, and will be obliged to 
compensate individuals who have suffered personal loss. 
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Despite such a restricted mode of cooperation, it has been demonstrated that a certain degree 
of convergence of judicial practices between these courts was achieved through the use of the 
preliminary ruling procedure, which contributed enormously to the consistent interpretation of 
EU law by the national judiciary and to the development of common standards on certain 
legal issues. There is no doubt as to its growing effect on the integration of EU legislation into 
the legal orders of member states. The domestic courts should make use of the preliminary 
ruling procedure in a more systematic and consistent way to secure the uniform application of 
EU law and to build a long-lasting partnership with the CJEU. If national courts when 
deciding cases involving EU law show willingness to recognise the principle of supremacy of 
EU law, the CJEU when adjudicating cases would be expected to attach due weight to the 
constitutional identities of the member states and to be more attentive to those solutions 
adopted at the national level by revising its own position when required. This will help to 
exclude potential contradictions between the courts and harmonise their relationship. 
 
As regards the collaboration between the CJEU and the ECtHR, the study has revealed a 
sizeable expansion of the scope of the compulsory jurisdiction of the two courts. It has been 
argued that, since the creation of the EEC, the powers of the Court of Justice have been 
transformed to the extent that the focus has shifted from economic cases to fundamental rights 
issues. The study has highlighted that the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty have made 
tangible progress in coordinating cooperation between the courts, and have played a crucial 
role in ensuring effective protection of fundamental rights by these institutions. The key 
changes were, first, assigning the EUCFR the status of EU primary law and, second, 
providing a legal basis for the participation of the EU in the Convention mechanism. The 
continuous application by public authorities of the EUCFR, which in Article 52(3) made a 
considerable step towards promoting a peaceful relationship with the ECHR, taken in 
combination with the accession of the EU to the ECHR, would have a beneficial effect on the 
development of coherent approaches to the interpretation of fundamental rights by the CJEU 
and the ECtHR. 
 
Having discussed several controversial provisions of the Accession Agreement, the author has 
argued that at this point it remains problematic to pursue this idea, unless the concerns of the 
CJEU expressed in Opinion 2/13 that the anticipated accession might affect the powers of EU 
institutions, are addressed through subsequent negotiations. It was emphasised that the 
distinctive nature of the EU legal system and competences of the CJEU and could be secured, 
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if the mechanism of prior involvement of the EU judicial mechanisms in the resolution of 
cases in which EU law matters are at issue is set up. This seems now even more feasible in 
view of the broad list of fundamental rights existing in the EU. 
 
Emphasising the importance of moving towards deeper integration by overcoming these 
obstacles, the study presented possible scenarios of the interactions between the CJEU and the 
ECtHR, once the accession of the EU to the Convention is completed. Even if a sensible 
degree of judicial harmony in the relationship between the courts is already achieved through 
the application of the equivalent protection doctrine, it would not seem practical to take this 
approach further. Considering that the ‘Bosphorus presumption’, which for a long period 
contributed to maintaining a peaceful cooperation between the two regimes, is likely to be 
abandoned on the finalisation of the accession, in order to strengthen the protection of 
fundamental rights the EU would be expected to accede to the ECHR ‘on an equal footing 
with the other contracting parties’.1023 
 
Given that there could emerge the problem of concurrent jurisdiction between the courts, it 
was presumed that in such a case the CJEU, which is charged with the functions of 
interpreting EU acts and adjudicating on their validity, would hold in respect of the EU the 
same status as that of the national constitutional courts, and thus would sustain its role as a 
guarantor of the unity of the EU legal system. Otherwise, the hypothetical situation of a 
subordination between the courts would probably undermine the authority of the CJEU and 
the coherence of EU law. In any event, given the subsidiary character of the Convention 
system which does not allow it to intrude into the national legal orders of the contracting 
parties, any interference with the Union’s autonomous legal order would similarly be 
excluded if a violation of the Convention’s provisions is detected. Accordingly, it will fall 
within the scope of the discretion of the EU to select the proper ways of complying with the 
Convention’s requirements and most efficiently implementing the judgments of the ECtHR in 
its legal order.  
 
The problem of jurisdictional competition has also been revealed in the relationship between 
the ECtHR and the courts of the ECHR member states. The analysis of the effects of 
judgments of the ECtHR on the legal systems of Poland, Germany and Russia demonstrated 
that national authorities do not always entirely comply with their obligations under the 
     ______________________________ 
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Convention, which was the major reason for judicial conflicts that were emerging between the 
courts, particularly in those cases where the implementation of judgments of the ECtHR could 
run counter to the fundamental principles of the national legal orders. Member states, in 
reserving a power to block the execution of these judgments, will be strongly criticised by the 
ECtHR for a failure to adhere to obligations under the ECHR, and so this may bring into 
question the further participation of states in the Convention mechanism. Only if judicial 
institutions operate within the limits of the authority vested in them, will the constructive 
collaboration be achieved and further clashes between them are excluded. 
 
It seems thus prudent to encourage the ECHR member states to properly translate their 
obligations under international treaty into domestic legal orders,1024 and to coordinate their 
actions in accordance with the requirements of the ECHR. In bringing national legislation and 
practices in line with the Strasbourg case law, national authorities will not only demonstrate 
greater receptivity to the Convention, but also increase their trustworthiness. The ECtHR 
would then be expected to avoid any intrusion into states’ sovereignty, attach considerable 
attention to national identities of the contracting parties to the Convention, and leave them 
sufficient discretion in balancing conflicting rights.  
 
To pursue a healthy dialogue, the courts have to cooperate and ‘learn how […] not just to co-
exist’, 1025  otherwise an increasing lack of mutual understanding between them might 
compromise the rule of law. It has been observed that since the contracting parties to the 
ECHR were not always willingly implementing judgments of the Strasbourg Court and 
reviewing their legal systems in light of its case law, the structrural problems in their legal 
orders became evident due to systematic non-compliance with the obligations under the 
ECHR, leading to a continuous flow of applications to the ECtHR. The absence of responses 
of the member states to the ECtHR’s judgments could endanger the effective functioning of 
the Convention’s control mechanism, and this has inspired the ECtHR to start using the PJP. 
 
The examples of the impact of the pilot judgments on the national legal systems of Poland, 
Germany and Russia suggest that the application of the PJP has had a positive effect as it has 
encouraged member states to introduce amendments to the national legislation and initiate 
changes in judicial practices to resolve long-standing legal anomalies revealed by the ECtHR, 
     ______________________________ 
1024  Nolte (n 946) 5. 
            1025  Sonia Morano-Foadi and Stelios Andreadakis, ‘The Convergence of the European Legal System in the 
Treatment of Third Country Nationals in Europe: The ECJ and ECtHR Jurisprudence’ (2011) 22(4) EJIL 
1071, 1088. 
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and to avoid further violations of the ECHR. It has been argued that since the respondent 
states, in bearing primary responsibility for the protection of fundamental rights, are free to 
choose how to redress identified violations in their legal orders, the Strasbourg system of 
fundamental rights protection, which has a subsidiary character, is not authorised to prescribe 
to the state concerned what remedial measures are to be adopted at the national level to rectify 
systemic problems. National authorities have thus shown reluctance to adopt structural 
reforms recommended by the ECtHR to overcome complex obstacles to full compliance with 
their obligations under the Convention. It became evident that the PJP, as an instrument for 
coping with the high workload of the ECtHR, did not completely meet its expectations as this 
eventually led to an increased number of repetitive cases at the ECtHR. 
 
Having highlighted that the application of the PJP in its current form could be detrimental to 
the sovereignty of states and to individuals’ status before the ECtHR, an alternative approach 
to alleviating the ECtHR’s burden of cases has been proposed, which is focused on improving 
the judicial protection of fundamental rights at the national level. If the contracting parties to 
the Convention address shortly revealed by the ECtHR deficiencies in the domestic judicial 
review procedures and strengthen the effectiveness of the constitutional complaint 
mechanism, which has proved to be one of the most efficient tools for securing the 
Convention rights, individuals will be assured that their rights and freedoms are properly 
guaranteed by their national judicial institutions. There has been successful experience of the 
constitutional complaint mechanism in states where individuals could exercise their right to 
appeal judicial decisions before the courts authorised to exercise constitutional review, and 
this should be transposed into those countries where several restrictions on their access to 
these courts still exist. By improving the position of the complainants in constitutional 
proceedings and allowing them to seek redress before the domestic courts, the number of 
cases brought to the ECtHR would be significantly reduced.  
 
Even if certain patterns of conflict between the CJEU, the ECtHR and the courts of the ECHR 
member states could be seen, positive tendencies in their relationships were also clearly 
visible as these judicial institutions engage in a dialogue with each other to regulate their 
competing jurisdictions1026 and sustain sufficient levels of convergence in interpretation of 
fundamental rights norms. Sabino Cassese argues that ‘proliferation of national, supranational 
     ______________________________ 
1026  Tzanakopoulus (n 759) 74. 
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and global courts obliges judges to attend to their respective and reciprocal interaction’1027 
through adhering to best practices at different levels. This suggests that only by taking joint 
steps in this direction will the courts explicitly demonstrate their willingness to repress in 
certain cases their interests for the promotion of mutual understanding between them and 
overcoming new challenges in their interactions.1028  
 
To ensure proper functioning of the examined judicial institutions and guarantee individuals 
effective protection of their fundamental rights it is important to deal with the problem of 
jurisdictional competition. The lack of coordination between the courts in Europe may risk 
undermining their credibility. In order to increase their legitimacy there must be a constant 
search for balance in judicial interactions, therefore it is vital to keep analysing the courts’ 
judicial practices to determine how the process of mutual learning evolves and whether these 
judicial bodies take meaningful steps to further strengthen their cooperation. This apparently 
would require verifying whether, on the one hand, the warnings of the courts of the ECHR 
member states are duly taken into consideration by the CJEU and the ECtHR, and whether, on 
the other hand, the judgments of the European courts are given the corresponding value in the 
national legal systems, so that their fruitful long-term collaboration is guaranteed. Only if an 
open and respectful dialogue is maintained, will the protection of individuals be strengthened 
and potential jurisdictional conflicts between the courts are avoided. 
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
     ______________________________ 
1027  Sabino Cassese, ‘The Constellation of Global and National Courts: Jurisdictional Redundancy and 
Interchange’ in Anja Seibert-Fohr and Mark Villiger (eds), Judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights: Effects and Implementation (Nomos 2014) 162. 
1028  Fontanelli and Martinico (n 24) 89-91. 
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